Atiselsts.eth Delegate Platform

[kfx]

April Votes

Onchain

1. BoB Uniswap v3 Incentives Package

Vote: For.

Following the snapshot vote, I continue to support this proposal.

2. Establish Uniswap v4 Licensing Process

Vote: For.

Following the snapshot vote, I continue to support this proposal.

Snapshot

1. [TEMP CHECK] BoB Uniswap v3 Incentives Package

Vote: For $375k.

Previously I stated that I’d support v3 / multichain incentives in exceptional cases. BOB hits the checklist nicely, and therefore is such a case:

• Relatively solid total chain TVL

• Strong buy-in from the chain, prioritizing Uniswap as the top DEX on the chain.

• Solid existing Uniswap TVL and fee revenue, relative to the chain’s TVL.

• Last but not least, more than matching Uniswap’s incentives with their own, part of which is already distributed.

It’s slightly disappointing that they did not go straight for v4, but since their v3 deployment has already been active for some time, forcing them to switch to v4 would create unnecessary friction.

2. [TEMP CHECK] Establish Uniswap v4 Licensing Process

Vote: For.

This proposal will streamline v4 deployments, while keeping the risks minimal.

3. UAC Renewal S4

Vote: Renew UAC.

The UAC has been successfully operating for the past three seasons and is a key actor of the ecosystem and a focus point of the DAO.

The increase in the runway budget is reasonable and in line with the increased responsibilities.

The discretional budget ask is also reasonable, relatively small compared to the main budget, and will hopefully ensure that the UAC can operate without unnecessary friction.

4. Approved Budgets Rebalancing (S4)

Vote: Approve Rebalance.

This action is necessary due to UNI token price changes. As UNI remains very volatile, it’s expected that we’ll need to occasionally do this.

5. [Temp Check/Revised] Treasury Delegation Round 2

Vote: For.

This is a revised version of a proposal that I supported previously. As the revised version is even more conservative, I continue to strongly support it. The change from 18 to 12 month limit is fine due to the situation with Unistaker potentially coming live in 2025. (It’s good to learn that it has not been abandoned, at least.)

For those in doubt of the need of such a program, the fact is that the DAO has been reliant on the previous iteration to reach consensus on almost all votes. Until this situation in some other way, let’s keep the program running to keep the DAO operational.

6. [TEMP CHECK] Scaling V4 and Supporting Unichain

Vote: For.

The proposal has GFX Labs requesting $250k to integrate Uniswap v4 in Oku Trade.

I support this proposal primarily because I would support any proposal for an alternative frontend that has reasonable cost requirements and a competent, experienced team behind it. Having alternative frontends is important for Uniswap, as it reduces both regulatory and censorship risks. Uniswap is too important a protocol to rely on a single point of failure at the UI level. Additionally, it provides the DAO with some leverage over Labs—something sorely needed, as the DAO’s history demonstrates.

Side note on the conflict of interest involving @GFXlabs that someone mentioned (quote below). As one of the authors of the DAO Principles, I’d like to clarify how I interpret their application in this case.

@Herees

A further concern is an apparent violation of the Uniswap DAO’s stated governance principles. Specifically, the Uniswap Foundation’s published guidelines require that all conflicts of interest be disclosed and that delegates with such conflicts abstain from voting on related proposals. GFX Labs, despite having a direct financial interest in this proposal, has already voted in favor of its own Snapshot proposal. This action appears to be a clear breach of the DAO’s governance principles.

Let me be clear that this is a conflict of interest situation, and potentially falls under the guideline that “severe conflicts of interest […] must be avoided.” Ideally, GFX Labs should change their vote to “Abstain.” However, I don’t believe this alone is a reason to veto the proposal. The principles are non-binding and voluntary—a delegate may choose to disagree with them. (Though the vision is that violating the principles will make a delegate ineligible for DAO programs such as the Treasury Delegation Program.) Furthermore, to my knowledge, GFX Labs did not vote in favor of adopting the principles—perhaps anticipating situations like this—so at the very least, their position is internally consistent.