[Temp Check] Forse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program

[Doo_StableLab]

Simple Summary

This proposal seeks to onboard Forse by StableLab as a data service provider, helping analyze the effectiveness of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program. The offchain vote (Snapshot) will be a weighted voting where each voter may spread voting power across any number of choices to help to assess three blockchain for Forse to analyze.

Motivation

In February 2024, the Uniswap DAO introduced the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program, which incentivizes users to participate in current and new deployments of Uniswap on different networks within the L2 space. The initial onboarding packages of this program cost the Uniswap DAO at least $3.5M worth of assets.

We propose that Uniswap DAO engage with Forse, our DAO intelligence and analytics platform, to analyze the impact of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth program and assess if the current approach drives real growth.

By assessing the impacts of the Revitalization and Growth Program, the Uniswap DAO will have valuable insights to improve further iterations of the Revitalization and Growth Program or other incentive programs. Armed with this information, Uniswap DAO will be able to understand what was the most relevant user groups, and their acquisition cost, and evaluate if the Revitalization and Growth program effectively modified user behavior and led to increased stickiness of users, and therefore TVL and other top-level protocol metrics.

Recently, StableLab supported the Arbitrum DAO as the Program Manager for the Arbitrum Short-Term Incentives Program, and we delivered a comprehensive analysis of the STIP to the Arbitrium DAO.

With Uniswap allocating over $3.5M worth of assets for the purpose of growing Uniswap’s market share, it is essential to ensure that the DAO analyses and reviews the impact of these incentives on an ongoing basis.

What is Forse?

Forse is a data and intelligence platform built by StableLab helping DAOs analyze the impact of governance decisions in protocol growth, top-line metrics, and governance operations, including its cost and effort structures. StableLab is the leading provider of governance products and solutions for decentralized protocols. We work with various projects, from the ones just starting their journey to decentralization to the most prominent DeFi protocols.

This service provider engagement grants the Uniswap DAO access to the services of the entire StableLab team. Specifically, three StableLab team members will be the primary points of contact.

Team

Christian Ziegler is the Tech Lead at StableLab. Previously, he worked as researcher at the Technical University of Munich (TUM), where he wrote his doctoral thesis on DAOs. In 2018, he co-founded Blockcurators GmbH. Christian has several published scientific articles, including: a Taxonomy of DAOs; scoring methodologies for DAOs; network analysis of DAOS; classification of DAO proposals using LLMs; among others.

Johannes Loewe is the Data Lead at StableLab, where he focuses on all stages of AI and ML development, from experimentation to deployment. Before joining StableLab, he was a Freelance AI & Blockchain Software Engineer. He also has experience with DAOs, being a founding member of PretzelDAO in Munich. He holds a Bachelor’s degree from Radboud University in the Netherlands and a Master’s degree in Machine Learning from NUI-Galway in Ireland.

Marcos Miranda is the Head of Product at StableLab. With over 5 years of experience in Product Management, with focus on Web3 and Analytics products, he is also experienced in building DeFi protocols, having previously worked for other protocols in the space.

Specification

By analyzing the impact of these incentives, Forse by StableLab hopes to identify the following:

• Impact quantification of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program in top-line protocol metrics with the isolation of external factors influencing these metrics as far as permitted and reasonably possible.
• User segmentation and analysis based on archetypes of users to determine the types of users attracted through the incentive program.
• Post-Incentive user retention, reactivation, and user acquisition cost metrics.
• Per-dollar value of incentives compared to other ways of incentivising users (e.g. Airdrops, LP rewards, grants, …).
• User Retention and activity patterns over the time of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program.

To see Forse in action, explore our interactive dashboard showcasing the Arbitrum Short-Term Incentives Program. This provides a great example of what our output could be for Uniswap’s Revitalization and Growth Program.

Budget Request

The proposal requests $70,000 worth of UNI to analyze the impact of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program so far for 3 blockchains chosen by the Uniswap DAO, with 3 months of additional maintenance support and updates to analytics modules utilized in the live dashboard.

Three Blockchains Chosen by the Uniswap DAO

We believe it will be better for Uniswap to better understand the impacts of the Incentive program for protocols that are at least sizable. So the options will compose the top 6 blockchains by TVL.

