We choose to abstain on this proposal for the reasons outlined below. We very much appreciate the work of StableLab and their continued contributions to the DAO, and are as a whole supportive of these types of activities to inform better decision-making. A few question marks to be resolved before we can fully support this onchain.
We voted for this proposal as we see the value both Oku and GFX keeps providing for Uniswap. In our initial comment on the temp check we echoed a few minor thoughts from delegates around user metrics and clarifying the scope of the license, and very much appreciate the GFX team for addressing these. These comments along with a more elaborative rationale can be found here.
Distributed our vote equally across Doo Wan Nam, Jordan Karstadt, Takeshi Ohishi, Sov, and Cole Schendl based on our observations of their previous work. We believe they all bring plenty of relevant experience and expertise to the UAC, a good mix of fresh blood and Uniswap history, and to some degree (albeit of less importance) also some different perspectives on governance. Based on this, we have no doubt they’d perform their roles to a satisfactory standard.
We supported the previous proposal that failed to reach quorum, and nothing has changed in our view to justify a different vote this time around; hence, we voted for this proposal.
We voted against this proposal as we believe it doesn’t make sense under the proposed scope. While we agree that it could be beneficial for the DAO to have more technical experts and developers amongst the delegate set and similar to improve discussions and decision making, the current lack of such proposals (as highlighted by @AbdullahUmarhere) does not in our mind justify having a pretty costly committee on the payroll. This could probably be easier solved on an ad hoc basis for now. As many others, we also have reservations around doing more treasury delegations unless the value add is super clear. Having said that, we do think that Uniswap should always strive to improve incentive alignment and give builders more of a say in governance.
We voted for this proposal. Yes incentive programs are susceptible to mercenary capital, but should also drive TVL and help Uniswap cement its position as the de facto DEX and ride the momentum growth that Etherlink has seen. The 2:1 ratio is good and the sum, on the whole, relatively small. Even if an unknown share of that TVL is not sticky, we’d argue that there are lasting positive effects on the perception of Uniswap as the canonical DEX on Etherlink after capturing majority TVL early on.
We voted in support of this proposal as the Delegate Reward Initiative continues to ensure delegate participation in governance, and the extension comes at an important moment when the DAO is within reach of struggling with quorum.
We also believe that the general direction of how the program is developing is the right one, with attempts to introduce more skin-in-the-game via the UNI ownership threshold. While right directionally, it likely won’t change much.
We likewise agree with some of the comments made by @pennblockchain:
This is why we don’t think additional rewards for “perfect participation” makes too much sense either.
Introducing more qualitative factors into the program to encourage more “meaningful” participation over checking boxes would obviously improve the program, though easier said than done. If not for this cycle, this should be the main focus for the next one.
We voted in favour of establishing the DUNI simply because it is a necessary and practical step to de-risk Uniswap Governance, and will give the DAO a proper entity to handle basic operational needs like contracts and payments while paving the way for managing protocol revenue from the fee switch. Thank you to the Uniswap Foundation for spearheading this proposal, we appreciate all the work that has put behind this effort.