The treasury fund it’s a mechanism to fund Uniswap development, any token distribution outside that intent should be considered dilution (it takes value from UNI holders and doesn’t add anything for them).
Fair enough, however, we already knew that the app did it, and that’s fine. But do you mind providing some proof that the Dharma didn’t added Uniswap to their landing on the 18 of September?. It may sound silly, but if that section of the landing was added on that date, in my opinion it shows a particular intention of manipulating public opinion of UNI holders. TBF there is a good chance that the image was there before it, but proof would be nice.
If we assume that 3rd party providers must compromise to move this proposal further, what do you think about these options:
a) The second airdrop includes a newly designed vesting, something around 5 or 10 years. These vested UNIs can vote but cannot be sold (and can’t be delegated, to avoid the formation of a cartel).
b) The companies that currently provide an “alternative frontend” to Uniswap can only be considered as such if they sign an exclusivity contract with Uniswap, only then their users can be considered truly “Uniswap users” and we can procede with the airdrop.
c) The companies behind these requests must provide a token of similar/equivalent value of the amount of USD that the Uniswap treasury has to use in order to move this proposal further, the format could vary depending if the company has a token or not.
Any reply to why MEW are in phase one? I asked about this multiple times in the thread. Would prefer if you answered here than in a DM so everyone can see it.
Since the proposal is being pushed back for a decrease in quorum, it should also be pushed back to after a vote on a UNI/ETH rewards pool. Shared this in the UNI/ETH thread but it should be here as well.
Hey Everyone, I wanted to share some thoughts on the two main proposals being discussed within this governance channel, and why I think we should be championing a UNI/ETH farming pool before any retroactive airdrop that @nadav_dharma and the rest of the Dharma team have been proposing. This proposal is in no way questioning the merits of the retroactive airdrop. As an analyst working in this space I have my own opinions on it, but it will ultimately come down to governance to decide what to do. That is what is nice about governance tokens, my opinion doesn’t matter.
To discuss why I think a UNI/ETH rewards pool should come before any retroactive airdrop, I want to take a high level look at what has worked over the past few months in during the yield craze. To me the what has surprised me the most has not been the amount of capital going into farming (You can see growth in TVL here: https://defipulse.com/) but the speed at which this capital has been rotating to different assets. There is no other asset class where billions of dollars can rotate investments in a few clicks at 3am on a Sunday night But to me this makes it clear that these new assets have no investible moat. That has lead me to ask what does have a moat, and what else is benefiting from this trend when looking at how to invest. To me this is pretty clear, it is the underlying assets that are used to earn yield in almost all new farming projects. This is your YFI’s, SNX’s, LEND’s, and LINK’s. These have all been assets used to farm in multiple farming projects from YAM to Kimchi, and all saw increases in price because of it. I see this because of two reasons. The first being it locks up a significant percentage of the circulating supply causing a liquidity crisis on the buyside. With high yields, more people look to buy the underlying asset to capture that yield, causing a recursive feedback loop to the upside. The second and more important is that it gives an additional use case to a governance token. The token is making people money rather than just a say in governance I discussed this more in another thread about whether the fee switch should be a dividend or a token burn.(Message 47, [POLL] How Would We Structure a Fee Reward? ) Alittle different, but apply the same line of thinking here.
Turning towards a UNI/ETH pool. By having UNI as an underlying asset to earn more UNI we would accomplish both of the two things outlined above. We would lock up a significant chunk of UNI and holders of UNI would make money/earn yield rather than just a say in governance, and ultimately help end the sell pressure that UNI has been seeing. It would also begin pulling UNI off of centralized exchanges, which I think is everyone’s goal.
This should be done before any vote on either retroactive airdrop proposal because it will provide a way for the new UNI holders to make more money instead of just seeing 400 UNI offers across all exchanges. I believe a UNI/ETH rewards pool will have a significant impact on slowing down any dilution in the form of retroactive airdrops as well as begin building a price floor for UNI overall, and would love to see this proposal up for a vote and active before any retroactive airdrop proposals. I am happy to answer any questions or concerns to what I have outlined above. Long UNI
A large part of the success of Uniswap is a product of 3rd party integrations.
The thousands of users who swapped coins on dharma knew they were going through Uniswap.
These thousands of users and their thousands of transactions were adding liquidity and velocity through Uniswap.
