This proposal requests $250k to integrate Uniswap V4 on Ethereum into the Oku interface within two months and asks for a $90k annual budget to operate and maintain Unichain support. It also seeks a blanket Additional Use Grant so GFX Labs can deploy licensed V4 instances across new EVM chains without separate DAO votes, accelerating Uniswap’s growth beyond the 30+ chains already reached after its earlier $1.6M grant.
Vote: For
Rationale:
We supported this direction during the Snapshot vote, and our stance remains unchanged because ongoing Oku maintenance will keep the ecosystem’s primary user gateway robust while accelerating V4 adoption. The request is proportionate to the operational burden of keeping cross-chain infrastructure up to date and aligns with the DAO’s mandate to ensure key interfaces remain accessible and community-owned.
This election selects two candidates for Season 4 of the Uniswap Accountability Committee, which plays a critical role in maintaining accountability and evaluating governance processes within the DAO.
Vote:
Doo Wan Nam: 25%
Cole Schendl: 25%
Sov: 25%
Takeshi Ohishi: 25%
Rationale:
We chose candidates based on their demonstrated commitment to transparency, governance expertise, and consistent advocacy within the Uniswap community. Given that Takeshi from our organization participated as a candidate, we strictly adhered to the election’s voting guidelines, ensuring balanced representation and fair distribution among qualified nominees. This approach reinforces accountability standards, ensuring effective oversight within the committee.
The proposal is the second on-chain vote requesting the Uniswap DAO to allocate $250K for integrating Uniswap V4 into Oku on Ethereum, along with a recurring $90K per year to maintain Unichain support, aiming to drive liquidity migration, improve developer tools, and maintain the protocol’s leadership.
Vote: For
Rationale:
Our support for this proposal reflects a consistent stance demonstrated through the previous Snapshot vote and the prior on-chain vote. Utilizing external providers for diverse frontend interfaces and multi-chain expansions has repeatedly proven efficient, significantly reducing the workload for Labs and core development teams. We view this practice as highly beneficial, effectively optimizing resource allocation, we believe that GFX Labs is the right team to take the role after all the contributions in the past.
This proposal establishes a 12-month Technical Advisory Board to give Uniswap DAO consistent code-level guidance, backed by 2.5 million UNI of delegated voting power. It budgets 39,400 UNI to pay six technical advisors and one professional delegate.
Vote: Against
Rationale:
This proposal creates a costly advisory layer even though only two of the twenty-nine on-chain items since January 2024 were technically complex. Existing bodies—the UAC for deployments and the Foundation for partnerships—already cover the rare code changes, so a 39 k UNI budget and a 2.5 M UNI delegation add bureaucracy without closing a real gap. Pre-selecting six members also removes the community’s ability to choose its own experts and risks inactive participants drawing equal pay. The DAO can obtain ad-hoc audits far more cheaply whenever a genuine upgrade appears.
This proposal introduces a $4M Uniswap DAO incentive program, split between a $1M fixed budget and up to $3M in unlocks tied to TVL growth milestones for USDS and sUSDS on Unichain. The plan aims to rapidly expand stablecoin liquidity via co-incentives and monthly DAO oversight, with at least $2.4M reserved for co-incentives only if Unichain TVL surpasses $100M and retention targets are met.
Vote: For
Rationale:
This proposal represents a efficient use of DAO funds, since the majority of the $4M budget is strictly performance-based and directly tied to the growth of USDS and sUSDS on Unichain. The expansion of USDS is an important driver for Unichain’s ecosystem, and rewarding real, on-chain results with matched incentives makes sense both strategically and operationally. Looking forward, we believe that decisions around similar incentive programs should be more closely coordinated with the Uniswap Foundation to maximize alignment and impact.
This proposal is to allocate $300K in incentives from the Tezos Foundation and request a $150K co-incentive from the Uniswap DAO, aiming to bootstrap liquidity for key Uniswap v3 pools on Etherlink, an EVM-compatible Layer 2 built on Tezos Smart Rollup technology.
Vote: Do Not Approve
Rationale:
This proposal outlines an exciting path for Etherlink and Uniswap.
However, it does not yet demonstrate that the requested $150k in UNI incentives will lead to durable liquidity and volume after rewards conclude. Similar campaigns on other young networks faced difficulties retaining their TVL three months post-incentive, and we do not have any other data that would indicate potential stronger retention at this point.
