Cp0x Delegate Platform

Delegation Pitch
21

Establish Uniswap Governance as “DUNI,” a Wyoming DUNA

Creating a legal entity for the DAO in the US under the Wyoming-registered Decentralized Unincorporated Nonprofit Association (DUNA) law.
As I’ve written before, this might mean saying goodbye to the idea of distributing revenue to UNI holders/stakers.
But it will be interesting to see the first major project registering a DAO in the US

Vote: FOR
Platform: Snapshot

[GOVERNANCE PROPOSAL] - Establish Uniswap Governance as “DUNI,” a Wyoming DUNA
22

GLI — Treasury delegation Round 2

Rationale:
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-governance-logistics-improvements/25737/31?u=cp0x

Vote: FOR
Platform: Snapshot

23

GLI — Incentivized Delegation Vaults

Rationale:
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-governance-logistics-improvements/25737/31?u=cp0x

Vote: FOR
Platform: Snapshot

24

Launching Uniswap v3 on Ronin with co-incentives

The vote is quite controversial:

  1. Ronin has had a Uniswap fork for quite a long time, which, as far as I understand, is controlled by Ronin itself
    It is quite strange that Ronin themselves want to take away part of the profit from their fork and give it to Uniswap - but for Uniswap this is certainly a plus
  2. The amount of $500,000 is quite large and higher than the standard $250,000 for deployment in other networks, but since the network is already operational, it is possible to accept such an amount

Vote: FOR
Platform: Snapshot

25

Establish Uniswap Governance as “DUNI,” a Wyoming DUNA

Rationale:
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/cp0x-delegate-platform/25321/21?u=cp0x

Vote: FOR
Platform: Uniswap Agora

26

Unichain Co-Incentives Growth Management Plan

Unfortunately, instead of analyzing the problem, Uniswap decided to just throw money at the chain
I initially voted against allocating funds to Unichain - the whole point is that there are a lot of chains and some of them provide some advantages (constant) for users, but this chain does not have this
It is necessary to think about the constant advantages of users, such as reducing the commission or others, before using money to solve problems that cannot be solved with money

Vote: AGAINST
Platform: Uniswap Agora

27

Grow Uniswap on Plasma

At first glance, this seems like a standard request for $500k for Plasma incentives.
But there’s a catch: the request is split into $250k + $250k.

Why is this?

The quorum issue is still unresolved → there’s a risk that the DAO won’t approve the entire amount.

But Uniswap has a trump card: the UAC, which has $721k. It’s easy to take $250k from these funds without a DAO vote (but it requires the internal consent of all five members).

Essentially, this vote is only for $250k, because the UAC might issue the other $250k.

Vote: FOR
Platform: Snapshot

28

Treasury Delegation Round 2 Elections

Voted (you could only cast a quarter of the votes)

For cp0x, Curia, Event Horizon, DAOplomats

I believe these delegates are the most deserving of representing Uniswap for their open positions and fair voting.

Voted:
25% for cp0x,
25% for Curia,
25% for Event Horizon,
25% for DAOplomats

29

Uniswap Community Proposal Factory

As often happens, good intentions in this case proved unfounded in the best-laid proposal.

I remember a similar story with Event Horizon, which received 7 million votes in the Arbitration, and there were serious doubts about who would control such a large vote (which was less than 5% of the quorum). In this case, it’s 50%, which greatly influences any proposal, practically a veto.

Besides the fact that it’s unclear how this contract will vote on proposals not its own, the problem is further complicated by the fact that Uniswap has already distributed 20 million delegations, meaning almost the entire quorum could be dependent on Uniswap—which doesn’t exactly sound like decentralized governance.

Vote: AGAINST
Platform: Snapshot