The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal.
During temp-check, we suggested that the focus be kept on two chains to analyze and monitor (Arbitrum and Base), which would serve as proof of concept. Although the onchain proposal is for three chains, the cost has also been reduced by $10,000, which we find to be a fair compromise.
Something that wasn’t addressed in the feedback incorporated in the proposal, which we also brought up previously, is that we’d ideally see someone take ownership of acting on the data collected through Forse when and where it makes sense to do so. Although it’s not a deal-breaker, we’d like to further discuss this going forward.
Thank you for the response to our question. We agree with the stance stated by @SEEDGov, specifically the part quoted below, and will therefore being voting against as well.
We know that the consequences of this are not serious in themselves… the issue here is that the DAO’s decision has been violated and not respected, which could set a very serious and dangerous precedent in other votes with greater impact.
It is fortunate that this proposal did not pass. A few changes should be made to governance and delegate responsibilities:
A code of conduct should be established for delegates in the delegate program. This will help reduce conflicts of interest and ensure adherence to the votes cast during temperature checks.
@Doo_StableLab abstained during the temperature check and should have also abstained during the on-chain vote, as this proposal directly benefits @Doo_StableLab .
Quorum needs to be raised. This vote was much too close for not following due process, and the number of abstentions rather than outright rejections is concerning.
An open call for service provider proposals. i.e. payment proposals related to providing data for the success of the L2 incentive program.
Rules should be established to prevent service providers from applying for committee positions. Uniswap DAO is already facing conflict of interest issues in this regard.
Hi guys, we’ve reviewed the vote and noticed a discrepancy between different voting platforms. On Uniswap’s Tally portal, it seems the proposal didn’t reach quorum, while the Agora interface shows a different outcome. We understand the quorum requirement is 40M UNI, but we’re uncertain if it includes only the “For” votes or all votes (For, Against, and Abstain). Typically, quorum counts all votes, but we’re unsure if that’s the case here.
We’ve observed that the handling of service providers applying for committee positions varies across DAOs. Some DAOs allow service providers to apply, while others do not. In DAOs that permit this, service providers are typically required to disclose any potential conflicts of interest and abstain from voting on proposals that would benefit them. To establish such rules, it would need consensus from the DAO as a whole.
Quorum: In order for a vote to pass, it must achieve quorum of 4% of all UNI (40M) voting in the affirmative. The purpose of the quorum is to ensure that the only measures that pass have adequate voter participation.
Established rules should have been contingent on the delegate reward program proposal being passed. It seemed to be rushed after the protocol fee switch proposal was floated. There is now very little oversight to how delegates are operating between DAO’s and within proposals themselves, as seen here.