Blockchains	TVL
Arbitrum	$2.596b
Base	$1.35b
Blast	$838.46m
Scroll	$601.14m
Linea	$519.15m
Mantle	$440.09m
Zksync	$77.19m
Sei	$70.62m
Manta	$39.74m
Moonbeam	$31.45m
Polygon zkEVM	$13.2m
Taiko	$13.29m

Next Steps

1. Launching Snapshot vote to decide the top 3 blockchains as well as regarding whether to proceed with this proposal

2. Proceed to Onchain Vote if the snapshot vote passes

[Doo_StableLab]

The snpashot is live https://snapshot.org/#/uniswapgovernance.eth/proposal/0xdf2d95ccfadebf141847b90e058f8fafb4f76d8ca2ec2a7351d93353187df560

[WintermuteGovernance]

Thanks for the proposal @Doo_StableLab

There seems to be no discussion around this proposal from other delegates (in the RFC), potentially indicating a lack of demand. Nonetheless, we think this proposal could be useful for the DAO but for us to be supportive we’d like to see the proposal expanded to at least 4 blockchains (3 seems a little low for $70k). Could you also please clarify if there will be a report delivered to the DAO with notable findings and recommendations or is it solely the dashboard? If it’s the latter, we’d like to see the former incorporated into the proposal!

[Doo_StableLab]

@WintermuteGovernance

we’d like to see the proposal expanded to at least 4 blockchains (3 seems a little low for $70k).

Hi team, we usually would ask for an increased in budget in such case but as we are interested in working in good will, we will indeed expand to 4, which will be reflected in onchain vote if the vote passes.

@WintermuteGovernance

Could you also please clarify if there will be a report delivered to the DAO with notable findings and recommendations or is it solely the dashboard?

It indeed will have findings and recommendations

[kfx]

I have voted against the temp check, explanation here:

@kfx

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The Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program has been a significant expense for the DAO so far and, if positively evaluated, will continue to be so in the future as new chains continue to emerge. It should be carefully analyzed, and its results should be reported. This could create valuable knowledge not just for Uniswap’s community but for the entire web3 space, where liquidity mining campaigns remain a contentious topic.

In my opinion, this task is too important to be rushed. In its current state, the StableLabs proposal is not convincing enough, and it’s unclear whether the metrics it plans to evaluate (such as user retention) are the most relevant to the program’s objectives (gaining market share for Uniswap on newer chains). Additionally, it’s not clear why it proposes to analyze Arbitrum, where URGP funds were not deployed. The LM campaigns on Arbitrum have different objectives, a different operator, different distribution weights, and a different approach to pool selection, so bundling the analysis together doesn’t seem to be a good idea.

I would accept the proposal if it were improved, but a better approach might be for either the UF or the DAO to define the metrics to be evaluated, outline the expected outcomes, create a call for proposals, and allow service providers to submit competitive bids.

[pennblockchain]

We have chose Arbitrum and Base due to their dominant positioning and large user presence - if incentives are going to be researched for optimization on any blockchains it should be done on these first.

Arbitrum, as a leading Layer 2 solution, offers a well-established ecosystem with a diverse and active user base, making it an ideal platform to study the scalability and cost-efficiency of Uniswap’s deployment. Its maturity and innovation in the Layer 2 space provide valuable insights into how Uniswap can optimize its operations in a high-performance environment. Base, backed by Coinbase, represents a promising new blockchain with the potential to tap into a broader and more diverse user demographic.

[Gauntlet]

Gauntlet has voted in favor of Base and Arbitrum (50/50), given that the chains represent the highest TVL and most strategic current Uniswap deployments.

However, before an onchain vote, Gauntlet would prefer to see greater detail regarding the exact data deliverables the dashboards will display as they relate to Uniswap’s growth strategy and transparency around the data methodologies the Stablelab team intends to deploy.

[Tane]

We voted on the snapshot as below:

https://gov.uniswap.org/t/tane-delegate-platform/24164/5?u=tane

One question, why isn’t BSC a part of chains to be analyzed on? In our understanding, the DAO has decided to distribute the maximum amount ($1M) on an on-chain proposal but it wasn’t deployed yet?

[SEEDGov]

In SEEDGov we voted:

• 33% Arbitrum - L2 with the highest LTV
• 33% Base - second L2 with the second highest LTV and with strong growth in the last months
• 33% Scroll - L2 with zero knowledge technology with the highest LTV, with strong growth in the last 2 months

Here our full rationale.

@Gauntlet

However, before an onchain vote, Gauntlet would prefer to see greater detail regarding the exact data deliverables the dashboards will display as they relate to Uniswap’s growth strategy and transparency around the data methodologies the Stablelab team intends to deploy.

We share this concern.

[AbdullahUmar]

Firstly, someone does need to conduct a retrospective analysis on the efficacy of these incentive programs, especially if we wish to renew incentives or alter them in some capacity. So I’m directionally in favor of this proposal.

@AbdullahUmar

There will be a review conducted on the efficacy of the incentive programs that the DAO’s running. The process for this and who will conduct it is still tbd. Most of these programs are either in the middle of being administered or have yet to start. The Base incentives were deployed on April 25 and will conclude on July 25.

