[RFC] Treasury Delegation Round 2

Requests for Comment
1

Update on March 17, 2025: after our careful examinations of the feedback from the delegates and extensive discussions especially with the UAC members, we have revised the proposal with changes outlined below:

  • The number of delegates for delegations: 12
    • Rationale: 16 is too many compared to 7 in the original program. There are delegates that don’t need VP, and fewer delegates should be qualified for the treasury delegations. We believe 12 is a good middle-ground number.
  • The delegation amount: up to 18M UNI
    • Rationale: Reaching quorum is still an issue, but we should minimize the amount increase from 10M.
  • Distributions: 1M for all selected delegates, additional 1M for Tier 1 delegates
    • All 12 qualified delegates will be chosen by the objective requirements.
    • Top 6 delegates (“Tier 1 delegates”) will be chosen by voting or only by the objective criteria
    • The maximum total VP limit is 1.5M for non-Tier 1 delegates, 2.5M for Tier 1 delegates
    • Rationale: simplify the amounts to be delegated (but hard limits are introduced) compared to the original program, but prioritize the top delegates for more delegations.
  • How to select delegates: based on the objective criteria/metrics/scoring (the DIP Cycle 3 one + VP cut-off)
    • VP cut-off is 1M
    • Utilizing a forum poll to choose how to choose Tier 1 delegates
    • Option 1: Decided by election
    • Option 2: Decided only by the objective criteria
    • Rationale: we should avoid “popularity contest” situation as much as possible and the criteria/metrics/scoring that the DAO utilized for the DIP Cycle 3 delegate selection are good to be reused for this case. The reason that we consider voting on selecting Tier 1 delegates is that we still believe we can capture preferences for delegates to be with more VP delegations by conducting a voting
  • Delegation period: 18 months delegations, but 1 year re-selection for all delegates
    • No time-based cohorts anymore
    • Expiration is set to 18 months for delegations, but promised to do re-selection every year for all delegates
    • Rationale: minimizing the operational burdens makes more sense while expirations of the delegations still happen and the DAO needs to go through the re-selection process every year until the treasury delegation is not needed for the governance.
  • Other additions
    • Added adherence to the DAO Principles as a requirement for the delegate application
    • Added a disclosure statement that we are willing to apply for this program if approved

We are planning to make final adjustments based on the poll and submit the first Snapshot proposal early next week.

Preface

The treasury delegation started in December, 2023 and it’s been successful and critical to keep the governance healthy and retain the talent within the Uniswap DAO.

To improve the program going forward, the community members including the Foundation have engaged in various discussions thus far, and we believe it is crucial to consolidate these to establish a clear direction, and make a proposal for the better program.

Special thanks to @eek637 @SEEDGov and the UAC members for the feedback and review and the ScopeLift team, especially @wildmolasses for the implementation of the delegation expiration.

Background

The DAO started the first treasury delegations as a program called Delegation of UNI to Active but Underrepresented Delegates in December, 2023. According to our analytics we shared in the original round 2 ideas thread, this program has been essential to keep the governance healthy and retain the active and capable delegates. At the same time, the originally promised time period has already passed, but the delegation has been kept as they didn’t have their expirations. In addition, there have been discussions to consider how we proceed with the treasury delegation going forward. Through the process, we have decided to implement an important feature, expirations of the delegations to the Franchiser contract and create a robust system to keep the delegations enabled for the appropriate delegates.

Proposal Summary

We propose allocating up to 18 million UNI of total amount as the treasury delegation, distributing into selected delegates.

We select delegates based on the objective criteria and metrics (the DIP criteria/scoring + VP cut-off) after the application phase. We would then introduce an election to choose the Tier 1 delegates from them.

Once we conclude the program details and delegates with each delegation amount, we will have an onchain vote to ratify the program, apply the delegations with expirations provided by the new implementation by ScopeLift team, and withdraw the original delegations as promised.

NOTE: Since the delegation to developers is in a slightly different context from the delegation to active but under-represented delegates in this program, we will scope it out and think it should proceed as another separate project.