There is nothing arbitrary about it. Uniswap is benefiting from Dharma.
nadav_dharma is an unselfish leader in this space campaigning on behalf of his users to promote both his product and Uniswap. His interest is in achieving fairness in the intent behind the distribution of UNI tokens.This distribution was not meant to exclude active users of the Uniswap platform. Yes, devs can’t get it right all the time in the complex world of software. I know this only too well.
Your worries about dilution are unfounded because the tokens are coming from the treasury, and unless you wish to liquidate your ‘interest’ early, there is no change to the fully diluted valuation.
Your claim that you understand the ‘spirit’ of the Uniswap system is also interesting. I believe this will be understood once the proposal is completed. That’s the nature of a DAO. It attempts to represent its values through the delegated parties that are charged with upholding this ‘spirit’. Your voice is but one in a quorum. Your appeal is an opinionated attempt to influence members to deny a vibrant partner within the Uniswap ecosystem. The impact of these types of decisions will have far reaching effects on the health of this ecosystem. Don’t assume Uniswap can survive in a bubble without frens.
Thank you for your response. I guess we’ll have to disagree on the use of the word ‘enrichment’. I tend to evaluate systems - not necessarily people. I see ‘enrichment’ of ecosystems as a product of USE. In a model where the Value of this ecosystem is greater than the sum of its parts, everyone participates towards this goal.
I don’t see ‘enrichment’ as the post-hoc greedy attempt to ‘cash-in’ on an air-drop. Nadav won’t personally benefit from this, except to champion the interests of his user community. Dharma users are as conscientious, loyal and thoughtful as dedicated Uniswap supporters. Demonizing one because of the disputed terms of an air-drop is unfair to them.
btw - you didn’t mention ‘dilution’, but you made reference to ‘market price of UNI’, so i apologize for the inference, if it indeed was incorrect.
This treasury should be spent on development, R&D, marketing, support, etc… not on handing money to companies just because. IMO It still counts as a dilution, because the recipients of those tokens are not going to be contributing anything to Uniswap in exchange for it.
I think you are failing to recognize that Dharma users would have received the original UNI airdrop if the Uniswap integration at Dharma was only slightly different. This has happened with other apps where the integration wasn’t going via a proxy contract (which allows developers more freedom/agility with how the integration can be used). There are already accounts out there that received the UNI without ever using the actual default Uniswap.org frontend.
I’m sorry, but I think your argument (also mentioned by others) that the airdrop should remain exclusive to users of the actual Uniswap frontend simply does not work, since the original UNI airdrop already included users and accounts of many different apps. If you need confirmation for this, you can look at Argent and Instadapp, for example, who both published guides for their users how to claim and withdraw UNI from their smart contract wallet accounts at those apps.
That air-drop was the biggest marketing event in Uniswap’s history from what i can tell. Adding another meagre allocation from the treasury to extend this campaign demonstrates Uniswap’s awareness of the value.
Your assertion that ‘recipients’ of the token are not going to contribute is also suspect - how do we know? In fact, what you are inferring is that Dharma (et al) users are ‘LESS’ likely to contribute positively with their UNI than original Uniswap token owners. If we are Uniswap owners, don’t we all belong to the same community? Is growing this community advantageous to you? I’m curious to know what your exact intentions are in expressing your opinion. If they are to ensure that current Market Cap isn’t diluted temporarily, then i agree with your argument. However, if they are to exclude a portion of Uniswap users from the community, simply because they operated through a proxy on a mobile wallet (pretty innovative!), then your argument doesn’t make sense. Why would you bite the hand that feeds you?
And were does it end? this second airdrop wave would cost us 40m USD, is that the best way we can spend 40m USD on marketing? should we keep doing more airdrops then? It doesn’t make any sense
Because those users never bothered to even interact with the Uniswap protocol directly in the first place, most likely they don’t really care about it… they are Dharma users, before the airdrop they didn’t even tried to use Uniswap directly (otherwise they would have been included)
No, someone who willingly tried Uniswap before the 1st of September, or provided liquidity to Uniswap v1 doesn’t belong to the same community as someone who happen to be routed using Uniswap by pure chance.
The airdrop wasn’t perfect, that doesn’t mean that we need to keep accentuating the problems of the initial airdrop.
The Argent case was different, the users that used wallet connect to interact with Uniswap received their airdrop just fine, that’s because they opened https://uniswap.exchange/ and did the trade there, Argent was just a wallet in that sense, they are Uniswap users. On the contrary some users traded using the Argent “exchange” integration, those users are Argent users and they didn’t interacted with Uniswap directly, they didn’t received the airdrop.
