[Snapshot] [RFC] Deploying Uniswap v3 on Ronin with Co-Incentives - Voted AGAINST
Deploying Uniswap v3 on Ronin is a strategic opportunity to expand into a leading Web3 gaming ecosystem with millions of active users, and we’re supportive of it, especially considering that Ronin is planning to fully migrate to an Ethereum L2 by Q2 2026.
However, given that we generally only support the deployment of incentives on chains built on Ethereum, we do not feel comfortable voting in favor of deploying incentives to Ronin before it actually migrates.
We’d be happy to revisit this proposal after Q2 2026 and Ronin’s successful migration, and we’d be happy to support it then.
[Snapshot] GLI — Incentivized Delegation Vaults - Voted FOR
We see incentivized delegation vaults as a constructive experiment to address the quorum challenge in a more structural way than repeated treasury delegations. By directly rewarding token holders for their participation, this mechanism can help grow the pool of active delegators and reduce governance’s reliance on a handful of large actors.
At the same time, this support comes with caveats. Once incentives are exhausted, it is unclear whether delegators will remain engaged, and there is a risk that most delegations will still cluster around the most visible delegates. For this reason, we believe the DAO should treat this as a trial: if the program proves ineffective or leads to undesirable concentration, it should be reconsidered or discontinued.
On the other hand, if the program does prove to be successful, then the question shifts to delegation stickiness, and then to sustainability. Is it viable in the long run to offer incentives for people to delegate their tokens?
For us, the potential upside justifies giving this initiative a chance, provided strong monitoring and a clear willingness to adjust or sunset it if necessary.
[Snapshot] GLI — Treasury delegation Round 2 - Voted AGAINST
While we recognize the quorum challenge this proposal seeks to address, we are not convinced that another round of treasury delegations is the right path forward. The first round has already committed 10M UNI, and extending this model risks creating a recurring pattern where treasury funds are continuously delegated without solving the underlying issue.
From our perspective, this approach treats symptoms rather than causes. It reinforces reliance on a small set of delegates while introducing potential centralization concerns, even with the safeguards proposed.
Instead, we believe the DAO should explore structural alternatives, such as mechanisms similar to Scroll’s auto-abstaining wallet proposal, to ensure quorum without artificially boosting delegate power. This type of solution could provide a more neutral, long-term safeguard while we organically work on increasing governance participation.
Our opposition to this proposal should not be read as dismissing the problem. On the contrary, we agree that quorum mechanics deserve attention and improvement. However, we would prefer solutions that tackle the root of the issue rather than perpetuate temporary fixes.
[Tally] Establish Uniswap Governance as “DUNI,” a Wyoming DUNA - Voted FOR
As we mentioned in our temp-check comment, this proposal is an interesting shield for Uniswap Governance, providing legal clarity, liability protection, and the ability to interact with the off-chain world while preserving decentralization. Our support extends to this on-chain stage, though we want to once again emphasise that we would like to gain a better understanding of any potential future implications of choosing a U.S.-based entity to wrap the DAO with.