Tané is formed with a group of crypto-native product builders, based in Tokyo, Dubai and New York. We are backed by SoftBank, and Japanese tech giants like DeNA, GREE, MIXI, and closely work with the big Japanese enterprises and have great relationship with Japanese crypto communities.
Our investment arm has invested in and supported various innovating projects that contribute to the decentralized society enabled by the new blockchain technology. Our network operation entity started directly contributing to the ecosystem by being validators for the core infrastructures and protocols that make Web3 move forward and contributors to the DAOs that manage them. We have been active as delegates in dYdX, Arbitrum and Optimism.
Takeshi, Head of Network Operations, who worked for Twitter as a senior software engineer and for SmartNews, a Japanese unicorn startup that provides a news aggregation mobile app with 30M MAU as a product manager, is the main representative of the account.
Disclosure
Our investment arm has invested in a number of projects and we will take appropriate actions if potential conflict of interests arise.
Rationale: As we have posted here, we believe that Gnosis Chain will benefit from more participation and contribution from the Uniswap side. We believe that $250k is a reasonable incentive amount because Linea and Scroll, which have larger TVLs than Gnosis Chain, also received $250k in incentives from Uniswap Revitalization and Growth, and we believe that Gnosis Chain should follow the similar amount to them.
Rationale: We oppose allocating any incentives from the Uniswap DAO to X Layer because the TVL on X Layer is significantly lower than that of other chains which have previously received $250,000 in incentives.
We generally agree on introducing an analytics tooling for the DAO to appropriately evaluate programs that the DAO has set out. Especially for the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program, we were wondering how the DAO evaluates the impact made by the incentives that were distributed to each chain and revisits how we can improve the program and calibrate how we distribute future incentives.
Ideally, creating an RFP based on the requirements that this proposal is addressing, asking for potential service providers to work on it and organizing an election of the SP would be the way to approach this kind of initiatives, but practically, we believe the DAO should accept the best available option by the DAO contributor with the track record.
For the selection of the chains to be analyzed, we choose Base, Scroll, and Blast according to their ranked TVL data and distributed our VP into each equally. 1) We believe with this budget as Wintermute suggested, the dashboard and analytics should cover 4 chains or more. 2) Arbitrum isn’t a part of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program. While Arbitrum is a good chain to analyze on, the DAO should focus on how the program performs based on the data and insights provided by Forse. 3) Why don’t we have BSC as a selection? The DAO distributed 1M and it’s worth looking into the performance of it. If it’s in the selection, we would add BSC for a chain to be supported on the dashboard.
Rationale: We support the deployment of Uniswap v3 and Oku Trade as we recognize the team’s commitment to providing $1M worth of liquidity in the protocol.
Rationale: We appreciate Austin’s proposal to compete with Aerodrome on Base, one of the most important battleground chains. We directionally agree with the proposal to experiment configurations to increase the protocol revenue. In addition to recognizing concerns from other delegates and community members, we would love to see a more concrete plan as it’s marked as an experiment; the plan should articulate 1) how those pools are created with minimized liquidity fragmentations 2) how the protocol reacts to fee changes by Aerodrome 3) how the DAO can evaluate the experiment success. How does the revenue increase from more market shares overweigh the decreases resulted from the lower fee pools? 4) how long the DAO experiments this and make sure the results will be properly evaluated. Who is responsible for the follow-through of the experiment? Looking forward to the complete on-chain proposal for a successful experiment to run for the protocol.
We support this Cycle 2 proposal that allows new delegates like us to apply for and contribute to the DAO governance in a potentially sustainable way. We believe it’s a positive development that the Voting Power requirement has been removed, making it easier for new delegates like us to participate in. The scoring mechanism would be iterated over and the impact the program has been making should be reviewed for the future cycle, though.
Rationale: While we agree that the Ethereum Foundation’s attacathon is trying to solve an important problem, we don’t feel strongly about the significance of sponsorship with such a large sum of money from the Uniswap DAO.
Rationale: we maintain the rational made below for its Snapshot and support the proposal to make a significant impact by applying those changes and monitoring the data.
Rationale: We would have voted abstain if it’s an option because we are one of the options to be chosen, but vote for Both as it’s closest to abstain. As expressed in the comment to the relevant thread, we would like to respect what the DAO decides and the outcome to be ratified on Snapshot.
Rationale: We believe this rebalancing is necessary due to the fluctuation of the UNI token price. We would suggest that the committee should consider adding some buffer for the future programs to the budget so that the DAO doesn’t have to vote on rebalancing again.
We fully support increasing both the number of committee members and working hours per member because the committee that has more responsibilities and commitments should greatly benefit the DAO.
We also believe it’s crucial for the current members to continue serving on the committee, given their contributions so far. We look forward to seeing their continued efforts.
The compensation for the overtime work in Season 2 is fair and necessary, and we consider the additional funding to be justified.
The proposed budget for the committee’s compensations in the upcoming season is essential and should be approved. We would love to start supporting the committee even more in the future.
Summary: Uniswap Accountability Committee (UAC) has proposed a renewal of its operations for Season 3, addressing both budget rebalancing from Season 2 and the new budget for Season 3. If this proposal is approved, two key changes will be implemented; First, the number of UAC members will increase from 4 to 5, and the maximum working hours per month will rise from 10 hours to 30 hours. Second, an additional 84,594 UNI will be transferred to the UAC wallet to cover the operational budget shortfall caused by UNI’s price fluctuations, compensate committee members for their overtime work, and allocate funds to support adding the extra 16th delegate for the delegate reward initiative.
Vote: For
Rationale:
We support this proposal because it addresses the critical operational needs of the Uniswap DAO by renewing the Uniswap Accountability Committee (UAC) for Season 3 with expanded capacity and funding, rebalancing the budgets for Season 2 to account for UNI token price fluctuations, and supporting an extra 16th delegate slot for the Delegate Reward Initiative Cycle 2 to promote broader participation within the DAO; these measures strengthen the DAO’s operational capacity, enhance governance, and support its long-term objectives.
Summary: This proposal aims to onboard ‘Forse’ by StableLab, a data service platform, to analyze the effectiveness of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program (URGP). If approved, a budget of 8,700 UNI (equivalent to $60,000) will be transferred to UAC and rewarded to StableLab at its completion.
Vote: FOR
Rationale: We support the proposal to secure a budget for analyzing the URGP using Forse. We feel that the concerns—such as including more than four chains at the Snapshot stage and that Arbitrum is not included in the URGP—have been resolved through efforts to eliminate budget issues and avoid overlap with Gauntlet. The URGP is a very important project for Uniswap, and we believe that measuring its effectiveness is essential. Initially, we thought that the UAC itself should investigate the feasibility of this project, but we feel that using Forse will allow for a detailed measurement of its effectiveness. We look forward to the detailed analysis results for the DAO to further improve the URGP.
