Someone asked me yesterday what I would like to see done aside from turning on the fee switch, and I thought I’d share some of those thoughts here in case other delegates want to add ideas of their own. Maybe the DAO could even act on some of the ideas.
Firstly, I want to note that turning on the fees for Uniswap v3 would be the most productive item the DAO could pursue by far.
Quick thoughts regarding v4 Apps/Infra
A robust Uniswap v4 analytics platform should be available to everyone (LPs, traders, pool creators). That way, there is a central location for all pool information. Perspective LPs can browse the platform. Traders could scout out pools and help them decide what new ones should be made. Overall, it would be a platform to support pool creation, discovery, and management (view only).
It would be great to have an app/site where people can interact with Uniswap with v4 pools, something for LP management and trading in specific pools. Ideally, it would also contain all the relevant pool info, such as the creator, the hooks used, some safety info on them, and general pool info.
To support hook developers and attract new assets and liquidity to v4, we should have a place where users can launch their own pools from a library of hooks. That would help Uniswap attract users by making it easy for them to adopt new tech. It will also help hook developers by allowing them to showcase their work to people who want to create pools.
One of the problems I foresee with v4 is the organization of hook developers, LPs, and traders. It would be ideal if there were a communication system/platform to help get new pools picked up by aggregators and other infra so that when a new pool is launched, trading volume finds its way to it.
The last item on my mind regarding v4 is supporting developers and LPs. They will be critical to its success. For hook developers, it will be very important to have the right platform to share their value proposition with LPs. For LPs, they need to know that their pools will see trading volume and have the necessary tools to provide/manage liquidity efficiently.
Other thoughts
Pivot the marketing on Unichain from “95% cheaper, open-source, 250ms blocks” to Uniswap’s chain. Uniswap has an amazing brand. We should be leaning into the brand because it’s the #1 thing that will set the chain apart from others.
We should turn on the fees on Uni X in addition to v3 and v2. We can start with v3, but it might be easier to start with v2 and then move up from there, doing X before v4.
Delegates should not forget about Uniswap X and how it can impact (bad or good) the other protocol versions and the related ecosystem partners.
We need to show some love to projects still building on Uniswap v3 (not just talking about Oku), particularly the folks working on automated market-making and lending space. There are folks who are building really neat protocols and trying to solve problems for LPs, but they aren’t getting the attention they should be. In the long run, these folks are essential to the success of the DAO.
We don’t think about supporting market makers enough. We need more tooling that helps reduce the barrier to entry for onchain market makers. The more market markers that get onchain, the more Uniswap liquidity improves and, thereby, trading volume.
I know this is being worked on, but protocol-owned liquidity is another avenue the DAO should explore more aggressively. If the DAO had $30M of PoL that it could allocate and manage across all its deployments, that would be a super high-impact item in Uniswap’s effort to establish dominance on new and existing chains. It would also help diversify the Uniswap treasury and support new ALM tools. We could accomplish three things in one initiative.
Hail Mary ideas.
I don’t see enough BIG ideas on the forum. We should normalize (and proposers should accept) big ideas getting proposed and often rejected. Folks (including myself) fear rejection, but if people pitch a dozen big ideas and only one gets selected, that is one more than what we’re doing right now.
Should Uniswap build a bridge? We could prioritize making Unichain a liquidity hub and connecting it to many EVM chains. Uniwap is in a privileged position because it has immense capital it could deploy, which is typically a bottleneck in the bridge system. We could build something from the ground up, partner with some folks, or maybe even buy an existing bridge or take a position in one.
Should Uniswap enter the borrow/lend market? Spark Protocol proved that capital is extremely useful for competing in that space, and Uniswap has a lot of it. Again, with Unichain, the DAO could launch a borrow/lend protocol, utilize its capital position, and then expand cross-chain. Personally, I think this is a pretty interesting avenue to explore, and I might even take a crack at putting a proposal together if folks agree it’s worth looking into.
Should Uniswap invest in projects with liquid tokens? That could help diversify the treasury and support innovative projects and folks who are building on top of Uniswap.
