[TEMP CHECK] - Etherlink Co-incentives Proposal
Summary: Etherlink requests $150,000 and will contribute $300,000 of its own tokens toward incentives.
Recommendation: For GFX Labs, generally supports proposals by chains that are willing to double-match the DAO’s contributions. Etherlink has the potential to scale massively; we should support Etherlink and reestablish the precedent of supporting chains willing to allocate funds toward Uniswap.
TEMP Check: Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 4
Summary: Renew delegate incentives
Recommendation: Abstain. The program has yielded poor results. There has been no meaningful progress by delegates to effect positive change worth their compensation. The DAO would likely be better off incentivizing UNI token holders to delegate their votes and for delegates to earn compensation via productive proposals.
TEMP Check: Establish Uniswap Governance as “DUNI,” a Wyoming DUNA
Summary: The UF proposes that the DAO create a legal entity so the DAO can turn on protocol fees.
Recommendation: For. The tradeoff of establishing the DUNA is worth it if the DAO finally gets to turn on the fee switch.
Launching Uniswap v3 on Ronin with co-incentives
Summary: This poll asks UNI holders whether they support providing $500,000 in UNI to co-incentivize Uniswap on Ronin Network. Ronin will provide $1,000,000 in RON.
Recommendation: Vote For. The incentive amount is appropriate given the TVL of Ronin. Additionally, Ronin is providing incentives as well, and providing UNI demonstrates to Ronin that it is correct to de-emphasize the local DEX, Katana, and encourage users and assets to migrate to Uniswap v3.
NB: Oku is the front end at launch for Ronin Uniswap v3
GLI — Treasury delegation Round 2
Summary: This poll asks UNI holders whether they support a Treasury Delegation program to alleviate pressure to meet quorum for simple community votes. 10,000,000 UNI with a maximum allocation of 2,500,000 UNI per delegate would be the intended amounts to delegate through this program. Full details and discussion can be found here, and voters are advised to review.
Recommendation: Vote Against. This is an imperfect solution, and introduces political risks by having delegates elect delegates. We would prefer to see a rules-based approach, and one that does not require substantial time from either current voters or a specialized committee.
Many possible alternatives exist if the core goal is to meet quorum. The treasury could do a matching program, where UNI is only delegated to those who have their own UNI or could attract UNI from existing holders – thereby keeping the delegate accountable to actual owners of the protocol since the treasury delegation is tied to receiving and maintaining that delegation.
Finally, this is in addition to an existing 10,000,000 UNI delegation from governance assets. A second round following the same methodology would leave 2/3 of the regularly active votable supply in the hands of delegates not chosen by UNI holders. That introduces a high risk of capture of a class of delegates required to have no direct connection to ownership or owners of the protocol.
We agree that governance needs to find a solution to the problem of meeting quorum. But any solution needs to be credibly better than the status quo.
GLI — Incentivized Delegation Vaults
Summary: This poll asks UNI holders if they support allocating a budget of 18,200 UNI to build and provide two years of support for incentivized delegation vaults. 180,000 UNI would also be earmarked – but not transferred or irrevocably committed – to provide 2% yield on a targeted 9,000,000 of UNI delegated through these vaults.
Recommendation: Vote For. Even if this option does not end up being used, the expense is small and could be repurposed potentially.
Unichain Co-Incentives Growth Management Plan
Summary: This poll asks UNI holder if they support allocating ~$4,000,000 in UNI to incentivize USDS and Spark on Unichain.
Recommendation: Vote Against. Optimism provided 2,000,000 OP to Spark to deploy on Optimism + Unichain. Those funds are already financing 1/3 of the yield on sUSDS on Unichain. We would prefer to see what USDS supply looks like after those user incentives are exhausted, and it doesn’t make sense to further subsidize users holding sUSDS on Unichain with the existing 7% yield. This is especially important given that neither sUSDS nor USDS appear to be integrated into the DeFi ecosystem on Unichain. There appears to not even be a Uniswap pool with USDS or sUSDS on Unichain, nor is USDS or sUSDS integrated in lending markets like Morpho or Euler on Unichain.
Onchain Vote: Establish Uniswap Governance as “DUNI,” a Wyoming DUNA
Summary: The UF proposes that the DAO create a legal entity so the DAO can turn on protocol fees.
Recommendation: For. The tradeoff of establishing the DUNA is worth it if the DAO finally gets to turn on the fee switch.