Arana Digital Delegate Platform

[AranaDigital]

April 2025 Voting Update

[Temp Check] Treasury Delegation Round 2

Vote: For

Type: Snapshot

Generally, we are in favor of this initiative and see it as a net benefit regardless of the drawbacks. Although the nature of Staker may significantly alter the delegation landscape, the details of how that’ll transpire are still unpredictable. The structure for Staker should be designed to funnel voting power towards those who contribute to Uniswap actively and meaningfully—and not just to name-brand entities.

@AbdullahUmar

My prediction is that UNI token holders, for the most part, will nonchalantly delegate their tokens to well-known names—granted their voting % is high enough (in case Staker rewards are based on a delegate’s voting rate). This will crowd out active delegates with smaller brands. Hence, one way the DAO can signal trust in certain entities is by delegating to them on its own. Right now, if you sort the top delegates by VP on Tally or Agora, you really don’t want folks to just delegate to those top entities. It should be a mix. Sadly, token holders don’t know delegates well. They just know brands from crypto in general.

Another aspect that we have a preference towards is using different metrics/methods to select the delegates who receive delegation:

@AbdullahUmar

Elections better mimic token holder delegation:

Voting for treasury delegation candidates better mimics the elective process that UNI token holders go through when determining who should have more weight in the system. It provides a direct mechanism for the community to choose trusted delegates based on a preference-based evaluation, reflecting the essence of representative selection. But the Delegate Reward Program prioritizes activity over community preference, which is a characteristic that probably shouldn’t fully translate to treasury delegation. Treasury delegation via voting and not fully based on “objective criteria” stands as the truer embodiment of the elective process, ensuring that influence is granted to those the community deems most worthy, not just the most active.

Popularity contests of course are a resulting issue. So a hybrid is probably best:

• 50% of a candidate’s score is derived by the stated numerical metrics

• 50% are based on an election

This way, the same people who get paid via the reward program are not necessarily the ones with more voting power—even though this will predominantly be the case anyways.

In sum, although there are aspects of the program that can be refined, we are in favor of continuing treasury delegation under the current state without Staker being active, and the presence of expiring delegation is something we’d like to see implemented via this program.