InstadApp users shouldn’t have received the airdrop, but at some point they cannot be distinguished from “Real” users without having to implement complex rules for that, so it’s a known inefficiency of the original airdrop, that doesn’t mean that we need to keep worsening the situation.
There has been a lot of discussion about how Dharma’s retroactive airdrop proposal is not dilutive because it would come out of treasury tokens that unlock on the 18th. TLDR, it is a lot more nuanced than that. First, lets look at what the tokens in the community treasury are meant for: " The governance treasury will retain 43% [430,000,000 UNI] of UNI supply to distribute on an ongoing basis through contributor grants, community initiatives, liquidity mining , and other programs." Lets start with liquidity mining. Though liquidity mining is dilutive in nature as users sell UNI to capture the yield, this dilution is predictable and distributed over time. Additionally, as I mention above in this thread (message 170/179) we can remove some of that sell pressure by introducing a UNI/ETH rewards pool, something I think should be a priority before any retroactive airdrop proposals. Further more, at current UNI coming to market per day, it is highly unlikely that all of the Y1 community treasury will come to market in the first year. Now looking at grants, again by looking at amount of money going towards grants from other projects such as ANT or GNO, there is no way the full Y1 community treasury will be distributed throughout the year, additionally grant holders are directly incentivized to hold onto excess UNI over expenses as their work should lead to a material impact on the UNI price if grants are distributed correctly. Even more importantly than that, and why it is so important to turn on the fee switch is that by holding onto the UNI, they will earn a portion of Uniswap’s revenues that will likely cover expenses and lead to less sell pressure. IMO both of these distributions lead to less dilution and directly benefit UNI holders as it either brings in more Uniswap users leading to higher trading fees through farming and improves overall infrastructure through R&D with grants.
Now changing the focus to the retroactive airdrop proposal, we already have an example of how recipients interact with their airdropped UNI from the initial airdrop.
We saw a huge amount of 400 UNI offers across DEX’s and centralized exchanges after the initial airdrop, and expect the same thing with any retroactive airdrop. This is not to argue for or against the retroactive airdrop proposal, we have our own opinions and will vote in any retroactive proposals. However, it is to say that arguing that a retroactive airdrop is not dilutive is not nuanced, and comparing yield farming and grants vs the airdrop lead to two very different types of dilution, and different benefits for Uniswap and UNI token holders. Happy to discuss more!
You may not be aware of the fact that on Dharma’s SWAP view, there exists the Unicorn logo to let everyone know what is powering their transaction. They all know. Perhaps they prefer the accessibility of a mobile interface over a website/metamask integration.
Do you really think that a new DeFi user understands the meaning of that small Unicorn logo? It could mean anything to the untrained eye… it’s almost a white label integration
And still, users of the Dharma wallet are users of Dharma, Uniswap has no way of retaining them unless Dharma signs an exclusivity contract
@jumnhy on the Argent side we checked the uniqueness of our list vs the original Uniswap drop. We did start working with Kyber to have a unified list but then the proposals were split, so Kyber would have to remove all duplicates from their list if this proposal is approved. We could definitely have users in common with Dharma or others too but @0age is correct, these duplicates would be removed when building the airdrop Merkle root.
Application aggregators that take a large slippage or addition exchange fee from its users for trades should have to pay a % of this to the treasury.
For example: lets say dharma charges 3%~ slippage per trade to its users. Then .10% of this 3% should be directed to the treasury OR to be supplemental cash flow to the reward fee once switched.
Users will be more likely to keep these UNI rather than dump onto the market.
So the original proposal was abandoned in order to lower the quorum and yet Univalent haven’t even held up their end of the bargain, and voted. Not going to get 40 million at this rate.
But to me this makes it clear that these new assets have no investible moat. That has lead me to ask what does have a moat, and what else is benefiting from this trend when looking at how to invest. To me this is pretty clear, it is the underlying assets that are used to earn yield in almost all new farming projects. This is your YFI’s, SNX’s, LEND’s, and LINK’s. These have all been assets used to farm in multiple farming projects from YAM to Kimchi, and all saw increases in price because of it. I see this because of two reasons. The first being it locks up a significant percentage of the circulating supply causing a liquidity crisis on the buyside. With high yields, more people look to buy the underlying asset to capture that yield, causing a recursive feedback loop to the upside. The second and more important is that it gives an additional use case to a governance token. The token is making people money rather than just a say in governance I discussed this more in another thread about whether the fee switch should be a dividend or a token burn.(Message 47, 
