The aim with going with a non-ranking approach is to agree on a baseline for the type of delegate we want. In order to get the delegates we want we need to agree on the minimum performance standard which can be set via quantiative metrics identified in this proposal as well as the delegate incentive proposal. Anyone who is able to cross that baseline should included into the cohorot. This encourages everyone to strive to meet these minimum requirements as opposed to competing with each other to be on a ranking list. Over time this baseline can be increased thus, increasing the caliber of delegates who participate in such programs.
The two tier model makes sense to me because we can create two baselines, higher and lower. Naturally more delegates will qualify for the latter than the prior and thus the larger cohort will receive less UNI per delegate as opposed to the cohort with stricter requirements.
This allows the DAO to
maintain continuity between cohort transitions as was intended in the original proposal
at the same time provide feedback on what is the general caliber of delegates we have across two tiers. This information can be used to tweak the parameters in the future in order to move towards the kind of delegates we want
Maybe thereâs misunderstanding because the scores will indeed be set based on quantitative metrics. But even under the misunderstanding, the goal will be the same. If your concern is delegates wonât contribute much and just expect they will just benefit from it, lowering the goal to âminimum performance standardâ would make it worse as rather than delegates doing their best to compete, they will feel content in this minimum.
This is not advisable as thereâs finite amount of UNI that can be delegated. And the proposal wants to at least have several to be able to make proposals onchain. Moreover, thereâs a balance between having too few delegates with too much power and too many delegates with too little power. Both have pros and cons, but in practice, the community would have to choose the top certain number to be eligible.
We thank @Tane for this proposal and for taking the feedback from us and other delegates and incorporating it into a improved proposal.
Regarding this vote, and despite the fact that we in SEEDGov do not benefit from it, we voted for tier 1 to be decided by scoring, because if it is decided by voting, there is a risk of carterisation or agreement between delegates to support each other, which would not be a healthy practice. On the contrary, deciding the order by scoring based on the parameters of the delegate incentive program is an objective way of deciding the order based on delegate participation.
We have voted to abstain from this temperature check, citing below our issues with the proposalâs current iterations alongside our previously communicated concerns. To confidently support this proposal, we would request the following change:
A 6-month or 12-month delegation program at maximum, rather than an 18-month delegation. 18 months is too long to go without reevaluation and, more importantly, too long to allow new delegates to be included.
We also do not fully agree with the rationale or criteria for the top 6 delegates receiving greater VP delegation. The scoring criteria do not reflect delegate quality, only participation, and the benefits of supporting certain delegates above others based on slim participation margins are unclear.
The following reflects the views of L2BEATâs governance team, composed of @kaereste, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and itâs based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
Weâre voting AGAINST the proposal.
While we understand the proposalâs premise, delegating tokens from the treasury is not the right way to address the issues cited in the original proposal, mainly the difficulty in achieving quorum.
Having difficulty achieving quorum is a feature, not a bug. Although it makes governance a bit trickier and time-consuming, it protects against malicious proposals passing simply because of delegate apathy or token holder indifference.
But even if we agreed that we need to do something to make meeting quorum easier, weâd suggest simply lowering the quorum and not artificially empowering delegates with more voting power from the treasury.
I do think one crucial aspect that the delegates might not understand fully is that for this round, the delegation automatically expire. Which means having it in the short term like 6 months is going to result in a case that it becomes extremely difficult to meet quorum as all the delegation expire. And not much time to prepare
While we do hope @Tane 's version proceed. But in case if it fails to pass the onchain vote, we can also propose alternative version that tries to balance some of requests as currently Abstain vote is too high proportion
Looks like the vote is in a contentious place at the moment. A couple of thoughts:
Program Length and Operational Overhead
Conducting a regular vote on this type of program is pretty messy. Operationally it would add unnecessary overhead for the DAO, which imo would outweigh potential benefits around adding new delegates. For example, I donât genuinely think many have been concerned with the status of the first round of treasury delegationâand thatâs because those whoâve received the respective voting power have actively partaken in governance over the past year. In fact, most of the proposals over the past year have been sponsored by teams like PGov and StableLab, both of which attained votes from treasury delegationâthis datapoint is relevant to the below concern:
It becomes inconvenient for active delegates to put up proposals when they have to rely on others to sponsor postsâŚspeaking from experience.
Plus, increasing the cohort at the present time to 12 total candidates addresses the need of qualifying new delegates. There likely wonât be too many new entrants into the DAO who would even qualify for treasury delegation off the bat. It usually takes a handful of months to cultivate some sort of persona with a DAO, at which point, the 12-18 month period will have passed, allowing the new delegates to partake in the next cycle of treasury delegation. So to address @Gauntletâs point, the feedback loop between assessing new delegates for treasury delegation requires at least a year and certainly more than 6 months.
