Hello!
Firstly, we would like to thank the UAC members for this post. Several delegates, including ourselves, have been warning for months about the quorum situation in the DAO, the risk of paralysis it faces and the need to find solutions.
We have some comments to make about the proposed alternatives in the post itself.
I. Community Proposal Factory (CPF)
This system didn’t address the DAO’s current main issue: onchain quorum. Lowering the proposal threshold to 1M UNI doesn’t solve the actual problem, as posting proposals has not been a bottleneck — it is common practice to coordinate with high-VP holders to publish them. Therefore, we do not see a need for this change.
Moreover, this proposed solution introduces an additional layer of complexity that is not justified given the current scale and activity level of the DAO. While such a mechanism might make sense in a larger DAO with a broader scope—where specialized sub-DAOs or expert groups could curate proposals—this is not the case in Uniswap DAO. If the main discussion space remains the forum, and no modifications can be made between Snapshot and on-chain execution, the added structure risks becoming counterproductive rather than helpful.
We also disagree with the 10M delegation boost from the CPF smart contract. This is effectively a 25% onchain quorum reduction (from 40M to 30M), increasing governance risk by making it significantly easier for a malicious actor to reach quorum.
II. Incentivized Delegation Vaults (IDVs): Increase Votable Supply
We do not support this approach that incentivizes V.P. delegation through UNI emissions or treasury allocations. Like with TVL-based incentives for liquidity pools, this approach creates unsustainable behaviors: tokenholders delegate while incentives are high, and withdraw when they’re gone, leaving governance participation dependent on continuous spending.
Also and more important, this system would compete against the soon-to-be-launched Unichain Validation Network (UVN) whereby tokenholders will be compensated for staking UNI to validate the network. We do not believe that another incentive system for parallel and external staking should be created to compete against the official UVN.
III. Treasury Delegation
This is a suboptimal solution, as the ideal scenario would involve aligning incentives with tokenholders so they participate directly or by delegating their voting power. Given the DAO’s current situation, another valid option would be for the UAC and Foundation to actively reach out to institutional tokenholders—such as a16z in the past—and encourage them to delegate to a curated group of delegates (potentially the same group that would receive the treasury delegation).
However, considering that outreach efforts to institutional tokenholders have shown limited results in other DAOs (e.g., Lido), treasury delegation emerges as a viable and pragmatic alternative. In this context, we reaffirm our support for @Tane’s proposals and continue to believe this is the most effective and low-risk solution at this specific time. It organically increases voting power by delegating to high-performing delegates, ensuring that the voting power is in active and responsible hands.
Key advantages:
- Zero cost to the DAO.
- A review mechanism allows delegation to be withdrawn from inactive delegates.
- Easy to revoke if needed at any time if conditions change, participation increases and it is no longer necessary to boost the V.P. in this way.
It is flexible, safe, and efficient.
IV. Quorum Alteration
We oppose this proposal. While lowering quorum may appear to be a quick fix, it introduces serious risks by reducing the barrier to a governance attack.
If the UNI price drops, this risk increases. Additionally, changing the quorum requires smart contract changes, adding further complexity and potential points of failure.
V. Optimistic Governance
While we support this approach as a voting system that we understand to be positive in certain cases, it remains unclear to us which proposals would fall under this category and which should continue using the traditional voting system.
Moreover, this system also does not solve the root problem. It may help with routine, whitelisted proposals and proposers, but doesn’t impact more strategic or high-stakes proposals, which are the ones struggling to reach quorum.
Given the DAO’s current quorum problem, non-routine and important votes will continue to be at risk of paralysis. Although the optimistic governance system was designed to handle low-risk routine and procedurally proposals, it was not intended to address the issue of difficulty in achieving a quorum. Solutions should not be found in tools that were not designed to address these particular problems.
Final Thoughts
It’s crucial to consider that Unichain is launching the Unichain Validation Network (UVN), which will offer official staking rewards for UNI holders to validate the network. This initiative will likely increase UNI holder engagement within the Uniswap ecosystem.
In this context:
- Incentivized Delegation Vaults (IDVs) would directly compete with official staking, which we believe is counterproductive.
- Solutions like CPF and Quorum Alteration pose governance security risks.
- Optimistic Governance does not address the real issue.
We firmly believe that Treasury Delegation remains the best short-term solution. It provides safety, zero cost, and strategic flexibility while we await UVN’s rollout that will encourage large holders to mobilise their funds for staking, which presents a unique opportunity to onboard these large UNI holders into governance through direct participation or delegation. We believe that this is where efforts should be focused.