Arana Digital Delegate Platform

Delegation Pitch
21

August 2025 Voting Update

Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 4

Vote: For

Type: Snapshot

In cycle 4 of this program, the addition of UNI held by a delegate’s wallet addresses a concern mentioned multiple times during previous iterations. The holding size is a reasonable amount for smaller entities that may not have latent capital for a UNI purchase. It’s also very reasonable for participants who have been involved in previous cycles. Although many delegates sell the UNI they receive through the program for covering operating costs, the payback period for the delegate program is relatively short. In other words, if a delegate holds 1k UNI, they should reasonably expect that investment to pay off after just a couple of months. Although 1k UNI relative to the amount a delegate can earn as a result of 100% participation in the 6-month program is not excessive, it does add an element of “skin in the game.” The mere psychological condition of holding onto an asset, even if the amount is small, aligns that entity with the success of the given business. Correspondingly, we voted in favor of the proposal.

Establish Uniswap Governance as “DUNI,” a Wyoming DUNA

Vote: For

Type: Snapshot

The UF has done a great job at spearheading the necessary research pertaining to Uniswap’s adoption of the DUNA. DAO members have long awaited the implementation of this endeavor since it enables a swath of exciting initiatives going forward. Many proposals in the past have been hamstrung by hazy legal clarity and infrastructure. The passing of this proposal will hopefully quell some of these overhangs. Many delegators, in particular large institutional UNI holders, have also refrained from partaking in governance discussions and votes due to the presiding legal implications. However, from the discussions that we’ve had, it seems many of these token holders will soon feel more comfortable voicing their opinions publicly due to the protections that come with DUNA membership. To those ends, we are in support of this proposal.

22

September 2025 Voting Update

Launching Uniswap v3 on Ronin with co-incentives

Vote: Deploy $500k in UNI Incentives

Type: Snapshot

Apart from the 2:1 match offered by Ronin, we voted in favor of this proposal because it allows for Uniswap to become the canonical liquidity layer on Ronin. The chain recently became permissionless, meaning that any protocol has the ability to deploy on the chain. This means that the protocols that have the strongest relationship with the Sky Mavis team are the ones that will dominate market share in their respective sectors. Protocols that aim to grow without core team support will naturally have more difficulty. This is evident in most all ecosystems that give preference to native builders as opposed to chain agnostic teams.

Our case is the DEX space. Katana, the current largest DEX on Ronin, is being deprecated, with the presented goal of migrating that liquidity over to the new, official v3 deployment. All new gaming token launches will route liquidity to Uniswap v3 instead of Katana, ensuring early volume and adoption. Due to the strong brand name that Ronin has, its specific focus on gaming as opposed to just a general purpose EVM environment, and their willingness to collaborate closely with the DAO, illustrate that this could be an advantageous avenue for Uniswap to explore.

Disclosure: Arana is part of the UEII and therefore has the potential to benefit from Ronin’s incentive match.

Establish Uniswap Governance as “DUNI,” a Wyoming DUNA

Vote: For

Type: Onchain

As per our Snapshot vote in favor of establishing the DUNI, we are also supporting this proposal in the onchain phase. Rationale remains the same.

GLI — Incentivized Delegation Vaults

Vote: For

Type: Snapshot

IDVs are an interesting experiment to see how much traction delegation vaults receive as a result of a small percentage of yield. Most UNI holders right now hold the token without utilizing it as a productive asset (LPing, lending, etc). What’s worse is that most token holders do not delegate at all. This has recently made it quite difficult to attain quorum. This present proposal will be a nice experiment to see if incentivized delegation works. A key constraint in this program is that incentives are only distributed if delegation is attained. In other words, spending guard rails are present. The expenditure is directly correlated to the desired outcome of more voting power. The main question folks have to ask themselves is—what is the marginal cost of each additional UNI token that is delegated. 0.02 UNI per unit of voting power is the variable posed in the proposal. While we are uncertain what this number should really be, we are still proposing to go forward with this to see how successful incentivized vaults can be. It is also presently uncertain how exactly the mechanism for the UVN will work, or when it’ll be live. Therefore, we think it’s worthwhile to proceed with this experiment. If in the event we realize that the UVN setup is in any way competitive with IDVs, the DAO can reflect and potentially scale back this program, reassessing the IDV distribution strategy and infrastructure.

