Vote: Against. Same rationale as for the snapshot vote.
To be clear, I will continue to support the UF and the DAO regardless of the outcome, even if I disagree with the proposed resource allocation: Disagree and commit.
Vote: Abstain. Upon reflection, I changed my “Against” vote in the snapshot to “Abstain” in the on-chain vote. While I believe it is important to provide liquidity incentives for the v3 to v4 migration, I do not want my vote to be interpreted as opposition to that effort.
That said, I want to reiterate that supporting Unichain incentives at this stage is premature. While Unichain has strong potential, the DAO should first establish some level of governance control over Unichain, including its fee switch. Additionally, incentives should be conditional on Labs delivering the promised technical innovations in Unichain, specifically:
Vote: Against. The liquidity incentive program has now been running for a year, and the evidence conclusively shows that providing incentives to low-TVL chains has been ineffective. As a result, I will vote against all such incentives going forward unless a compelling, exceptional case is made for the chain.
While the Saga architecture is interesting, it does not currently meet the threshold for an exceptional case.
Vote: For. Strong support. We clearly need the treasury delegation program to continue to reach quorum on votes. Furthermore, this is a solid proposal that improves the existing program in several ways (notably with automatically expiring delegations), is clear and comprehensive. I’m also happy to see that agreement to the Uniswap DAO Principles has been added as a requirement.
Previously I stated that I’d support v3 / multichain incentives in exceptional cases. BOB hits the checklist nicely, and therefore is such a case:
Relatively solid total chain TVL
Strong buy-in from the chain, prioritizing Uniswap as the top DEX on the chain.
Solid existing Uniswap TVL and fee revenue, relative to the chain’s TVL.
Last but not least, more than matching Uniswap’s incentives with their own, part of which is already distributed.
It’s slightly disappointing that they did not go straight for v4, but since their v3 deployment has already been active for some time, forcing them to switch to v4 would create unnecessary friction.
The UAC has been successfully operating for the past three seasons and is a key actor of the ecosystem and a focus point of the DAO.
The increase in the runway budget is reasonable and in line with the increased responsibilities.
The discretional budget ask is also reasonable, relatively small compared to the main budget, and will hopefully ensure that the UAC can operate without unnecessary friction.
This is a revised version of a proposal that I supported previously. As the revised version is even more conservative, I continue to strongly support it. The change from 18 to 12 month limit is fine due to the situation with Unistaker potentially coming live in 2025. (It’s good to learn that it has not been abandoned, at least.)
For those in doubt of the need of such a program, the fact is that the DAO has been reliant on the previous iteration to reach consensus on almost all votes. Until this situation in some other way, let’s keep the program running to keep the DAO operational.
The proposal has GFX Labs requesting $250k to integrate Uniswap v4 in Oku Trade.
I support this proposal primarily because I would support any proposal for an alternative frontend that has reasonable cost requirements and a competent, experienced team behind it. Having alternative frontends is important for Uniswap, as it reduces both regulatory and censorship risks. Uniswap is too important a protocol to rely on a single point of failure at the UI level. Additionally, it provides the DAO with some leverage over Labs—something sorely needed, as the DAO’s history demonstrates.
Side note on the conflict of interest involving @GFXlabs that someone mentioned (quote below). As one of the authors of the DAO Principles, I’d like to clarify how I interpret their application in this case.
Let me be clear that this is a conflict of interest situation, and potentially falls under the guideline that “severe conflicts of interest […] must be avoided.” Ideally, GFX Labs should change their vote to “Abstain.” However, I don’t believe this alone is a reason to veto the proposal. The principles are non-binding and voluntary—a delegate may choose to disagree with them. (Though the vision is that violating the principles will make a delegate ineligible for DAO programs such as the Treasury Delegation Program.) Furthermore, to my knowledge, GFX Labs did not vote in favor of adopting the principles—perhaps anticipating situations like this—so at the very least, their position is internally consistent.
As in the snapshot, I continue to support this incentive. The updated Additional Use Grant text also makes extremely clear what the scope and limitations are.
While I did not support the initial Forse proposal, I’m willing to support this one. The reasons are:
I was hoping that there could be some competition in proposals aiming to analyze the DAO’s incentive programs. Since this has not happened, and Forse remains the only candidate with a concrete proposal, at this point its fair to support them.
The Forse team has delivered their initial analytics and proven their competency and ability to execute.
Some has raised concerns about duplication of work if/when Gauntlet does some of their own analysis, especially for Unichain. In my view, there is no duplication, since the incentives manager should not be the one responsible for analyzing the success of the program. Ideally that should be an unaffiliated third party, but absent that, Forse will have to do.
Polygon zkEVM - this was probably the least successful of DAO incentive programs in terms of TVL retention, so it would be important to do a postmortem here to avoid similar failures in the future.
zkSync - a fairly prototypical chain / L2 in the context of this incentive program, so can serve as a baseline for comparison. Also there’s a clear follow-up potential, to analyze the zkSync’s own Ignite incentive program, and contrast/compare that with the DAO’s incentive program.
To my knowledge, none of the candidates had a significantly different vision for the UAC compared with the existing UAC’s direction and responsibilities. In light of this, it made the most sense to look at the experience and accomplishments of the candidates in Uniswap DAO so far, so that the new UAC members can “hit the ground running”. Both Doo and Takeshi have experience in authoring and submitting proposals, being active members of working groups, etc. Doo also has previous UAC experience.