Also, because the distribution is preset rather than KPI-based, the DAO would have little flexibility to adjust or pause the program if the results prove underwhelming.
This proposal outlines the Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative Cycle 4, a compensation program designed to improve and sustain the participation quality and dedication among Uniswap delegates following the conclusion of Cycle 1, 2, and 3.
Vote: FOR
Rationale:
The Delegate Reward Initiative has already proven to be an efficient mechanism for maintaining active governance contributors. Reinforcing it with financial alignment measures such as the UNI holding requirement is a refinement that improves the quality of participation without inflating the budget. We consider this direction both reasonable and beneficial, and we are in favor of the proposal.
The proposal is to establish “DUNI,” a Wyoming-registered Decentralized Unincorporated Nonprofit Association, as the legal entity for Uniswap Governance. It requests $16.5M in UNI for a legal defense and tax budget and $75k in UNI for Cowrie as compliance administrator.
Vote: FOR
Rationale:
We thank the proposers for the considerable work involved in developing this framework, which represents a decisive milestone for the DAO. Historically, the absence of liability protections and tax certainty has created a chilling effect on governance participation, and this step offers long-needed clarity and security for token holders. What is especially important is that the structure does not introduce centralized control, but instead codifies the primacy of Uniswap DAO’s decisions while equipping it to meet regulatory and tax obligations. We view this as a natural evolution of the DAO, one that both protects participants and enhances Uniswap’s credibility and competitiveness in a rapidly maturing environment.
This proposal is the onchain execution of a previously approved Snapshot vote, establishing Uniswap Governance as “DUNI,” a Wyoming DUNA. It includes $16.5M in UNI for legal and tax reserves and $75k in UNI to Cowrie, while leaving core protocol mechanics unchanged.
Vote: FOR
Rationale:
This proposal enacts onchain what was already approved by the Snapshot vote, and our fundamental stance remains unchanged. The simulation output showing an unexpected address was concluded to be specific to the Seatbelt/Tenderly environment. In actual execution, this address will not appear and has no effect on calldata or state. With this assurance, we are confident in proceeding. This step is important to equip Uniswap Governance with legal clarity while maintaining decentralization.
The proposal is to deploy Uniswap v3 on Ronin with $1M in RON incentives from Ronin and $500k in UNI incentives from the DAO, aiming to make Uniswap the primary DEX of the chain’s gaming ecosystem.
Vote: FOR
Rationale:
This proposal requests $500k in UNI incentives, which is a significant amount relative to Ronin’s current TVL of under $60M (Dune). However, the chain demonstrates strong fundamentals, with weekly transactions of 5.04M and nearly 480k weekly active addresses. figures that surpass Linea and compare favorably even to OP Mainnet.
Of course, since Ronin’s ecosystem has historically been gaming-centric, its user base cannot be compared directly with that of DeFi-focused rollups or general-purpose blockchains. Even so, these numbers are highly impactful and suggest that Ronin offers meaningful potential as a foundation for Uniswap v3’s growth.
With $1M of matching support from Ronin itself, this is the right moment to invest in positioning Uniswap v3 as the chain’s canonical DEX and to capture the onboarding of DeFi protocols and users into this ecosystem.
This proposal requests the onchain execution of the Unichain Co-Incentives Growth Management Plan, allocating 430.5K UNI ($4.11M) with $1M fixed and $3M performance-based, tied to ambitious KPIs such as reaching $60M, $100M, and $200M in USDS/sUSDS/sUSDC TVL. It aims to accelerate Unichain adoption through co-incentives, rebalancing pools, and weekly reporting.
Vote: FOR
Rationale:
This proposal builds upon the direction we already supported at the Snapshot stage, and we continue to endorse it here. The decision to raise KPI thresholds demonstrates a stronger commitment to accountability and ensures that the allocated $4.11M budget will be deployed effectively. While Unichain’s recent slowdown shows that broader and multifaceted measures are required, this program represents an essential component in addressing those challenges and should be pursued.
This proposal introduces Incentivized Delegation Vaults that give UNI holders a 2% APR for delegating, targeting 9M UNI in new delegations with up to 180,000 UNI reserved for emissions. It aims to reduce reliance on treasury delegations for achieving quorum.