I would also lean into the branding capabilities here. I know that Uniswap Labs owns the trademark, but we should see if there is a brand opportunity that the DAO can natively own. Ideally one that doesn’t conflict with Labs brand, but also allows teams to building on Uniswap Protocol to leverage the brand power as well.
I’m thinking of something along the lines of an “Intel Inside” campaign, or perhaps even licensing rights to say “powered by Uniswap DAO”.
Great ideas Getty! To second this - I think it’s time for the DAO to have more ownership/control over its own destiny. A couple thoughts on how this might happen:
One of the possible reasons for the DAO’s lack of activity is that in a group setting, there is a lack of ownership + responsibility - the thinking that “Oh other people will do it” leads to infinite procrastination
One thing we should do is to empower individual delegates/teams that are really passionate about things they want to change. We should create a structure - whether that be RFPs, committees, grants etc. in which DAO delegates themselves can directly step into and become PMs that own a project.
From the recent committee elections and the caliber of talent with the candidates, I think the UAC committee model is a great example of how we can institute “ownership” over projects and tasks.
We should endorse an open-bid process in crowdsourcing both project ideas and teams that execute on these projects, and have interested delegates directly involved in these projects themselves + coordinating with outside parties.
In this vision, delegates in the DAO become self-organized into nimble, specialized subteams, focusing on projects/visions that have the approval/validation of other delegates.
One curiosity, when you say “success of the DAO” what do you mean? do you mean the success of the protocol? the growth of the treasury? the diversification of projects? Improving credible neutrality?
What does success mean in this instance, and specifically, how do you connect it to the success of the DAO? It’s great to hear how people are strategizing different growth opportunities and why
I know it probably is more literal than some might like, but the best measure of the DAO’s performance is the UNI market cap over a long period.
The free market votes with its dollars on whether the DAO’s work, investments, and progress are valuable. They are the ultimate judge.
If the DAO is successful, the market cap will increase (or at least we will have grown into our current one), and if it is unsuccessful, it will decrease.
While Uniswap might be tied to Bitcoin’s and the overall economy’s performance, I believe the DAO can potentially create significant value aside from macro moves. I don’t think it will be easy, but Uniswap is truly positioned like no other DAO in our industry.
I like the thoughts regarding v4 apps/infra – think we as a DAO can benefit from more focus towards these or similar concrete technical ideas (and collaboration with the UF on their execution).
My vision of the DAO is quite different, more to be a neutral organization that governs rather than executes, and focuses on facilitating growth in the ecosystem. Specifically, the DAO can focus on the tasks that cannot be done / will not be done by for-profit actors, because of incentive misalignment. The “bridge report” from 2023 is a great example of such a task. Some ideas in this direction:
“L2beat for hooks” - provide a neutral risk assessment platform for v4 hooks that shows a scorecard and properties for popular hooks
fund / incentivize the operation of “public good” hooks, for example, oracle hooks. Protocols that want to use Uniswap pools as oracles are forced to use v3 even when building on v4 – this is not a long-term sustainable solution
quantify the cost of providing liquidity on different chains. We have made a lot of progress in understanding the costs in theory: we know that not all chains are equal. However, there’s not that much empirical research or dashboard on how chain properties and MEV activity translate into cost for LPs.
I am curious about how the different fee switches direct fees. For v3, the initial idea is for Unistaker and UNI holders to direct their voting power to delegates and receive fees. I assume this would also apply to v2 and v4. For Uniswap X, fillers can direct flow to their own asset holdings and compete with on-chain LPs. Should the Uniswap X fee switch be directed towards Uniswap LPs? Would this offset the LP fee switches in v2, v3, and v4?
I also wonder how Unichain validator staking fits into the fee flow of v2, v3, and v4. Would these be two isolated staking opportunities, or can they be tied into one unified staking accrual?
Can specific fee switches support developers, LPs, and users without fragmenting these groups?
If success is tied to market cap (and I think that’s as good as most other measures) – how do you break that down to shorter-term goals? or is the action to fund only those where you can measure impact to market cap?