Motivation

Originally, the delegation to underrepresented delegates was intended to promote healthy governance.

To meet the above conditions, the previous treasury delegation assigned 10 million UNI to seven delegates.

Around when the originally promised time period had passed, the discussion about delegation began with a proposal concerning a governance attack.

Based on our preliminary research and the discussions held in the forum regarding the delegation of UNI to active but underrepresented delegates, we have compiled actions that the Uniswap DAO should take from the perspectives of maintaining healthy governance and preventing governance attacks, and have drafted items for voting.

Key Discussion Points

Here, we compile the delegates’ opinions from each thread along with Tané’s perspectives to examine the challenges facing Uniswap DAO and consider the necessary solutions to address them.

Increased Allocation

Starting point of the discussion:

Opinions on the delegation amount:

Tané’s opinion:

Considering that the number of active, but under-represented delegates has increased since the last round, it is reasonable to reduce the cap of UNI to be delegated compared to before.

As an appropriate allocation, we propose to divide the delegates into two cohorts of delegates, 12 in total. Delegating to each delegates up to amount of UNI delegation on each cohort, described in the specification section.

Expiring Delegation

Starting point of the discussion:

Delegates’ opinions:

Tané’s opinion:

We propose setting the expiration period for the delegations. Continuous evaluation of delegates receiving delegations during these periods is necessary.

As GFX mentioned, we should allow the DAO to revoke delegations and establish an environment where delegates can be continuously evaluated during their delegation period.

The original application requirements last time were as follows:

If it’s acceptable to use the similar delegate requirements this time as well, the treasury delegation should be halted when these conditions are no longer met.

Additionally, we agree with starting the next round months before the current treasury delegation expires, to prevent sudden changes in voting power from disrupting the smooth progress of DAO governance.

Developer Allocation

Starting Point of the Discussion:

Tané’s opinion:

We believe that delegating to developers is a crucial step for strengthening the Uniswap ecosystem and its long-term growth. This initiative effectively aligns the incentives of developers and strengthens trust among stakeholders within the ecosystem, and we are highly supportive of the concept itself.

However, we consider that proceeding with this initiative and the delegation to delegates simultaneously may have differing directions. We believe that the details regarding developer delegation should be advanced as a separate project.

Proposal Specifications

Based on the discussions in each thread and feedback from the delegates, we propose a balanced and feasible proposal for the next iterations of the treasury delegations. This framework focuses on increasing allocation, setting the delegation period, establishing sustainable evaluation methods, and building the operation for continuity of the program.

Decide on its continuation, delegation amount and delegate selections

Program continuation

First, we need an option to vote on for whether we continue the treasury delegation program.

Setting the increase or keep the amount

Allocate up to 18 million UNI, distributing a certain amount of UNI to the two sets of delegates. This will provide sufficient voting power to the currently active 12 delegates, allowing them to reflect their opinions in votes.

Delegate selections

First, we need a thread for delegates to apply for this round. As before, we need to conduct applications and select delegates from there with the objective criteria that were used for the DIP Cycle 3 and VIP cut-off.

  • Only delegates who have participated in onchain voting for at least three months prior to the application post
  • DIP Cycle 3 criteria and scoring metrics
    • We will re-calculate the scores for each delegate based on their activities
  • No more than 1M UNI VP has been delegated to the account. For the delegates who have received the original delegations, the current VP amount minus the amount of the delegations in the original program should be considered as the original delegations will be withdrawn, should the round 2 be approved and proceeded.
  • Agree to adhere to the DAO Principles

Selected delegates based on the above criteria and metrics will receive 1M VP delegations (1.5M in total as delegation hard limit).

In addition, we would conduct a weighted Snapshot vote for the delegates who have applied (otherwise, utilize the scores from the above criteria and metrics), to select Tier 1 delegates for additional 1M VP delegations (2.5M in total as delegation hard limit)

Delegation period and evaluation mechanism

Expiration period

Erin and we have worked with the ScopeLift team to introduce the expiration of each delegation at the contract level, so that we are sure that delegation period is set onchain. The factory contract has been deployed on https://etherscan.io/address/0x807d62f954a2c3fb00ef32f064032228000b9899.