Vote: FOR
Rationale:
This proposal directly addresses the quorum deficit by incentivizing delegation and complements treasury delegation as a short-term remedy. The quorum challenge is deep-rooted, and while long-term solutions such as Unistaker, UVN, and the establishment of DUNI may contribute, the timeline and certainty of their impact remain unclear. In the meantime, adopting this mechanism provides a direct and immediate path to strengthen quorum reliability. The associated cost is acceptable compared to the risk of stalled decision making, and in parallel with other measures it is not excessive for the value it secures.
The proposal recommends Treasury Delegation Round 2, where 10M UNI from the treasury will be distributed via a capped waterfall model to eligible delegates. This would expand total treasury-delegated UNI to 20M and bring the active votable supply closer to quorum.
Vote: FOR
Rationale:
This proposal provides a necessary step to address the quorum deficit that threatens to stall DAO governance. We have consistently emphasized the need for additional treasury delegations, and this round directly delivers on that need. While it does not solve the root causes of governance concentration, it represents the most straightforward and critical measure to ensure quorum in the short term. Given the limited set of available options, this initiative is essential to keep Uniswap governance functional and prevent systemic stagnation.
This election is to choose candidates to receive the treasury delegation approved by this Snapshot by the waterfall distribution described in this post.
Vote:
Tané 25%
Arana Digital 25%
Event Horizon 12.5%
KPK 12.5%
SEEDGov 12.5%
Avantgarde 12.5%
Rationale:
Adhering to the self-voting policy, we allocated 25% of the VP to ourselves. We also allocated 25% of the VP to Arana Digital, who has been the most active and influential member with their strong committement and contribution to the Uniswap Governance. We allocated the rest of the VP equally to the above delegates who have done significant contributions to the Uniswap Governance.
The UAC and Uniswap Growth Program, in collaboration with Plasma, have proposed a dual-tranche incentive program to support Uniswap’s deployment on the Plasma network. This proposal intends to accomplish two purposes:
Publicly signal the UAC’s intent to eventually allocate $250k from the incentives discretionary budget to the Plasma deployment. This is tranche 1.
Collaborate with Plasma to request an additional $250k from the treasury via the customary governance path (RFC, Snapshot, Onchain vote). This vote pertains to tranche 2.
Vote: Allocate $250k
Rationale:
Overall, we recoganize the growth and importance of the stablecoin-focused chains and see Plasma is the recent development that attracts interests and funds. Therefore, we are in full support of incentivizing the Uniswap presence in collaboration with the Plasma team.
For tranche 1, we understand that the UAC doesn’t need an approval from the governance as it’s well within the approved budget surplus. For tranche 2, we support the additional 250k from the treasury to support the incentivized growth of Uniswap on Plasma.
We vote against this proposal because of a couple of reasons as below:
We don’t consider the problem statement of this proposal is strong enough for the DAO to build a new function/contract by paying the cost. There has been ways for delegates who want to make a proposal and don’t possess an enough VP to do so; you can ask other delegates with enough VP to sponsor one or with the Foundation’s temporary delegation. We agree that it’s the best for an author to make a proposal by themselves, but also believe it’s not an urgent issue for the DAO to address at this moment.
We are against the idea that this “proposal factory” also votes on proposals with 20M VP delegated. If it were to be implemented, its scope is only making a proposal, not voting, and with the minimium required delegation to be eligible for making proposals (1M).
As blockful suggested, we believe it’s best for users (in this case, delegates) to be integrated into Tally, rather than commissioning another service provider with an additional cost because Tally has been the main frontend for Uniswap onchain governance and a Service Provider for the very service.
While we consider there is space for discussions about whether all the fees in TokenJar should be burned, we support the overall plan and its execution as the fee switch proposal the community waited for and appreciate the effort by Hayden, the Labs team, and the Foundation team.
We support the proposal as those three deployments are strategically important and make sense for Oku to support them while Uniswap frontend doesn’t. The ongoing costs seem reasonable as well.
We continue to support the proposal by GFX as we expressed our support at the Snapshot phase. (We are also glad to see an onchain proposal that are relatively operational passes with quorum)
We continue to support the important proposal as we expressed our support at the Snapshot phase. We continue to look for the impact made by the new mechanism and ongoing effort around it.
The initial protocol fee rollout has gone smoothly, so extending it to more chains and the remaining v3 pools is a reasonable scale-up. The tier-based v3 adapter also simplifies ongoing fee management while keeping governance control via overrides.