Rationale:As we expressed during the debate, we support this proposal as it provides a legal framework for Uniswap governance, enabling it to comply with current regulations without compromising or affecting its decentralization or decision-making process. This will allow both governance and the protocol to scale and operate in the real world, while also granting its members limited liability against potential legal or administrative claims against the DAO.
Rationale: We are voting against this proposal, consistent with our position on similar past proposals, and for the following reasons:
First, as a principle (except for very particular and selective cases), and especially at a time when Uniswap is prioritizing and promoting Unichain, we are against allocating temporary incentives to generate traction in others chains. Evidence shows that TVL tends to grow while incentives are active but quickly returns to pre-incentive levels once they end, as capital moves on to farm elsewhere. This policy therefore leaves no lasting benefit in terms of user growth and ends up being a waste of funds with no sustainable outcome.
Second, we believe that the requested $500k in UNI is far above what comparable networks to Ronin have received, as well as above Uniswap’s own deployment guidelines: new or smaller networks typically request between $125k and $250k, while larger, established networks may receive $500. In this case, the requested amount appears excessive.
Third, according to DeFiLlama, Ronin’s metrics are relatively small: DeFi TVL of $56.4M, stablecoin market cap of $5.7M, and 24h DEX volume of $7.44M. The requested incentives would represent nearly 1% of Ronin’s Total DeFi TVL and nearly 10% of the total stablecoin supply on the network, which we find disproportionate relative to the size of the chain.
While, as stated, we are principally against allocating incentives in this way, we could reconsider if the requested amount were significantly reduced between 125k and $250k.
Rationale: We are voting in favor of this proposal, consistent with the positive feedback we provided during the debate and with our prior vote in Snapshot. We believe that the formalization of Uniswap governance through the proposed DUNI represents a significant step forward in adapting to current regulations, enabling scalability without compromising the DAO’s decision-making processes.
We reproduce our rationale here, as our position remains unchanged:
Rationale: We are voting in favor of this proposal, consistent with our opinion shared during the debate and with our position on a similar previous proposal. While we acknowledge that this is not the ideal solution to the quorum challenge the DAO is facing, we believe it is a necessary measure under the current circumstances. It does not generate any negative effects and can be deprecated once the underlying issue is resolved.
That said, we want to reiterate our opposition to selecting delegates for treasury delegation through a DAO vote, as this favors popular delegates and incentivizes harmful practices such as collusion or cartelization among delegates to vote for themselves. We believe that delegates should instead be ranked based on participation ratios, which is an objective criterion that allocates VP to the most active delegates. We hope this adjustment will be made in the onchain vote.
Rationale: We are voting against this proposal, consistent with the opinion we expressed during the debate. We believe that this initiative will eventually overlap and compete with UVN, currently under development by Uniswap on Unichain, in its effort to attract UNI. This could create an undesired competition in APY to attract UNI. In our view, a smaller-scale 6-month pilot program with a significantly lower budget would have been more appropriate, allowing for renewal every 6 months until the launch of UVN.
Additionally, we want to reiterate our concern regarding a potential conflict of interest between a member of the UAC and the company proposed to develop the IDV system. We do not consider it healthy governance practice for one individual to hold two opposing roles—both evaluating the delivery of a product and authorizing payments to a service provider with which they are directly affiliated.
Rationale: We are voting in favor of this proposal , consistent with the opinion we expressed during the debate and with our Snapshot vote. While we generally have reservations regarding incentive campaigns and their effectiveness once they end, in this particular case we see two key aspects that make it highly favorable and beneficial for Uniswap. First, the incentives will be allocated on Unichain , which we believe should be a top priority. And second, the incentives will be allocated to Sky’s sUSDS/USDS pools and vaults, an OG DeFi protocol, where a strategic alliance like this to drive Unichain adoption is in our view very positive and promising.
Additionally, we strongly support the approach of releasing incentives gradually, tied to the achievement of TVL growth KPIs, as this ensures that funds are only deployed when concrete results are achieved.
Rationale: We are familiar with how they work, both at Uniswap and in other governance, and we recognise their professionalism, seriousness and dedication. We understand that these are delegations that deserve to have more VP and influence in the DAO’s decision-making process.
Rationale: We fully support this proposal. While at SEEDGov we have recently supported the idea that Uniswap’s incentive efforts should currently focus on the growth of Unichain, and we have therefore voted against allocating incentives to smaller or newly launched L2s, since such incentives generally offer poor ROI, with capital leaving immediately after incentives end and TVL collapsing shortly thereafter, providing no lasting benefit to either the chain or Uniswap, we believe Plasma is a clear and compelling exception to that rule.
Plasma is a new chain, but it has the strong backing of Tether, which aims to establish it as a stablecoin chain focused on becoming a payment infrastructure. Its growth has been remarkably fast, yet unlike other networks, we believe this is not a temporary phenomenon: Plasma is here to stay and is on track to become one of the most significant networks in the ecosystem.
For these reasons, we consider it entirely reasonable to deploy incentives to attract users, and we note that the proposed incentives are fully aligned with the UniswapDAO’s own deployment guidelines. We also welcome Plasma’s commitment to allocating no less than $3M of its own incentives. This represents a significant investment and effort on their part, far greater than that proposed by Uniswap. While this is logical, we still applaud that commitment.
Rationale: We voted against the proposal, as we believe that setting such a low threshold of 100 UNI (currently less than USD 600) could lead to unnecessary spam. While this may not cause direct harm, it does create noise and disrupt governance processes.
We also consider that this change would add complexity to the governance framework, since the current process (RFC > temperature check on Snapshot > on-chain voting) would gain an additional and separate channel through the CPF module.
We agree that if this issue were causing significant problems, the proposed mechanism could be an appropriate response. However, this is not currently a pressing or contentious matter within the DAO, unlike the quorum issue, which clearly deserves higher priority. Also, it is common practice for delegates or community members without sufficient VP to secure sponsorship from other delegates who do have the necessary voting power to post proposals on their behalf. While not ideal, this has not created any real blockers nor prevented anyone from submitting a proposal previously discussed in the forum.