With the new implementation, we are able to set the expiration of delegations for each delegate. This proposal will utilize the new features to assign 18 months as the expiration time for delegations.

Selected delegates’ responsibilities

Each delegate elected by the DAO, who will receive the treasury delegation should maintain the following requirements:

  • Maintain a minimum 80% voting participation rate over the past 3 months.
    • Participation rate calculation:
      • Includes both Snapshot and on-chain proposals
      • Excludes cancelled proposals
      • Measured from the date of Snapshot approval
  • Maintain a minimum of 80% justification rate for all votes cast in the delegation thread. The motivation is that a delegate’s primary responsibility is not only to vote on behalf of their delegators but also to provide a clear, reasoned explanation for each vote. This transparency helps the community understand the basis for decisions, reassuring them that the vote was carefully considered and aligned with community interests. Providing a well-founded rationale is a fundamental duty to maintain open communication and uphold the trust placed by delegators.

Program management

To continue the program effectively and secure the Uniswap governance, we will work with the Uniswap Accountability Committee to smoothly operate the program including actions like below:

  • Publish every 3 months report of the evaluation
  • Delegate selection management and evaluation of the program for each round

Evaluation and revocation process

Every 3 months, we will publish a report in a dedicated thread on the forum detailing the proposals from the past three months, including a list of the delegates who met the participation requirements and those who did not, following a similar format used on the incentive program.

Delegates who fail to meet the minimum participation requirements will have their delegations revoked via an onchain voting. (NOTE: the new implementation hasn’t supported early terminations based on the off-chain conditions yet.) They will be eligible to reapply during the following cycle. We will create a proposal to revoke their delegations.

Proposed actions and upcoming votes

The next actions required to take forward this proposal are as follows.

  1. Determine program continuation and Treasury Delegation amount (Snapshot)
    1.5. Election of Tier 1 delegates for the Treasury Delegation program (Snapshot)
  2. Onchain delegation with expirations to ratify the changes (Onchain)

Proposal 1: Decide on program continuation and the total delegation amount (Snapshot)

  • If Yes to the program continuation, the delegation amount and delegation details are;
    • Up to 18M
    • 12 delegates
    • 1M to all selected delegates (capped at 1.5M), additional 1M to Tier 1 delegates (capped 2.5M)
  • If No to the program continuation,
    • No
      • If this option is voted for, we will come up with a proposal to appropriately wind down the current treasury delegation program or propose another revision of this proposal.

Application period: selection of delegates for the treasury delegation program (Snapshot if needed)

  • Between Proposal 1 and 2, we will have a thread for delegates to apply for the program. All prospective delegates must submit their applications through this designated thread for consideration.
  • After an enough time, we select qualified 12 delegates. Then, we would conduct a Snapshot vote for the Tier 1 delegates who receive additional delegations.

Proposal 2: Execute the delegations with expirations to ratify the changes (Onchain)

Create an onchain proposal to ratify the changes voted on Proposal 1 (and 1.5), and execute transactions to delegate the appropriate amount of voting powers from the treasury to elected delegates with the expiration set and withdraw the delegations done in the original program.

Disclosure

We (Tané) are willing to apply for the proposed treasury delegation as a recipient if no critical objection as we believe our further involvement is beneficial to the DAO while we are the author of the program proposal. We will abstain from voting on the Snapshot itself and would abstain from voting on the onchain proposal if needed.

6 Likes
2

Thanks for the proposal @Tane!

Some thoughts:

  • The election process for something like this could get tricky real quick if we don’t use more objective metrics or qualifications in my opinion (quickly becomes game of delegate politicing). This is the main reason why the Delegate Incentives Rewards was focused on objective metrics.
    • Part of this is that I think there should also be some more strict requirements to get any level of treasury delegation than simply voting and saying how you did so. Maybe some level of community attendance or proposal to the DAO could be needed as well.
  • Using more delineations as mentioned above could also tier the subsequent delegation (does it really make sense for all 15 delegates to get the same amount of delegation?)
    • Maybe more importantly even is that if you have all 15 delegates get ranked and then have all top 8 delegates expire at the same time, that semiannual election will likely be much more contentious than the other semiannual election. Probably smart to split up whatever rankings we end up deciding on between cycles.

