Several comments have mentioned the idea of increasing the amount of UNI we delegate from the treasury. How should we think about what the right number is?
there is likely a merit in the following:
- is the current reward delegating program gonna expand the amount of enrolled delegates? If the answer is yes, bears weight in proceeding and in aligning potentially delegates that are enrolled in second cycle, and potentially in future cycles, to the current ones
- is there a necessity from a governance attack standpoint? if so understanding thresholds and probability can help in quantifying the number
- is there a necessity in term of spreading more the current voting power vs the active delegates? And vs the inactive delegates?
Withouth having thought too much about this problem, I personally feel answering the questions above can help driving the topic toward a somehow right answer. Or at least an answer that makes sense.
It will depend on set up of course but 10 million additional would be Upper limit. 5 million might be sensible as if 1 million each, that would be 5 additional delegates with enough voting power to post proposal onchain. If we have the waterfall method we did last time, then it could help more than 5
The ultimate goal for this in our opinion is such that of the “active set” of governance delegates, we should easily be able to reach quorum on votes that aren’t contentious. Even with dozens of messages being sent out to voters often times a day or two before the time ends (fyi to everyone we’ve sent these to, sorry for spam and bumps ), we barely get to quorum on a majority of the votes.
In our eyes, this should at least be 50% more than quorum. So it ends up being that we’d like to see at least 60m+ votes active on each 40m quorum needed vote. Again, this would mean adding in an extra 15-20m of delegation on top of the 10m already being sponsored, which we also think would be a bit much in one go. Somewhere a little less such as 10m or so makes sense, and dividing it between some up to 2.5m and up to 1.0m delegates that @Tane propsoed earlier this week also makes sense.
Bottom line, over the last year, we have had quite a few qualified and active delegates enter governance, and we think these individuals should all 100% have enough delegation to at least sponsor a vote if they want to.
On pinging the voters, are there any telegram bots or Twitter bots to ping when new proposal voting happens? Can’t seem to get the email notifications for Snapshot or Tally to work, so have to manually check.
Agree with 5 additional delegates at 1 million each.
We haven’t found something that works amazingly well. Recently started using Boardroom and that’s been pretty great so far. Tribuni also has a telegram bot (will send you info) that does a pretty good job.
Supposedly Uniswap Foundation funded a couple better governance Agora govmodule UI/UX plus maybe others on their notion site (very confusing to me). What can be done to add a voting whipBot with crosslinks back to delegate platforms decision trees?
Agora is building an alert service for vote.uniswapfoundation.org. I also think they have a product in dev rn that’ll list the delegates who have not yet voted on a proposal so targeted outreach is easier as votes come down to the wire.
We have native push notifications working, that works for both the UNI Snapshot (Temp) + Governor contracts.
I posted about our tool here: https://gov.uniswap.org/t/mobile-governance-with-lighthouse-uniswap/24629
This should be dependent on two main factors in my opinion:
a. What amount of honest votable token supply is necessary to mitigate governance attacks?
b. Over shooting quorum by a significant margin as stated by @PGov seems like a reasonable way to go about this. This however raises the question of cycle nature of this initiaitve i.e. increase delegated tokens → increase quorum → increase delegated tokens → increase quorum. While this may not be necessary bad, we may want to aim at a max. quorum threshold with respect to circulating supply and this number should help us mitigate dishonest governance attacks.
We continue to support increasing the allocation, just as stated in our previous post.
Regarding the increase, as Doo has proposed, we feel that an increase of 5M UNI, with a scale of approximately up to 1M UNI per delegate, is appropriate for a single treasury delegation.
However, when we counted underrepresented delegates from the delegate threads, seven delegates met the conditions for being underrepresented in the previous round. Therefore, when deciding how the DAO executes treasury delegations, we believe that ranking the delegates and allocating up to 1M UNI for the top ten delegates, and using the same waterfall method as before for the remaining delegates, would best balance the diversity of delegates and the increase in the voting power.
Additionally, in addition to these 15M UNI, when adding more than 5M UNI, we think it is most beneficial for DAO operations to conduct a separate round (Round 2.5 or 3) to avoid suddenly falling below the on-chain quorum.