We appreciate the effort by the UAC team for delivering such a thorough and well-structured analysis. This post does an excellent job of surfacing the critical issues facing Uniswap governance and framing a path toward constructive solutions.
From my perspective, the situation is clear: our governance is structurally precarious. Quorum margins are near historic lows, and our ability to pass proposals increasingly depends on the consistent participation of a very small group of delegates. This over-reliance creates a systemic risk where the the abstention of just one or two key actors can stall the entire governance process.
The quorum vulnerability we observe is not the root problem but a symptom of two underlying factors:
1. Low participation among delegates
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Inactive or “ghost” delegates – A number of delegates hold significant voting power but fail to participate, rendering that power dormant.
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Delegators delegating to inactive delegates – Tokenholders compound this issue by delegating to these inactive accounts, effectively sidelined their own voting power.
2. Undelegated tokens
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Institutional undelegation events – cases like a16z where large-scale undelegations from funds or institutions for asset transfer or exit positions, which abruptly reduce votable supply.
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Dormant Undelegated UNI – wallets that hold UNI but have never delegated, leaving this portion of the supply inactive in governance.
I also agree with @1a35e1’s observation that the problem is not the total delegated UNI (~193M), but rather the inactivity of much of this delegated power. While this latent voting power leaves governance vulnerable to decision paralysis, it also represents a profound opportunity if reactivated.
Thus, the ultimate goal should be to increase meaningful governance participation across two critical dimensions:
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Votable Supply – increasing the amount of delegated UNI by encouraging delegation from holders and mitigating risks from large-scale undelegations (e.g., institutional actors like a16z) through proactive outreach.
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Delegate Activity – improving how delegated voting power is utilized by:
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Ensuring delegates who receive voting power actively participate in governance.
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Guiding delegators to delegate to active participants rather than ghost or inactive delegates.
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1. Community Proposal Factory (CPF)
I share the view that CPF does not directly address the quorum issue. While it may improve accessibility and inclusivity, there is little evidence that delegates with small voting power currently face difficulty pushing proposals, as coordination with larger holders is already a functional pathway.
Moreover, CPF comes with structural complexity and implementation costs that may not be justified at Uniswap’s current scale. A key concern is the security risk tied to its design:
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The CPF contract would hold a standing 10M UNI delegation to push proposals to the main DAO.
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This effectively lowers the quorum for CPF-originated proposals from 40M to 30M UNI, reducing the cost for reaching quorum.
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If misconfigured, this could make it significantly easier for a malicious actor to exploit the process and pass harmful proposals.
Rationale: CPF is not a priority for addressing the current quorum and participation issues. However, it could still be tested as an experimental tool to enhance proposal diversity, provided the DAO agrees on strict safeguards and clear cost-benefit justification.
2. Incentivized Delegation Vaults (IDVs)
I strongly support this solution. IDVs directly incentivize delegators, targeting both:
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New UNI holders who have not delegated yet, and
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Existing delegators who are currently delegating to inactive or “ghost” delegates.
This strategy aligns well with the goal of activating dormant voting power. We are keen to contribute to the discussions on defining “active delegates” to ensure the program 's effectiveness similar to our works within Obol collective.
Regarding the concern from SeedGov that IDVs may overlap with UVN. I agree with @DonOfDAOS’s clarification. While UVN is promising, its timeline is uncertain and its impact is not guaranteed to fully address quorum issue. It may be prudent, therefore, to concurrently explore DAO-led solutions like IDVs. Such initiatives could serve as valuable complements to UVN, addressing any delegation gaps it might leave unaddressed, and could be phased out if UVN proves to be a comprehensive solution on its own.
3. Treasury Delegation Expansion (TDR2)
I support TDR2 as a necessary short-term measure to improve the quorum issue. However, it should be treated as a temporary bridge, not a permanent solution.
To maximize its impact while avoiding governance centralization, its implementation would ideally involve:
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Paired with Healthy Delegation Margin (HDM) tracking to evaluate whether it actually improves participation.
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Distributed carefully to avoid further concentrating voting power among existing large delegates.
I also echo SeedGov’s point that active outreach to institutional tokenholders—such as previous efforts with a16z—should be pursued alongside TDR2. Encouraging these investors to delegate to a curated set of active delegates would greatly strengthen quorum issue while keeping voting power in engaged, responsible hands.
4. Quorum Alteration
I do not support quorum reduction. Lowering the quorum threshold increases unnecessary security risks while failing to address the root cause of the problem (low participation and undelegated tokens).
Since there are alternative solutions with less risk and more alignment with improving delegate engagement, this should not be pursued.
5. Optimistic Governance
I also do not see Optimistic Governance as a solution to our current quorum problem.
It may improve efficiency for routine proposals, but it does not impact participation in high-stakes votes—the ones most at risk.
If implemented, we should clearly define which proposal types fall under this model to avoid confusion or misuse.
Like CPF, it is not a priority but could be tested as an experimental process improvement.
Additional Consideration: Dynamic Quorum
Another solution worth exploring is Dynamic Quorum, where the threshold is not a fixed number but can adjust over time. While the implementation details would require careful research,one potential design could involve adjusting the thresholds based on metrics like recent delegate activity. The primary benefit would be ensuring our quorum requirement remains realistic and connected to the actual state of governance activity.
Summary of Stance
Based on the analysis above, my current position on each solution is as follows:
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Treasury Delegation Expansion (TDR2): Support as a necessary short-term measure, with HDM tracking, careful distribution, and active outreach to institutional tokenholders to strengthen governance without over-centralization. -
Incentivized Delegation Vaults (IDVs): Support, as they directly activate dormant voting power and align incentives, with the understanding that they complement rather than conflict with UVN.
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Quorum Alteration: Do not support, as it introduces risk while failing to address the root cause. -
Community Proposal Factory (CPF): Not a priority for solving the current problem, but could be tested under strict safeguards as an experimental tool for proposal diversity. -
Optimistic Governance: Not a priority for addressing quorum, but may be valuable as a process improvement if scope is clearly defined.
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Dynamic Quorum: Recommend research to explore its feasibility as a long-term, adaptive governance mechanism.
These are my initial thoughts on the path forward.I look forward to continuing this discussion and incorporate perspectives from other delegates as we work toward a solution that ensures Uniswap governance remains resilient and decentralized.