GLI — Treasury delegation Round 2

Vote: For

Type: Snapshot

Due to the success of the first treasury delegation initiative, where most all of the recipients have demonstrated an excellent voting track record, and have participated in putting up and sponsoring votes, we believe that a second delegation event from the treasury is beneficial. The parameters of this second iteration have been debated over the past handful of months, around size of delegation, criteria to become eligible for delegation, expiring delegation, etc. For the sake of simplicity, and following up on the first initiative, we believe that holding these variables constant this time around is also warranted. This is especially the case if we want to get something through for the sake of more easily attaining quorum. We believe that the first component of the application, where objective measures are considered, is prudent. But more importantly, the final candidates of this program are proposed to be determined by a vote since there are security concerns pertaining to this proposal. Delegates may attain voting power that becomes far too sticky and therefore pose pervasive to governance. Having delegates vote on the community members that they trust is more beneficial. This is likely the best way for this voting power to be distributed.

Unichain Co-Incentives Growth Management Plan

Vote: For

Type: Onchain

Same as our vote on the Snapshot, we voted in favor of the onchain vote. The systematic approach with the KPI hurdles and TVL retention criteria is favorable for the DAO, and the increase in the TVL benchmark from 20M to 60M due to the recent USDS adoption is good to see.

23

October 2025 Voting Update

Treasury Delegation Round 2 Elections

Vote: 25% each to kpk, Tane, SeedGov, and Avantgarde

Type: Snapshot

Our even allocation to each of the above candidates was based on two primary factors: the delegate’s contribution to Uniswap DAO and their general participation in the DAO space. Some of the candidates have been active in Uniswap for many years now, like Avantgarde. Others have made contributions in the form of research for the DAO, like kpk did with the UTWG. Both of the mentioned teams also have subject matter expertise in asset management across numerous DAOs. And teams like Tane and SeedGov have demonstrated strong governance activity across a broad swath of DAOs. Their familiarity with governance-related issues is valuable for Uniswap DAO.

Grow Uniswap on Plasma

Vote: Allocate $250k

Type: Snapshot

There is a significant match coming from the Plasma team, which in and of itself makes this proposal worth considering. Plasma has executed quite well on their go to market strategy so far, bringing in large amounts of TVL from day-one across a large number of well-known defi partners. Uniswap is one of those partners—but this partnership was led by the DAO and technically administered by Oku. We also believe that there is potential for persistent volume using the v3 deployment due to Plasma’s intention to launch a Plasma-branded swapping FE in their app. This should act as a strong funnel for retail traders looking to trade USDT, XPL, and long tail tokens. Uniswap will face competition from the likes of Fluid, for example, but we believe that incentivizing the v3 deployment will enable Uniswap to attain some degree of prominence on the chain. Due to the large stablecoin chain market potential and strong backing from investors and partners, Uniswap seems poised to benefit from investing in this deployment.

1 Like
24

November 2025 Voting Update

Uniswap Community Proposal Factory

Vote: For

Type: Snapshot

We appreciate new mechanisms that have the potential to assist with both governance participation and quorum issues. It could be an interesting experiment to run since we don’t clearly know whether or not submitting a proposal is a keystone problem. Is the reason people don’t submit/ideate more proposals due to high barriers? Or is it simply a consequence of a lack of impactful surface area? After all, there are quite a restrictive set of tasks governance can ontake in Uniswap. And for building auxiliary tooling/products/systems, the UF has a grants program. Perhaps the CPF would provide some datapoints related to this. But we do generally believe that it’s unlikely for too many new and impactful proposals to be proposed. Most folks with ideas tend to attain sponsorship—however, that custom may not be known by many. But that rule can also apply to the CPF. It has to be advertised to a degree. As for the 20M number, we believe it should be lower, likely around 10M. The CPF can help address quorum issues but should not be an exorbitant pool of voting power, and 50% of quorum is high. Integration of this type of system into Tally is also good to consider. We would like to revisit this proposal after the fee switch proposal so we can assess the new pool of potential voters. This vote may demonstrate that quorum issues aren’t going to be as much of an issue in the future, but we cannot say that for sure. For the time being, we voted in favor to indicate directional support of the idea.

