We do not share the sentiment outlined that the proposal has no consensus, that the negative vote was almost null, and that abstentions, although valid, do not mean being against the proposal.
We would like to share some thoughts on what has been discussed in the last few posts, especially @AbdullahUmar’s post:
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Of course the ideal would be that the quorum is reached with genuine participation of the tokenholders and not existing it, as it is the case, could be achieved with a delegation campaign, but even successful takes time to polanificación, implementation and waiting for results. This, although ideal, is not real according to the current circumstances of the DAO and the near future, even with a successful delegation campaign.
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So, this proposal, although not ideal, is necessary because the real situation today is that it is very difficult to get a quorum for onchain proposals, and even more so when the VP of the previous cycle is de-delegated. We would like to warn of the real and concrete risk of paralysis of the DAO if this proposal is not approved.
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Lowering the quorum is an even more dangerous and risky scenario, we do not recommend following this path which could put the DAO at risk of a governance attack, the quorum is a line of defense to make an attack costly, so we need to increase participation, not lower the quorum.
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We do not see the 18 month term (with re-selection at 1 year) as a problem as it proposes to revoke the delegation if a delegate does not maintain the participation requirements, so that only active delegates will enter and remain in the program, delegates without good participation metrics will lose their assigned VP.
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Likewise, we do not agree that this proposal limits that within the 18 month period it can be extended for more delegates to be included if the DAO deems it necessary. There is nothing to impede this being proposed, voted on and implemented.
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The method of selection by the delegate reward program scoring, while not ideal, we believe is objective and fair as it allows active delegates with good participation parameters to be eligible. The method of total or partial/hybrid selection by election means selection by popularity contest and, even worse, it implies the real risk of incentivizing a carterization agreement of delegates to vote among a group, which would be undesirable and not in line with good governance practices and violates the Uniswap DAO Principles (‘Delegates must prevent the formation of cartels and ensure that the protocol is protected from any proposals driven by personal motives that do not align with the protocol’s best interests’), as this selection system may favour popular delegates or delegates who reach agreements without necessarily being active, which goes against the objective of this proposal to increase UNI’s participation in voting.
We support this proposal without changes and are willing to support it in the on chain vote.