Thank you for structuring the two proposals!
We have separate feedback and comments for each of them:
In principle, we agree with this proposal, as we have repeatedly and in differetn postrs expressed our support for it. While we acknowledge that it may not be the ideal or definitive solution, we believe it is necessary given the current challenges the DAO faces in consistently reaching quorum for on-chain proposals.
That said, we have two suggestions to improve the proposal:
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Cap per delegate. In addition to maintaining the 2.5M VP total cap (coming from the treasury or otherwise), we suggest that no delegate should receive more than 1M or 1.5M UNI through this program. This means that regardless of the VP each delegate already holds, no single delegate would be allocated more than this threshold, with the overall cap of 2.5M UNI per delegate remaining in place. This adjustment would ensure that treasury delegation is distributed more horizontally across more delegates, reducing the risk that only 4 or 5 delegates capture the entire 10M UNI delegation pool.
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Selection method. We do not agree that delegates should be chosen by DAO voting. As we have pointed out on previous occasions, such a process risks becoming a popularity contest or incentivizing cartelization or collusion among delegates. This would contradict good governance practices and directly contravene the Uniswap DAO Principles (“Delegates must prevent the formation of cartels and ensure that the protocol is protected from any proposals driven by personal motives that do not align with the protocol’s best interests”). Instead, we believe that the ranking and selection among applying delegates should follow the same scoring methodology as the rewards program, which accounts for participation rates. This is a more objective and reliable way to prioritize delegates based on their actual engagement in the DAO and avoid the risk of assigning VP to popular delegates with low participation, which would conspire against the proposal’s goal of increasing the voting VP.
We have previously stated our opposition to this proposal, and in addition to the reasons already provided, we would like to add further concerns based on the details now available:
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Overlap with UVN - Trial Program. Unichain will soon launch UVN, which aims to attract and incentivize UNI tokenholders to become stakers and validators of the network. We believe this IDV system would directly compete with the official staking mechanism since both aim to attract UNI. When we raised this point, @donofdaos responded that Unichain’s launch may take time and, if this initiative proved redundant, the IDV could be deprecated once UVN is live:
However, the proposal currently presented includes a two-year implementation and budget. This is inconsistent with the response given, since while UVN’s timeline is uncertain, it is not expected to take two years or longer. If approved with a two-year scope, the IDV program will very likely become redundant and compete with UVN in attracting UNI. We are not comfortable with this, Unichain and UVN should have full priority and support from the DAO. We believe the proposal should be significantly reduced in both duration and budget, and instead designed as a 6-month pilot program, renewable every 6 months by DAO vote if proven successful, and only if it does not overlap with UVN once launched.
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Potential Conflict of Interest. In reviewing this proposal, we want to raise a concern regarding the dual role of @donofdaos as both a member of the Uniswap Accountability Committee (UAC) and the founder of @eventhorizon, the entity proposed to develop and maintain the IDV.
As described, the UAC would not only monitor implementation and evaluate deliverables, but also oversee the disbursement of funds related to this proposal. Given @donofdaos’s connection to @eventhorizon, this could place him in the challenging position of being both service provider and evaluator of the same work — for instance, participating in decisions on milestones, APR adjustments, or payment releases to the company he founded.
We believe this situation raises important questions for the DAO:- How should we handle cases where a UAC member has a direct financial or organizational interest in the outcome of a proposal they are also responsible for overseeing?,
- Would it be more consistent with our principles of transparency and accountability to require recusal or even temporary replacement of UAC members in such scenarios?
The Uniswap DAO Principles note that “Severe conflicts of interest that could undermine the integrity of governance must be avoided.” and that “delegates should err on the side of transparency and openness.” In light of this, we respectfully suggest that the DAO consider whether additional safeguards (such as recusal from budget administration or milestone evaluation) would be appropriate if this proposal moves forward.
Our intention is not to question the good faith of any individual, but to ensure that Uniswap governance upholds the highest standards of impartiality, transparency, and accountability.