Selection Criteria
I donât fully agree with using the metrics from the Delegate Reward Initiative for this proposal, aligning with @jengajojoâs main concern, albeit for different reasons. Adding a voting component like the first iteration of the program makes more sense than having a second set of eligibility criteria. Hereâs whyâ
Elections better mimic token holder delegation:
Voting for treasury delegation candidates better mimics the elective process that UNI token holders go through when determining who should have more weight in the system. It provides a direct mechanism for the community to choose trusted delegates based on a preference-based evaluation, reflecting the essence of representative selection. But the Delegate Reward Program prioritizes activity over community preference, which is a characteristic that probably shouldnât fully translate to treasury delegation. Treasury delegation via voting and not fully based on âobjective criteriaâ stands as the truer embodiment of the elective process, ensuring that influence is granted to those the community deems most worthy, not just the most active.
Popularity contests of course are a resulting issue. So a hybrid is probably best:
50% of a candidateâs score is derived by the stated numerical metrics
50% are based on an election
This way, the same people who get paid via the reward program are not necessarily the ones with more voting powerâeven though this will predominantly be the case anyways.
Governance Takeover
Would not suggest lowering quorumâlower quorum means that governance attacks become easier. One can argue that treasury delegation is in effect a governance attack from within, where delegates themselves just subvert token holders to control the DAO.
But Scopeliftâs work on implementing expiring delegation is a very neat addition to control for this issue. If at a future date the influence of delegates via treasury-sourced UNI isnât up to snuff, then those votes are recalled. In that sense, âdelegate takeoverâ has an inherent termination date.
Lower quorum is a more permanent alteration with the potential for more dire consequences caused by malicious and anonymous external parties. At least with delegates there is a degree of transparency and communal responsibility where folks are in part kept in line for their reputationâs sake. Plus, thereâs the incorporation of the âDAO Principlesâ in this proposal.
I would suggest that he DAO take advantage of Scopeliftâs work and utilize the expiring Franchisers.
Regarding Delegation Campaigns & Unistaker
The best time to run a delegation campaign is upon launch of a governance token. The second best time is when thereâs an economic incentive attached to the delegation. Most protocols with high delegation % today ensured that TGE aligned with a congruent delegation campaign. L2s are pretty good at this, and tools like Tally have helped with the process. Unfortunately, this setup wasnât common at UNI TGE, so thereâs latent voting power that never considered delegating.
Running a delegation campaign is notoriously difficultâŚbecause people just donât care. From the below numbers, it seems like the UFâs delegate race had good success. We could run one of these again, but the amount of token holders willing to partake in such a race quickly taps out.
Although I am unsure how active the voting power from this race is since most of it went to new, smaller delegates.
Objectively, the event that brought in the most delegates so far has been the Delegate Reward ProgramâŚfor obvious reasons. But most of the new delegates donât have much voting power. And likely, the catalyst for increasing the other side of the equation, the number of delegators, will be launching Unistaker.
My prediction is that UNI token holders, for the most part, will nonchalantly delegate their tokens to well-known namesâgranted their voting % is high enough (in case Staker rewards are based on a delegateâs voting rate). This will crowd out active delegates with smaller brands. Hence, one way the DAO can signal trust in certain entities is by delegating to them on its own. Right now, if you sort the top delegates by VP on Tally or Agora, you really donât want folks to just delegate to those top entities. It should be a mix. Sadly, token holders donât know delegates well. They just know brands from crypto in general.
As a final point, if the DAO ever wants to capitalize on fees itself to attain operating revenue, it must delegate its treasury tokens. This proposal would be a step in that direction. Although out of the scope of this discussion, we should be very careful about using the DAOâs tokens as revenue generating assets, which may warrant blacklisting the Franchisers from earning Unistaker fees.
We think the original proposal was better than the updated version. The updated one uses a scoring system from a recent proposal where the delegate rankings are already known, and on top of that, the number of spots was changed arbitrarily. It feels like picking which delegates to include in the program based on a ranking you already have.
Iâm a bit late to the party here and drinking from the fire hose, so forgive me if anything is misguided.
I agree that the effort to run these initiatives is extensive, and to do so regularly is that much more so. I also agree that 18 month time cycles for new delegations is prohibitive to encouraging new entrants. I would support expanding the programâs pool such that it adds new seats at regularized intervals.
For example, an initial 12 seats are selected, with 6 additional seats left unallocated. Every 6 months, the next two highest ranked delegates by the KPIs set are included. If the requirements look back is less than 6 months (perhaps 3), this gives incentive for even newer delegates to participate more. I just fear that if the incentive is as far as 18 months away, the reward for participating becomes a bit abstact.
Has there been any discussion on either directly capping or soft pointing users in a way to set max delegations from Unistaker? This would force a more diverse distribution. Albeit, overly-constraining caps could exhaust available, reputable delegation recipients more quickly and could force distributions to less qualified ones.
