Trial run a Technical Advisory Board (TAB)

[SEEDGov]

We have some concerns regarding this proposal:

• Unlike Optimism and its Developer Advisory Board, and as @AbdullahUmar remarked, Uniswap DAO does not regular engage in technical protocol upgrade discussions that would require a dedicated structure with deep development expertise. Regarding integrations and deployments, the UAC already handles these tasks effectively. As for partnerships, the Foundation plays a leading role, along with Alpha.Growth within the DAO. For all these reasons, we do not believe creating a new structure with the proposed characteristics is necessary.

• Regarding the scope of this new proposed structure:

@jengajojo

Responsibilities:

• Analyze all governance proposals from inception, evaluating the feasibility and impact of proposals which are technical in nature throughout the voting process, while providing timely and insightful feedback.

• Proactively identify and address potential risks or unintended consequences within proposal design

• Vote on all proposals during the 12-month term and provide a brief overview of the TAB’s rationale.

• Translate complex technical concepts into clear and accessible language for non-technical delegates.

• Develop educational resources and explanations to enhance understanding of proposal implications. This could include publishing reports, hosting webinars, and generally simplifying technical concepts to foster community understanding

Except for the last point, we believe that the rest of the listed tasks are inherent responsibilities of all delegates. Delegates are compensated to review proposals, provide feedback, raise concerns when misalignments are detected, and vote — as explicitly stated and approved in the Uniswap DAO Principles. Therefore, we do not believe it is necessary to create a new structure whose responsibilities would largely overlap with those of the delegates.

• Regarding the delegation of V.P. to developers: this issue was already discussed in [RFC] Treasury Delegation Round 2 and did not move forward. We do not agree with introducing it now into this proposal with six pre-selected individuals.

• We also disagree with the approach of creating a seven-member structure where all members have already been chosen, preventing other interested candidates from applying and limiting the DAO’s ability to select its members.

• For all the reasons stated above, we fail to see what concrete value this kind of structure would bring to the DAO, which may be necessary in other DAOs with regular deep technicals scopes, but is not the case for UniswapDAO, especially considering that it would cost 41,800 UNI per year.