A couple of other points:

  • Given the recent still quorum issues on many votes, I think it still make sense to add in at least 15m more UNI to the voting pool. Which equates to 25m total when given the prior 10m
  • More in favor of a clean split → maybe a 8/8 split instead of a 8/7 split of delegates.
2 Likes
3

We believe this proposal is of very high quality and well thought out, and we want to thank Tane for drafting it. We agree with most of @juanbug’s feedback, except for the part about considering proposals. The number of proposals used as a metric in delegate evaluations makes it very difficult for new delegates to even have a chance to participate. This was evident in the Delegate Reward Initiative (Cycle 3), where a delegate with perfect on-chain and off-chain voting participation over the last six months, along with perfect attendance at community calls, did not qualify for the program simply because they had no points in the proposal section.

Adding proposal requirements would prevent new delegates from participating or force them to submit low-quality proposals just to meet the criteria. We believe strong proposals like this one from Tane require time and effort, making it challenging for new delegates to fulfill this requirement.

Regarding our feedback on the proposal, we’ve been thinking about a potential issue in the delegate selection process, but to be honest, we haven’t found a clear solution yet. To be among the top eight delegates, one must be voted in by their peers, which presents a problem. This system puts delegates who frequently flag issues in proposals and vote against certain initiatives in a difficult position. We’ve seen a new delegate consistently raise concerns about multiple proposals, and we believe their work is valuable for the DAO. However, the current proposal favors delegates who can attend physical meetings, network with others, and vote in favor of their peers’ proposals.

It would be great to find a way to ensure that delegates who are less popular among their peers due to their critical stance on proposals are still considered. Unfortunately, we haven’t been able to come up with a viable way to incorporate this into the proposal, it may be an impossible challenge to address.

2 Likes
4

Just voting yes or no doesn’t warrant more delegation in my opinion. There’s probably hundreds of bots that do that already.

That’s the whole point, well thought out proposals should let you have a greater chance of deserving delegation/rewards. I don’t understand how requiring “time and effort” to get delegation is a negative.

3 Likes
5

We agree that delegates that are compensated should add value to the DAO and put in time and effort. Tane spent several months as a delegate before creating this proposal, and it’s their first one. Our point was that adding these restrictions in a way that completely blocks participation prevents new delegates from even having a chance. Instead, the number of proposals could be used as a way to boost delegate rewards or, in the case of this proposal, to receive more UNI tokens for delegation, but not as a key factor that prevents delegates without proposals to participate.

We agree that voting alone can’t be the only factor, as bots could exploit the system. However, after reviewing the results from the current Delegate Reward Initiative (Cycle 3), did you find any bot that submitted an application? We think it’s a valid concern to raise, but it’s also worth considering whether this restriction unintentionally prevents new, active voting delegates from participating rather than solely targeting bots.

1 Like
6

Agreed

What I’m saying here is that if you don’t have any voting power and all you do is vote yes or no without participating in any way, it’s pretty similar to the same as a bot.

2 Likes
7

Thanks Tane and the team for proposal. It’s a good overview of ongoing discussions and several parts will need to be clarified before the next stage.

Each method has a trade off but do agree that objective method is ideal. We did have election process during the initial phase to decide top delegates who receive delegation till they have enough voting power to submit proposals. And other remaining amount was split among others. However, this was subjective even though the program was successful.

Do want to note that delegation doesn’t necessarily have to be equal. And for those who receive less can still coordinate with those who have enough voting power to put the proposals to Offchain and eventually onchain vote.

3 Likes
8

This is more of a philosophical debate, but to be honest, we don’t think the main role of a delegate should be to create proposals. Is it a nice-to-have? If they’re good at it, then yes. But the primary responsibility of a delegate should be to carefully assess whether a proposal benefits the DAO and doesn’t pose any risks, while also ensuring the DAO isn’t exploited by other delegates for personal gain.

