Maybe I’m just particularly pessimistic in this way but I think the thresholds for quorum and proposals need to come way down. Like, way down. Looking at even real life examples, there will always be a significant chunk of people who won’t delegate and who aren’t interested in voting or are in different time zones or are holding these for investment and doesn’t even know the community exists or whatever. The key is that it’s pretty much unavoidable that if you use a high quorum to enforce decentralization , you’re likely to get stagnation. In real life examples, American voter turnout has always been low, because many don’t feel that their opinions were represented, or they don’t care about the issues, or that they didn’t know, etc. And in a sphere like this you can’t force people to delegate without people randomly delegating as a popularity context for “for the lulz”. This of course benefits centralization because if you can just use attention to get votes from people who don’t care, well, there it is.
I think that there should possibly be a few different categories of proposals in addition to the “pork problem” (riders that gets added on for the benefit for a few), in terms to what degree they affect policies writ large how much potential impact, insfoar as they can be calculated, and adjust the requirements accordingly. How many counts for a quorum, how many needs to just to get the proposal on the table, etc, doesn’t need to be fixed forever but be done on a sliding scale. Now, of course the law of unintended consequences tends to throw wrenches down the line, but that just requires some sort of way to figure out how quickly these can change via voting. It may tale some time to work out a reasonable system here on testnet or something before this can be put in.
And some of this is spitballing but I’ve been intrigued with the notion of decision-making in a certain sense by lottery. Now, an ordinary lottery wouldn’t work if a centralized actor holds a ton of power already, but it may also be possible to essentially delegate specific proposals addressing more particular areas of reform out to smaller groups of randomly selected voters who are put their hats i nthe ring so to speak, to work out, and then depending on impact either then put it in as a general proposal or if it’s something truly minor, enact it with obvious knowledge ahead of time. I need to flesh this out, certainly. There are no perfect systems and the goal needs to balance between functional and fairness and that’s kind of a problem that has existed for centuries.
I’m personally less concerned about “governance attacks” per se but more the way it is done. We’ve seen both relatively easily systems go to waste (the 1933 March German Elections, even though their safeguards meant that Hitler failed to even get a majority but were able to get dictatorial power anyway) with overwhelming support with threats of violence and bribery) and in the current US congress where pretty much nothing ever gets passed because even though they’re only a few votes short, that gives immense power nonetheless to the party with even 1 extra vote to dictate literally everything. I personally think that the way you prevent hostile takeovers is to not create a system where power can truly be concentrated in a way such as that. I know this is all lofty but pie-in-the-sky right now but at least that’s the sort of safeguards we need to have in mind. I’ll gladly do some research in the next few (I’m quarantined right now so at least I have time) because governance is of course hard but it doesn’t mean it’s bound to fail.