I think this discussion is a very important one to have, responding to the question “how does the role of the DAO overlap / aligns with Uniswap Laps and Uniswap Foundation? and, how can the DAO contribute to the bigger picture for Uniswap?”.
Two actionable ideas coming out of this discussion that I find particularly interesting and valuable are:
hooks marketplace
bridge
I think what is being suggested here is a hooks marketplace. While there is currently a collection of all the hooks created, there is no curated list. We are still in the early stages of Uniswap hooks, but if the long-term vision is for Uniswap to become a platform, then a hooks marketplace could be a good next step to encourage growth both in terms of users and developers community.
Apple introduced the App Store as a strategic platform to expand the functionality of the iPhone by allowing third-party developers to create and distribute applications directly to users. To me, Uniswap is going in a similar direction with hooks.
The other idea I find particularly interesting relates to bridges. Bridging is a very complex and risky business, as history proved with all of the Billions hacked. That said, as the number of chains is continuously growing and with the launch of Unichain, the bridging aspect becomes increasingly relevant for the success of Uniswap.
To me, the two aspects are extremely inter-related. While I see the borrowing/lending idea as an expansion to a new market area, I think bridging is way more connected with swapping as it is in essence just cross-chain swapping.
It’s up to the DAO how we’d want to direct the fees for each protocol/deployment. If we wanted to use one system for everything (as I’d guess we would), that would be fine.
Regarding your Uniswap X question, the DAO can set a protocol fee of up to 0.05% on the existing deployment. That fee would be included in the trade executed through the protocol. As for your second question, yes, if the DAO voted to direct the fee to Uniswap LPs, that is possible (although it would likely require a fair bit of additional work).
Regarding the Unichain validators, the Unichain whitepaper mentions that a series of validators, staked with UNI, will exist, but it doesn’t give much info on how fees/rewards might flow for fulfilling that role. The best we get is “At the start of each epoch, the currently staked balances are snapshotted, blockchain fees are collected, and a reward per staked token value is calculated.” Later, “The Service smart contract validates these attestations as they are posted, and compensates the validator immediately based on the validator’s stake-weight.” The Uniswap Foundation or Uniswap Labs would likely be able to answer that question better.
Yes, although we might want to consider the technical lift of implementing different fee switch systems rather than a single robust system to manage all collected fees.
A multi-year plan that the DAO aligns on would be great (who knows, maybe I should request a grant from the DAO for this).
Start by determining where we want to be at the end of 2027 based on KPIs like MCAP, DAO annual revenue, Uniswap volume traded, and treasury size. Then, develop annual goals.
Then, develop 3-5 initiatives/ideas to help the DAO reach the three-year goal. Then, break down those initiatives/ideas into their sections. For each one, we need a three-year goal that directly supports one or more of the KPIs, and then we need annual goals. Once we have goals, then we shift into execution. What needs to happen each year, what exactly needs to happen over the next four quarters, and what needs to happen in the next three months to get the ball rolling?
What is great about a plan is that it forces ideas from the brain onto paper that can be shared, iterated on, and eventually executed. No plan needs to be perfect; some of the best plans lack details; ultimately, it is more about preparedness rather than perfection. Then, once the execution begins, don’t be afraid to update the plan as new information comes to light.
Thanks for layering on. You might find this work by Wormhole particularly relevant regarding how they use Uniswap as a marketplace to form liquidity for trading cross-chain assets.
Even if the DAO doesn’t want to build its bridge protocol, it is well-positioned to partner, invest, or buy a protocol (for example, Hop). I’m glad you agree!
Uniswap Labs has just presented a permissionless intent bridge powered by Across Protocol across 9 networks integrated into the protocol’s UI and wallet. This bridge has some limitations today, as it only allows the transfer of native assets and stablecoins, but the article announces that new features will be built.
What would be the sense or purpose for the DAO to build, partner, invest or buy another bridge?
I agree on the need for Labs and DAO actions to be aligned (not just on bridging).
The bridging infrastructure is a risky business though and relying on a multi-bridge solution that natively integrates multiple of the battle-tested bridges might be a responsible way forward.