1 Like
25

UNIfication

Vote: For

Type: Snapshot

On the whole, we are very excited about this proposal and the broader implications that it will have on the industry. We appreciate the multiple highlights from the Labs team regarding their forthcoming alignment with the UNI token. Commitment towards directing various fee sources towards UNI burn using a modular adapter setup is an elegant solution. This provides an ongoing opportunity for token holders to benefit from not only core protocol (v2/v3/v4) activity but also from auxiliary products, even those that may not have been introduced yet.

Labs’ service provider agreement with the DUNI will enable governance to effectively hold Labs accountable. However, the assessment of accountability is very much vague. It is presently uncertain how/what Labs will be judged on. Specific KPIs, like those mentioned in the Foundation’s funding proposal earlier this year, are not mentioned. This is of course not an outright reason to reject this proposal. What must be appreciated is that reporting and accountability will in part come into fruition as the UNIfication occurs. Labs has previously been operating in more of a black box, as a private company. But their reporting standards should be molded to conform to their new role as a service provider. We will be keeping a keen eye on how the Labs team goes about this operation. Ideally, delegates should reassess the results and reporting component of this service provider component quarterly, as each new unlock from the UNIVester in 3-month increments.

The other component that we will closely observe is the ratio between annual burn versus the UNI expense. If the annual dollar value of the burn is lower than the 20M UNI expensed, then governance should review Labs’ grant. If the price of UNI happens to rapidly increase over the year, then it may also make sense to reduce the UNI allocation. It shouldn’t be exorbitant. The LOI itself is, generally, in favor of Labs as well. The DUNI controls how many UNI tokens are deposited each year into the vesting contract, but the DUNI cannot arbitrarily reduce the amount below 20M unless Labs agrees, because the LOI binds DUNI to that number unless mutually altered. Hence, once this proposal passes the onchain phase, it is difficult to alter it unilaterally. The benefit to this is that Labs has a longer time to prove their value add for token holders, and they should not reactionarily expect immediate positive price impact. This is a longer-term relationship.

As far as the immediate impact of this proposal goes, we are most keen on observing LP activity. This is the keystone concern for Uniswap’s competitive edge, and therefore, value capture by token holders. PFDA is a great show of commitment to LPs. But the results of that setup are yet to be seen. If the supply side is adversely affected, hopefully there is a degree of balance that occurs on the demand side, with more users visiting the front-end once the Labs take rate is removed.

2 Likes
26

December 2025 Voting Update

Strategic Renewal of Gnosis, Linea, and Mantle Deployments

Vote: For

Type: Snapshot

Keeping Gnosis, Mantle, and Linea makes sense in our eyes. After the unfortunate Balancer incident, Uniswap has become the primary DEX on Gnosis chain. Funding this deployment is strategically beneficial to sustain a venue for LPs and Swappers. As far as Oku-oriented deployments go, Gnosis is higher up in terms of TVL, sitting at $22M at the moment. Linea and Mantle are less appealing simply based on existing metrics, however, they do pose a strategic benefit for Uniswap, as both ecosystems have very strong backing, from Consensys and Bybit, respectively. Keeping the deployments running to take advantage of a future surge in activity due to lending market launches, TGEs, incentive campaigns, etc. Yes, there is an element of speculation here, but it seems worth the cost. Scroll and Taiko deprecation are fine as well due to their broader ecosystem declines, lack of Uniswap dominance, and less clear future catalysts.