We do not share the sentiment outlined that the proposal has no consensus, that the negative vote was almost null, and that abstentions, although valid, do not mean being against the proposal.
We would like to share some thoughts on what has been discussed in the last few posts, especially @AbdullahUmarâs post:
Of course the ideal would be that the quorum is reached with genuine participation of the tokenholders and not existing it, as it is the case, could be achieved with a delegation campaign, but even successful takes time to polanificaciĂłn, implementation and waiting for results. This, although ideal, is not real according to the current circumstances of the DAO and the near future, even with a successful delegation campaign.
So, this proposal, although not ideal, is necessary because the real situation today is that it is very difficult to get a quorum for onchain proposals, and even more so when the VP of the previous cycle is de-delegated. We would like to warn of the real and concrete risk of paralysis of the DAO if this proposal is not approved.
Lowering the quorum is an even more dangerous and risky scenario, we do not recommend following this path which could put the DAO at risk of a governance attack, the quorum is a line of defense to make an attack costly, so we need to increase participation, not lower the quorum.
We do not see the 18 month term (with re-selection at 1 year) as a problem as it proposes to revoke the delegation if a delegate does not maintain the participation requirements, so that only active delegates will enter and remain in the program, delegates without good participation metrics will lose their assigned VP.
Likewise, we do not agree that this proposal limits that within the 18 month period it can be extended for more delegates to be included if the DAO deems it necessary. There is nothing to impede this being proposed, voted on and implemented.
The method of selection by the delegate reward program scoring, while not ideal, we believe is objective and fair as it allows active delegates with good participation parameters to be eligible. The method of total or partial/hybrid selection by election means selection by popularity contest and, even worse, it implies the real risk of incentivizing a carterization agreement of delegates to vote among a group, which would be undesirable and not in line with good governance practices and violates the Uniswap DAO Principles (âDelegates must prevent the formation of cartels and ensure that the protocol is protected from any proposals driven by personal motives that do not align with the protocolâs best interestsâ), as this selection system may favour popular delegates or delegates who reach agreements without necessarily being active, which goes against the objective of this proposal to increase UNIâs participation in voting.
We support this proposal without changes and are willing to support it in the on chain vote.
We are voting For the RFC: Treasury Delegation Round 2 proposal. We support the continuation of treasury delegation as a key mechanism to sustain DAO voting power participation. This program plays a critical role in the security and resilience of the DAO.
We also support the idea of expiration dates for delegations. Enforcing term limits through on-chain contracts is a meaningful step toward stronger accountability. While the proposed 18-month delegation period is slightly longer than what weâd prefer, the inclusion of an annual re-selection process provides a reasonable check-in point.
We would appreciate a clarification regarding the selected delegatesâ responsibilities - 80% justification rate requirement - specifically, whether there is a defined timeframe for rationale submissions following each vote? For reference, the Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 3 provided a 7-day window
We also agree with AbdullahUmarâs point that this program has distinct goals compared to the Delegate Reward Initiative. Given that, we believe it would make sense for this program to have its own scoring system aligned with its own objectives. Reusing the previous scoring framework could unintentionally favor delegates with a long history of activity and reduce diversity in participation.
Weâd love to see a scoring approach that creates space for newer or smaller delegates - those bringing fresh perspectives and showing strong engagement. A thoughtful balance between recognizing historical contributions and supporting emerging voices would lead to a healthier, more inclusive governance landscape.
To Abdullahâs comments on outstanding structure mentioned on todayâs call:
If the intent is to increase votable supply and reward qualified delegates, why put a cap on seats and a set delegation amount per seat vs choose the votable supply increase desired and then establish a threshold set of metrics? All delegates who meet the criteria equally share the VP to be allocated? Eg anyone with over X points qualifies, no tie breakers
Net effect: desired votes increase is achieved and maximal qualified delegates are added?
Current approach trades off maximally including qualified delegates / contributors just to arbitrarily set a per seat delegation amount. And from a dollar value perspective the delegation per seat is actually quite high leaving room to reasonably spread it a bit wider.
Alternatively to respect the tier structure tier 1 could be capped seats for the power delegates, tier 2 could be open ended.
We agree that lowering the quorum is not a viable solution. Maintaining a higher quorum threshold ensures greater security for the DAO, a critical consideration for DAOs with substantial treasuries, such as Uniswap.
Regarding treasury delegation, we share other delegatesâ perspectives that it might not be the optimal long-term strategy. However, longer-term solutions naturally require extended periods to develop and implement. In the meantime, we see this program as an effective interim measure until more sustainable and robust initiatives become feasibleâsuch as the full deployment of Unistaker, increased token-holder re-engagement following the DUNA initiative, and improvements in the regulatory landscape.
To ensure effectiveness in the interim, it is crucial to incorporate objective metrics for evaluating applicants.
