It does retain its voting ability. The proposal will only incentivize farmers who currently dump their tokens to hodl their tokens. Will it also incentivize voters to add their $UNI to the pool, yes, but that’s their choice, it’s their token to what they deem most valuable for them.
I think it’s better from a coding POV anyway to separate the incentivization of the pool from the implementation of a snapshot of staking derivative. It’s cleaner and iterative (hence safer) approach.
I strongly disagree. First, it’s up to the token holder to decide what is more valuable to them. Second, there’s a lot of token holders that don’t vote. And that’s true in any governance. You’re not going to get 80% of any community to meaningfully participate in governance, that’s not realistic.
I think it’s a false problem. I do agree that enabling LP to vote is useful. But it can be implemented later. The $UNI is a governance token, but it is first and foremost a token, ie a value capture mechanism. It’s a flaw in the token model not to have a sink or value capture. I’m happy to discuss this point on Discord, but I have been making that point for weeks now, I’m surprised we’re still going back and forth on this point.
There is a flaw in the token model. Incentivizing the UNI/ETH pool is a way to fix it.
I think the question whether rewards should be added is a very interesting one.
It would shift the incentives of investing in UNI into a different direction, while also influencing how the governance will work in practice.
I was trying to get an overview over the arguments, to for an opinion, but I feel there might be more to it. I used a structured discussion tool, to map out the arguments. (has been used to discuss ETH governance before)
I’d be happy if you help me add the missing pieces!
Yes nên làm như vậy…
The dangers of not doing this are significant IMO. If UNI trading markets move to primarily be on centralized exchanges, it allows for Uniswap’s primary competitors to use their dominance of those markets capture its governance. They don’t even have to try to decide whether to be a LP or a voter, they can effectively do both as a centralized custodian.
The economic implications of this proposal are debatable, but IMO this is about an existential threat to the protocol and keeping price discovery out of CeFi should be a primary objective.
Yes. This is a good idea!
Ok tôi nghĩ đó là 1 ý tg hay
Yes làm sao để thêm nhóm vào
It definitely make sense to add $Uni/$Eth pool as it will push people to hodl $Uni for long term.
To add to this I though maybe have additional stable coin-uni pools as well to retain those stable coin amounts
A locking mechanism for voting would resolve this as well longer term option of course
We need to incentivize people to not keep tokens on exchanges.
Exchanges are threat and competitor to Uniswap.
Binance already offers 0.44% interest on UNI per year without any lock!
In my opinion we have to give any UNI holder bigger interest every month than exchanges.
For example 1% monthly would be 2 million tokens on 200 million circulating supply.
We have 14mil tokens in treasury every month.
@Alex17 @Mr_Po @iwearahoodie @PhABC @Micah
In my opinion, there’s nothing wrong with UNI holders being able to get interest on their UNI tokens outside Uniswap.
If the preparation period (voting delay) is introduced, UNI holders will be able to keep their UNI whenever they like. And mobilize them if they wish to vote on an important proposal.
It is by far the easiest and the cheapest solution to the problem.
On a side note, I don’t think there is a big chance of Binance being a threat to Uniswap governance.
There is a decent possibility that Compound will transform Uniswap governance, bringing more power to large UNI holders.
There is a proposal there that will allow for UNI held there to vote.
By the way, currently, Compound offers 5.88% APY on UNI.
More ‘minority’ votes will unwillingly vote the way the ‘majority’ wants with that system.
But it is up to COMP holders to decide that.
Maybe not by itself but with other exchanges, they are threat. Binance and Huobi have around 30mil UNI on main accounts.
This is 0.477% monthly and we can easily give 1% monthly to everyone account except exchanges.
(that would cost only around 13% of monthly treasury at the moment)
What makes you think they are a threat? What is the scenario of attack you find feasible for them?
Launching any sort of attack on Uniswap would cost these exchanges much more value loss through reputational damage than what they could ever get out of it.
On top of that, it is quite unlikely to succeed, as a lot of money would vote against that.
Even if the attack somehow succeeds, UNI can be forked to a pre-attack state.
Surely with all the interest in this pool and the fee locking timer some whale could start the vote in this one?
Obviously this proposal has a lot of traction, yet nothing is clear about how those things will be voted and when implemented? The current rewards end in 7 days. Nothing is clear what is next?