To do this effectively, a delegate needs to spend hours reviewing proposals and staying up to date with developments in the ecosystem, which is difficult without some form of compensation to cover the costs. A bot would never be useful for this task, or at least, it wouldn’t be a good idea to rely solely on bots for monitoring.

An active delegate with low voting power can still play a crucial role by flagging issues in proposals and applying pressure on other delegates to act and push for modifications.

The challenge here is that you can’t always determine whether a delegate who voted for a proposal truly analyzed it thoroughly or possesses the necessary knowledge of the crypto ecosystem to make an informed decision. We believe this is what you were referring to when comparing active delegates with low voting power to bots.

Perhaps, in some programs, the DAO should require delegates to hold UNI, not just delegated UNI, but their own acquired UNI. This would ensure they have skin in the game while also acting as a deterrent against Sybil attacks.

We don’t see a better way to distinguish bots from genuinely engaged delegates without introducing subjective elements, as seen in the Arbitrum delegate program, where the program administrator rates delegate comments.

2 Likes
9

It’s not philosophical musing but goes to the core of what governance model you want. Giving delegates the power to submit (or pre-vet) proposals is:

  1. akin to the UK parliamentary model where MPs become eligible to head bureaucracies as well as issue private member bills. Having delegates be a point of contact might hopefully reduce the number of proposals to serious ones as lesser issues can go to UF or procurement. This is more efficient of the cognitive attention span of delegates
  2. having delegates just yay/nay proposals sorta makes Uniswap token holders akin to a functional electoral college (cf HK as exemplar). You are reliant on the “professionals” to identify problems and craft (perhaps a range) of options to act upon. The worst case is it degenerates into Brussel-style scl€urosis or US corporate capture anti-bu$t where entrenched interests or corporate capture makes it hard to change the system.
  3. a policy/platform oriented system leads to party (hidden?) negotiation where specialist delegates focus on different competencies … I can think of Israel where the cabinet posts (allocation of power) are given to different factions. So this tends to lead to high competence but not necessarily unity.

Essentially the question to ask is what is the behaviour you want to incentivise. Broadly speaking (as independent with no horse in race)

a) archetype (voter = UNI holder) … does the process foster representative of the stakeholders in the ecosystem - initially identified as coders (ex-UniLabs), investors (concentrated holdings), LPs and community (60% drawdown to 40% after 5 years) with a tiny sliver to experts/advisors (hopefully grown by now). Apathy is the biggest risk here
b) activity - what this proposal is trying to fine-tune … there’s a spectrum of delegates from professional multi-DAO governance specialists, to service providers down to independents. There are >50 names in the delegates channel but as noted only a dozen-plus active (as measured objectively). Points raised (policing delegates vs compensating for cognitive load) are valid concerns.
c) aliignnment - how well do decisions taken (both direct and delegated voting) can be linked to desired long-term goals/objectives? This is an open question.

I’d just note that economic incentives are not the only carrot/stick in the toolbox. For example, operation of Unichain might be given as “bragging rights” to whoever delegate/policy is considered MVP for 1 year to promote as they see fit (in return for a harberger tithe).

1 Like
10

Thanks for the work put in to create this proposal @Tane. I agree with your approach of splitting the delegation into two cohorts.

I strongly support having an objective metrics based criteria in order to avoid the gameability associated with elections. However, having a cutoff and equal delegation does not seem fair to the delegates who have scored non-zero points as well as to the delegates who scored higher than others.

The proposal metric is an interesting challange, since delegates can form a ‘cabal’ of sorts and put each others’ names in the proposal as authors. Then these same delegates can propose an incentive campaign based on metrics such as proposal writing to qualify themselves for such a campaign. We have seen this behaviour in the recent incentives cycle. On the other hand we do want delegates to come up with interesting proposals that move the DAO forward.

A good solution would be to proportionally allocate to all delegates who participate (and can prove they are not sybills). I.e. create a objective criteria which includes points for proposal writing as well as other stated metrics and proportionally allocate to all delegates based on their score, only excluding those who are proven sybills or have demonstrated other behaviours which conflict with Code of Conduct of the DAO.

