Rationale: We support this proposal, which we believe is an improvement on the previous cycle. In principle, we believe that it is necessary to use part of the UNI treasury to increase the VP of the most active delegates aligned with the protocol, as in previous votes it has been very difficult to achieve the necessary quorum for onchain votes, so not renewing the treasury delegation could mean a risk of governance paralysis. The ideal situation would be to achieve genuine tokenholder participation in voting or delegation, but until that happens the DAO must take steps to avoid governance paralysis, and this measure is appropriate.
We also thank @Tane for taking feedback from other delegates and the community and improving the original proposal. We believe it is reasonable that the delegates who qualify for the treasury delegation should be the most active delegates (based on the parameters of the delegate programme), as this is a relatively objective way of selecting those who qualify, without subjectivity or elections that could lead to cartelisation or undesirable arrangements.
The amount of 18M is also adequate to increase the current amount and to further ensure the chances of achieving a quorum for on-chain proposals.
Rationale: We support this proposal, as BOB has prioritized Uniswap as the canonical DEX in its ecosystem, a type of alignment we consider particularly valuable and beneficial for the protocol. We recognize that BOB is a new L2, which brings inherent risks, such as the potential for incentives to drive short-term activity without long-term impact. However, given the growth of BTC DeFi and BOBâs positioning as the leading EVM L2 for BTC for BTC LSTs, we see strong potential in this chain. In this context, allocating incentives here appears to be a real opportunity to drive meaningful growth for both BOB and Uniswap within the network. We also view BOBâs $500k incentive matching commitment over the next six months very positively, especially as it exceeds the amount requested from Uniswap.
Rationale: We support this proposal, which aims to structure and streamline the licensing process to make the deployment of Uniswap v4 contracts more efficient, accessible and agile. We believe this is essential for the protocolâs growth, driving adoption, increasing market share, and maintaining Uniswapâs historic position as a leader in the space.
Rationale: We voted in favor of this proposal based on the same reasoning we provided when voting on Snapshot. While we do have some concerns due to BOB being a new network with low TVL, we see in this case a strong potential in its value proposition and believe the incentive match is appropriate.
Below, we quote the rationale from our Snapshot vote, as we maintain the position expressed there::
Rationale: The UAC has done an great job over the past 3 seasons, becoming a key player for Uniswap DAO, both in the deployment to new chains and in the operational management and accountability of approved programs budgets and DAO multisigs. For this reason, we support its renewal for Season 4. We agree with the proposed five-member structure, with two rotating seats, as it ensures continuity while onboarding new members. We also support the projected increase in working hours, which makes sense given the expanded scope of responsibilities observed throughout the past seasons.
Rationale: We support this proposal, as the program budgets were approved in USD, yet payments are being made in UNI. The decline in the UNI tokenâs value has led to a imbalance in the approved budgets, making the proposed rebalancing a sensible step to restore financial alignment.
Rationale: In line with our Snapshot vote, we support this proposal as it seeks to structure and streamline the licensing process, enabling a more efficient, accessible, and agile deployment of Uniswap v4 contracts.
We quote the rationale from our Snapshot vote, as we maintain the position expressed there:
Rationale: We appreciate the efforts made by @Tane in the seeking of the necessary consensus. While we found the previous proposal to be appropriate, this new updated version seems to us to be a good and solid middle ground, as it addresses all the concerns discussed in the forum and synthesises them into a reasonable proposal. We will therefore support this new proposal.
We would like to reiterate part of our rationale from the previous snapshot vote as it reflects our view on the substance of the proposal:
Rationale: We support this proposal, as Oku has proven to be a key tool on chains where Uniswap lacks an official front-end. Additionally, on chains where Uniswap is already present, having an alternative front-end like Oku brings valuable benefits as it mitigates regulatory and censorship risks and removes a single point of failure. The requested budget seems somewhat high, but within the bounds of reasonable.
Rationale: We are abstaining from this vote for several reasons:
First, the previous Force-funded project covering 4 chains (Arbitrum, Base, Blast, and Scroll) was presented only a month and a half ago in 20 March, which we believe is too early to assess whether it had the intended impact and utility for the DAO and protocol in shaping incentive policies. At this point, expanding the projectâs funding without understanding the impact of the previous phase seems premature.
Regarding the proposed chains, we only see potential value in gathering the proposed metrics on Unichain. However, we see limited value in the remaining chains since, according to DeFiLlama, they have very low DeFi TVL: Linea (rank 34), Mantle (27), Zksync (46), Sei (14), Manta (82), Moonbeam (103), and Polygon zkEVM (135).
While we do see value in Unichain metrics, we notice a potential overlap with the dashboard that Uniswap Foundation and Gauntlet have committed to providing in relation to the recently launched incentive program:
We would like to hear the proposerâs view on this potential overlap. If no overlap exists, we may reconsider our vote during the onchain voting process to support Force for Unichain, with an adjusted cost due to the reduced scope to a single chain.
Rationale: In line with our Snapshot vote, we support this proposal, as Oku has demonstrated its value as a critical tool on chains where Uniswap lacks an official front-end. Even on networks where Uniswap is already established, Oku provides meaningful advantages by offering an alternative interfaceâhelping to reduce regulatory and censorship risks while eliminating a single point of failure. While the requested budget appears somewhat high, it remains within a reasonable range.
Rationale: We voted in favor of three candidates whom we believe are well-positioned to contribute effectively to the UAC:
@Sov - 33.3%: Although he doesnât have a recent track record of active participation in the DAO, he has been previously involved, as evidenced by the 2022 report. We believe his background leading grant programs at Gitcoin, serving as a multisig signer in that protocol, and his experience in other governance roles, make him qualified to take on the responsibilities required for the UAC.
Takeshi Ohishi from @Tane - 33.3%: We know Takeshi from other delegations where SEEDGov is active, and we can attest for his professionalism and commitment. Combined with his role in Optimismâs governance, we believe he is a strong candidate to serve on the committee.
Cole Schendl from @404DAO - 33.3%: We consider Cole a highly suitable candidate for the UAC due to his experience in similar roles â including being a signer on 12 Arbitrum multisigs and a member of NEARâs Treasury Manager Working Group â as well as his proven track record as a delegate with 404DAO.
Rationale The change regarding the removal of the Permissionless Licensing Agreement does not alter our initial support for the proposal. Therefore, we vote in favor and reiterate the rationale previously stated, as it still reflects our current position:
Unlike Optimism, and as @AbdullahUmardetailed pointed out, Uniswap DAO does not typically engage in highly technical discussions that would justify a permanent structure dedicated to deep technical advisory.
The requested budget is considerably high, relying on a large structure that could be replaced by an individual service provider or auditor who provides ad-hoc advice and charges by the hour.
We do not agree with creating a 7-member structure where all members have been pre-selected, without giving the DAO the opportunity to run an open process to nominate and elect its own representatives.
RationaleAs we mentioned in the proposal thread, and despite having some reservations about the general effectiveness of incentive campaigns â which often attract opportunistic capital that moves on once rewards end â we believe this specific case is particularly compelling since involves Unichain and Sky, a well-established and reputable OG protocol currently undergoing strong growth and expansion. In this context, a joint campaign on Unichain to attract USDS holders could have a very positive impact on the network, especially if the goal is to build a more sustained presence over time by leveraging Skyâs SSR.
We also support the mechanism of releasing incentives progressively, based on the achievement of concrete milestones. This ensures that funds are not wasted if the campaign fails to deliver meaningful results.