Vote: Against. Same rationale as for the snapshot vote.
To be clear, I will continue to support the UF and the DAO regardless of the outcome, even if I disagree with the proposed resource allocation: Disagree and commit.
Vote: Abstain. Upon reflection, I changed my “Against” vote in the snapshot to “Abstain” in the on-chain vote. While I believe it is important to provide liquidity incentives for the v3 to v4 migration, I do not want my vote to be interpreted as opposition to that effort.
That said, I want to reiterate that supporting Unichain incentives at this stage is premature. While Unichain has strong potential, the DAO should first establish some level of governance control over Unichain, including its fee switch. Additionally, incentives should be conditional on Labs delivering the promised technical innovations in Unichain, specifically:
Vote: Against. The liquidity incentive program has now been running for a year, and the evidence conclusively shows that providing incentives to low-TVL chains has been ineffective. As a result, I will vote against all such incentives going forward unless a compelling, exceptional case is made for the chain.
While the Saga architecture is interesting, it does not currently meet the threshold for an exceptional case.
Vote: For. Strong support. We clearly need the treasury delegation program to continue to reach quorum on votes. Furthermore, this is a solid proposal that improves the existing program in several ways (notably with automatically expiring delegations), is clear and comprehensive. I’m also happy to see that agreement to the Uniswap DAO Principles has been added as a requirement.
Previously I stated that I’d support v3 / multichain incentives in exceptional cases. BOB hits the checklist nicely, and therefore is such a case:
Relatively solid total chain TVL
Strong buy-in from the chain, prioritizing Uniswap as the top DEX on the chain.
Solid existing Uniswap TVL and fee revenue, relative to the chain’s TVL.
Last but not least, more than matching Uniswap’s incentives with their own, part of which is already distributed.
It’s slightly disappointing that they did not go straight for v4, but since their v3 deployment has already been active for some time, forcing them to switch to v4 would create unnecessary friction.
The UAC has been successfully operating for the past three seasons and is a key actor of the ecosystem and a focus point of the DAO.
The increase in the runway budget is reasonable and in line with the increased responsibilities.
The discretional budget ask is also reasonable, relatively small compared to the main budget, and will hopefully ensure that the UAC can operate without unnecessary friction.
This is a revised version of a proposal that I supported previously. As the revised version is even more conservative, I continue to strongly support it. The change from 18 to 12 month limit is fine due to the situation with Unistaker potentially coming live in 2025. (It’s good to learn that it has not been abandoned, at least.)
For those in doubt of the need of such a program, the fact is that the DAO has been reliant on the previous iteration to reach consensus on almost all votes. Until this situation in some other way, let’s keep the program running to keep the DAO operational.
The proposal has GFX Labs requesting $250k to integrate Uniswap v4 in Oku Trade.
I support this proposal primarily because I would support any proposal for an alternative frontend that has reasonable cost requirements and a competent, experienced team behind it. Having alternative frontends is important for Uniswap, as it reduces both regulatory and censorship risks. Uniswap is too important a protocol to rely on a single point of failure at the UI level. Additionally, it provides the DAO with some leverage over Labs—something sorely needed, as the DAO’s history demonstrates.
Side note on the conflict of interest involving @GFXlabs that someone mentioned (quote below). As one of the authors of the DAO Principles, I’d like to clarify how I interpret their application in this case.
Let me be clear that this is a conflict of interest situation, and potentially falls under the guideline that “severe conflicts of interest […] must be avoided.” Ideally, GFX Labs should change their vote to “Abstain.” However, I don’t believe this alone is a reason to veto the proposal. The principles are non-binding and voluntary—a delegate may choose to disagree with them. (Though the vision is that violating the principles will make a delegate ineligible for DAO programs such as the Treasury Delegation Program.) Furthermore, to my knowledge, GFX Labs did not vote in favor of adopting the principles—perhaps anticipating situations like this—so at the very least, their position is internally consistent.