1 Like
12

Thank you, @Tane, for structuring such a strong and valuable proposal—we really appreciate your work on this.

While we agree with most of the recommended approaches, we have some concerns regarding the selection of delegates who will receive the delegation.

On this point, we agree with @Juanbug: applying objective metrics is essential to avoid political bias. The current weighted Snapshot vote tends to favour candidates with larger voting power (e.g. 1.4M vs 5k), as well as those with strong brands or connections. Basing the evaluation on more objective criteria would ensure a fairer distribution.

Regarding the UNI amount to include in the program, we believe that 15M represents a good balance. A 1M delegation per delegate meets the threshold for posting proposals on-chain. Hence, it empowers each selected delegate to perform their role effectively.

3 Likes
13

Thanks for this post @Tane. We agree with your point that developer delegation is important, but it should be pushed as a separate initiative. @Juanbug made some good points, but we also agree with some of @Argonaut’s feedback. Delegates who spend several months as an active delegate before creating a proposal shouldn’t be excluded from being eligible. It shouldn’t be a limiting factor in getting selected here.

create a objective criteria which includes points for proposal writing as well as other stated metrics and proportionally allocate to all delegates based on their score, only excluding those who are proven sybills or have demonstrated other behaviours which conflict with Code of Conduct of the DAO

Completely agree, this seems like a good middle-ground.

The “popularity contest” problem is a difficult one to solve. It might best be addressed by simply reminding delegates not to discriminate based on whether or not the delegate votes in favor of or against certain proposals - encourage objectivity.

2 Likes
15

We thank @Tane for all the effort put into this. We had a great conversation at the Uniswap workshop in Denver about the proposal, and are happy to see it has made its way to the forum.

Generally speaking, we’re for the idea of broadening the delegate set. Ideally, we should try to do more than simply extend it, but add specific expertise we believe the DAO is either lacking or could strengthen.

For example, how is “underrepresented” being defined here? Is it just the fact that these delegates hold a too small amount of voting power to be deemed influential in governance? Obviously if we need to increase delegations because we think we have quorum issues, that’s fine and we get that. But we believe it would be more useful to categorise areas of expertise that the DAO could benefit from having/adding, and tie this “underrepresentation” to that and add delegates accordingly. We think permissionless tech and ethos is great in many ways, but we also think that DAOs should try to incorporate more meritocratic principles. At some point, and we are probably not there yet, just adding additional “proposal reviewers” may not bring much more value to a DAO.

We also agree with @Juanbug on the significance of proposal making. If anything, proposals at least provide some form of proxy for “real” contributions. Circling back to “underrepresentation”, there seem to be this notion of “fairness” floating around where supposedly anyone should be able to join the paid delegate set as long as they show up for every vote and community call. While participation rates are clearly important, the fact is that anyone can do that. Getting a proposal through governance not only requires effort, but usually also a deeper understanding of Uniswap in one way or another. Having said that, it does become tricky in situations where delegates are pushing proposals as part of another committee or working group gig they are already getting paid for, and by extension of merely doing that job, they get to secure their place in the rewards program.

We would also like to see a cap on the final voting power that these newly selected delegates can gain as a result of this program. As we understand it, participation in the program will be filtered by setting a maximum amount of VP that anyone interested in applying cannot exceed. Selected delegates will then receive a fixed amount depending on which tier they’re selected for, and as we understand, this number may be as much as 2M VP. This means that if we have an initial max VP threshold of 1-1.5M VP, said delegates could end up with 3-3.5M VP via the program (these VP numbers are examples, but you get the point). We think this would be discouraging to many of the delegates that have been involved with Uniswap for years who are currently sitting at around 2.5M VP (including us), and don’t think it makes sense to fast-track new delegates to the same level of influence unless they bring unique knowledge and capacity that the DAO can benefit from. Instead, better to structure the program so that selected delegates can be topped up to a set bar of say 2m total VP, which would only require some minor Excel calculations to figure out. Maybe a time-centred variable could also be included to allow smaller delegates with a significant participation history in Uniswap to apply.