We concur with this assessment, particularly in a purely electoral context lacking objective criteria. Delegates with significant voting power and established reputations are likely to dominate purely political or brand-driven elections. While many of these delegates indeed merit such delegation, incorporating objective evaluation metrics would better support delegates who demonstrably contribute meaningful value to the DAO.
Ultimately, for this specific program, we advocate prioritizing delegates who provide tangible value to the DAO over those relying solely on established brands, though these attributes need not be mutually exclusive.
Hi everyone, thanks for your continuous feedback and waiting on the update on the proposal. We have modified the proposal as below and are planning to put up another Snapshot to make sure if the original proposal with those changes are good enough to move forward with the delegate application process and its onchain voting.
Before explaining a few changes made to the proposal, like most of the delegates, we view this treasury delegation is a temporary solution, rather than the permanent solution to the voting quorum challenge. At the same time, we should acknowledge the fact that we have already been reliant on this program to move the DAO forward with important initiatives as the data described in the original post shows. This proposal is to improve the original program with a few changes including an introduction to the expiration of the delegations, which is considered a commitment to re-examining the program in a regular cadence.
Here are the revisions to the original proposal that passed its Snapshot, based on the feedback from the delegates and key stakeholders.
Setting a shorter period of the delegations with the promise of re-evaluating the program if and when a significant change to the delegation landscape, especially the Unistaker implementation
Specification: we will set 12 monthsâ expirations to the delegations. After 9 months, we will re-evaluate the program.
Diff to the Snapshot ver: the expiration term 18 months â 12 months, the re-evaluation term 12 months â 9 months.
Rationale: as the original program covered 2024, and has been extended for about 3-4 months in 2025, we think itâs reasonable to assume this program to continue until the year end and re-evaluate the program in early 2026. However, we are aware of the Unistaker initiative to be shaped up and ready for discussions and its potential ratification in this year. We will be committed to working to make this program and the changes to be introduced by the Unistaker and other initiatives in delegations cohesively exist together and make sure that the DAO independently functions without the treasury delegations in the future. As the original proposal promised, we will publish the report of the program every 3 months after the start and evaluate the qualified delegates based on their requirements/responsibilities for the program.
Snapshot for selection of the âdistinguishedâ delegates out of the qualified delegates
Specification: conduct a Snapshot election to select the âdistinguishedâ (renamed from âTier 1â) delegates from the candidates who are qualified delegates based on the objective criteria and scoring.
Diff to the Snapshot ver: the name of the selected delegates from âtier 1â to âdistinguishedâ for clarity. Selection logic: using the criteria and scoring â Snapshot election.
Rationale: we still believe that, in addition to recognizing the need to empower under-represented (e.g. low VP), but active delegates who are willing to contribute more to the DAO governance, we should acknowledge and empower the delegates that are approved by the DAO based on their continuous activities to the DAO and impact made for the DAO in various ways that are not possible to be recorded in observable metrics, but can be evaluated by the token holders. While acknowledging the risk of being a âpopularity contestâ, we believe this is the best way to achieve the representative selection.
Reducing the total amount of UNI for delegations to up to 15M
Specification: 12 delegates will be qualified based on the objective criteria and scoring from the Delegate Reward Program Cycle 3 and receive 1M UNI delegations (hard capped to 1.5M VP in total). The distinguished delegates chosen via the Snapshot election will receive additional 500k UNI delegations (hard capped to 2M VP in total). (compared to the Snapshot ver: 1M delegations to the qualified delegates, another 1M delegations to the selected delegates)
Type
# of Delegates
Total Amount of Delegations
Distinguished
6
1.5M (capped at 2M in total)
Other Qualified
6
1M (capped at 1.5M in total)
Diff to the Snapshot ver: the amount of additional delegations to the distinguished delegates 1M â 500k
Rationale: still an increase in the number of qualified delegates (7 â 12) and total amount of the delegations (10M â 15M) to effectively operate and achieve the quorum, but to minimize the reliance from the treasury compared to the originally proposed amount, up to 18M.
We appreciate the efforts made by @Tane in the seeking of the necessary consensus. While we found the previous proposal to be appropriate, this new updated version seems to us to be a good and solid middle ground, which we believe will be able to satisfy all or at least most of the delegates and active members of the DAO, as it addresses all the concerns discussed and synthesises them into a reasonable proposal. We will therefore support this new proposal.
Hey all - writing here in my capacity as governance lead at the UF. Weâve been working with Takeshi and the other folks involved in this proposal and paid for the updated franchiser contracts and the accompanying audit. Happy to see all the conversation around treasury delegation, and the recognition that itâs not a long-term solution. Weâre supportive of the way the proposal is currently structured and think sets the program up nicely for periodic reviews - hopefully weâll be able to phase it out in the future!