Just some of our thoughts at this point - thanks again @Tane and looking forward to see how the program develops!

2 Likes
16

Thanks for your comments/feedback @Juanbug @Argonaut @Doo_StableLab @drllau_LexDAO @jengajojo @karpatkey @Boardroom @Avantgarde.

After our careful examinations of the feedback from the delegates and extensive discussions especially with the UAC members, we have revised the proposal with changes outlined below. We hope most of the critical feedback are addressed.

  • The number of delegates for delegations: 12
    • Rationale: 16 is too many compared to 7 in the original program. There are delegates that don’t need VP, and fewer delegates should be qualified for the treasury delegations. We believe 12 is a good middle-ground number.
  • The delegation amount: up to 18M UNI
    • Rationale: Reaching quorum is still an issue, but we should minimize the amount increase from 10M.
  • Distributions: 1M for all selected delegates, additional 1M for Tier 1 delegates
    • All 12 qualified delegates will be chosen by the objective requirements.
    • Top 6 delegates (“Tier 1 delegates”) will be chosen by voting or only by the objective criteria
    • The maximum total VP limit is 1.5M for non-Tier 1 delegates, 2.5M for Tier 1 delegates
    • Rationale: simplify the amounts to be delegated (but hard limits are introduced) compared to the original program, but prioritize the top delegates for more delegations.
  • How to select delegates: based on the objective criteria/metrics/scoring (the DIP Cycle 3 one + VP cut-off)
    • VP cut-off is 1M
    • Utilizing a forum poll to choose how to choose Tier 1 delegates
    • Option 1: Decided by election
    • Option 2: Decided only by the objective criteria
    • Rationale: we should avoid “popularity contest” situation as much as possible and the criteria/metrics/scoring that the DAO utilized for the DIP Cycle 3 delegate selection are good to be reused for this case. The reason that we consider voting on selecting Tier 1 delegates is that we still believe we can capture preferences for delegates to be with more VP delegations by conducting a voting
  • Delegation period: 18 months delegations, but 1 year re-selection for all delegates
    • No time-based cohorts anymore
    • Expiration is set to 18 months for delegations, but promised to do re-selection every year for all delegates
    • Rationale: minimizing the operational burdens makes more sense while expirations of the delegations still happen and the DAO needs to go through the re-selection process every year until the treasury delegation is not needed for the governance.
  • Other additions
    • Added adherence to the DAO Principles as a requirement for the delegate application
    • Added a disclosure statement that we are willing to apply for this program if approved

We are planning to make final adjustments based on the poll and submit the first Snapshot proposal early next week.

We still believe that making proposals is a critical contribution to the DAO and qualified activities for the delegates who are worth receiving the incentives and treasury delegations. Permissionless-ness is a virtue that we promote and admire and any delegates (new or OG) can make proposals and valuable contributions to the DAO.

This is a very interesting point and something the DAO should consider to design the future delegate related programs!

3 Likes
17

Hi everyone, in coordination with @Tane as well as other members, here’s forum poll to select how Tier 1 Delegates will be selected. For context:

The forum poll is used to help get the consensus from the community, but in order to counter unlikely but possible case of new accounts created and spamming to sway the poll, only accounts that were created 24 hours before this poll would be counted. The poll will last till March 21st 10am EST.

  • Tier 1 Delegates should be chosen by voting
  • Tier 1 Delegates should be chosen by scores
0 voters
2 Likes
18

What is the issue with the number being higher than the original program? If they are active delegates who stay up to date with the ecosystem, vote, and participate in the forum, we don’t see a large number of delegates as a problem. On the contrary, we believe it would be highly valuable for the DAO, more participants dedicated to adding value to Uniswap.

19

Thanks for posting an update on this @Tane

While selecting the top ‘x’ delegates based on scores is an improvement over simply electing the top ‘x’ delegates, this approach still raises some concerns:

  • The number ‘x’ seems to be LARPed without a clear rationale

  • Instead of setting a clear, pre-agreed standard for what makes a delegate “good enough,” this method ranks delegates and includes those who may not meet the desired quality. The threshold for inclusion is determined by the last delegate who makes the cut, which means the standard is flexible and potentially too low. By focusing on the top ‘x’ delegates “we can get” rather than the top delegates “we want,” we risk settling for less-than-ideal candidates. This approach doesn’t encourage us to aim higher or attract better delegates who might be out there.

  • Ranking creates a zero sum dynamic with winners and loosers which demotivates delegates who are highly motivated, skilled, and aligned with the DAO’s values.

Instead, why don’t we create two tiers of eligibility criteria and equally divide between delegates who simply fulfill the criteria in each tier instead of ranking them?

2 Likes
20

Understanding that Gauntlet is a large delegate, we aim to communicate our concerns with the program below.

Firstly, treasury delegation aims to solve a real problem. Unfortunately, it complicates measuring eligibility since DIP participation doesn’t necessarily indicate value or competence and increases vulnerability to governance attacks while reducing accountability to UNI holders beyond the DAO.

More critically, this approach deviates from the original intent of delegation, where token holders empower representatives who mirror their interests. Treasury delegation effectively transfers influence from UNI holders to delegates themselves, who may have a misaligned incentive to preserve power. Therefore, it is a requirement that any delegated treasury UNI has a programmable and automated end-period for delegation.

This broader issue is compounded by two dynamics: widespread apathy among UNI holders toward Uniswap governance and a misalignment between UNI holders’ interests and those of the DAO.

Have we analyzed organic delegation data from active delegates in round 1 to fix these dynamics? Perhaps a “matching program”—pairing organic delegation with treasury UNI—might better align UNI holders’ interests, bolster delegation, and resolve the quorum issue.

An even better approach would be to explore the re-engagement of active UNI holders post-DUNA and Fee Switch, including the potential for UNI staking and governance alignment that motivates UNI holders to be more directly engaged in delegation and DAO governance.

To summarize, we view treasury delegation as a band-aid solution to a much larger problem, but one that may be necessary to ensure smooth operations in the short-medium term.

Of course, we appreciate all the hard work by @Tane and others to bring this proposal to its current state.

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Thanks for your feedback, @Argonaut @jengajojo @Gauntlet!

The number of to-be-selected delegates is actually higher (almost double) and as said, we believe 12 is a good middle-ground number at this point. It’s reasonable not to be in hurry to increase the number of delegates to be trusted with the treasury delegations too much.

We agree with this view, but still, we would end up setting an arbitrary number for delegates anyway. As discussed with Avantgarde, we would like to continue to discuss how we attract delegates that we “want” through the programs with you and other delegates in the future.

We are not certain how this proposal addresses the issue you raised. With the voting option for Tier 1 delegates, we are basically introducing two mechanisms to select delegates for the delegations.

We haven’t looked into these data, but it would be interesting to do so. A matching program is also an interesting idea too. However, as we have seen struggles to activate (re)delegations in various DAOs (example cases like the one with Arbitrum), it would be challenging to do so in the Uniswap governance too. As you mentioned, the governance staking will change the situations around this and we are very much looking forward to seeing how the dynamics change.

We are completely in agreement with this view, and we promise that we will revisit how to approach the treasury delegations in a year.

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There’s genuine no significant increase in delegation for active delegates. And this is especially pressing as many delegates as well as other stakeholders have been in conversation to trying to encourage more holders to delegate. But both due to legal and logistics aspect, there’s no interest in delegating nor re delegating. This was why the program was created in the first place and as time goes, DAO governance, not just Uniswap, but across other DAOs is seeing even less delegation and re delegation.

This was actually one of reasons why we delayed posting RFC for round 2 as we believed that was also the intention but after talking with Stakeholders including Uniswap Foundation, it was to be separate and implement it earlier.

This is actually one of reasons why stakeholders are interested in seeing the change in the program as the new version will have expiring delegation.

At the end of the day, how do you define “delegates who are highly motivated, skilled, and aligned with the DAO’s values”? And if there’s a scoring to measure it then there’s ranking indeed.

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