As per the above, not all of the programs have been terminated yet. Looks like Base is currently leading the race, which is good since those incentives have come to a conclusion. For anyone interested, here’s a more detailed overview of the Base program:

• Scroll incentives ended on July 11th.
• Blast was divided into two parts. 50% of those incentives concluded July 2nd. The other 50% haven’t yet been deployed.
• Linea concluded on July 11th.
• Mantle is still live.
• Arbitrum LTIPP is still live.

^Note: analysis will only be available for campaigns that have concluded. Those that are still live will require some wait time.

@Tane

One question, why isn’t BSC a part of chains to be analyzed on? In our understanding, the DAO has decided to distributed the maximum amount ($1M) on an on-chain proposal but it wasn’t deployed yet?

Correct–the BSC incentives haven’t been deployed yet since we are trying to finalize some of the bridging issues. This is the only campaign set that hasn’t begun yet. The Accountability Committee will keep you all posted.

@kfx

Additionally, it’s not clear why it proposes to analyze Arbitrum, where URGP funds were not deployed.

^This point is being overlooked…Arbitrum incentives were a part of the LTIPP matching program. Here’s some color on how the URGP differs from the LTIPP:

@AbdullahUmar

Gauntlet tends to follow a 98/1/1 breakdown (with 98 going to fees and the other 2 equally given to the other parameters). For the incentive programs being managed by the Accountability Committee, slightly different gauges have been selected, with both 60/20/20 and 40/30/30 structures having been implemented. The duration of Gauntlet incentives are also 2 weeks. The AC, however, usually distributes on a 3-month basis. This means that Gauntlet is involved in active management, constantly looking at data points from each previous campaign, factoring in current market conditions, and consequently selecting the best pools to deploy incentives to.

This proposal therefore isn’t limited to the URGP. Since there’s overwhelming support for Arbitrum right now, the DAO should note that this analysis will be reviewing Gauntlet’s distribution, which is far more sophisticated than the URGP method for distribution. It could be beneficial to contrast the two methods, however. We may see that a simple, heuristics-based approach being used for the URGP isn’t effective enough (or it could reveal the contrary).

I’m also interested in seeing the efficacy of incentive programs on EVMs that Uniswap is less dominant on. We already see a degree of success on Arbitrum and Base–but the majority of the URGP incentives actually go to new or less active EVMs. We are therefore voting for Scroll, Blast, and Base. Scroll incentives were deployed nearly a year after its mainnet launched. Blast incentives were deployed early-on, when Blast just went live. This would show how much benefit an early mover advantage yields. And Base would be a good case for studying how tied incentives are to a chain that is directionally doing well due to narratives like memecoins.

[kaereste]

The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.

We’ll be voting FOR this proposal while opting to select only Arbitrum and Base as the chains to analyze and monitor. We believe that focusing on the two chains with the highest TVL will be a good ‘proof of concept’.

Given that, we’d like to see an updated proposal before the on-chain vote to reflect the lower cost of analyzing and monitoring 2 chains -as opposed to the originally proposed 3, which was later amended to 4.

More importantly, however, we’d like to better understand the potential outcomes of such an analysis and Forse’s ultimate purpose in the DAO. Ideally, we’d like to see some sort of ‘ownership’ of the task of acting on the data collected and the insights from them. That could come from StableLabs or another party in the DAO (e.g., the Deployments Accountability Committee).

[Userisky]

Why can’t this data be analyzed using Dune Analytics?

Why are Uniswap holders spending $70k for this very limited query? Pre-incentive data for all targeted chains was provided before the incentive proposal was accepted. Why can’t the same queries be used afterward?

Data collection and analysis teams have been funded by the Uniswap Foundation in the past without much success. Many of those tools either do not work or the sites are no longer active. Why will this be different?

I am concerned about the direction where large delegates support other delegate projects to avoid upsetting potential votes on their own projects in the future. Uniswap holders need to be very careful about delegate collusion and self-dealing on projects they are affiliated with. While I’m not saying this is happening here, I am seeing very little critical feedback on many other proposals and programs. As more programs are rolled out, it can be very easy to lose track of where the money is going and how it is being spent.

[GFXlabs]

While we do believe an analysis needs to be performed for each chain, the proposed solution is expensive. For $70K, and assuming a generous $300/hr, the DAO would be paying for 233 hours to complete the analysis of four chains. To justify such a cost in our eyes, either the scope of the study would need to expand, or the deliverable by Forse needs to be better detailed so we can assess the potential value of the report.

As others have pointed out, only a handful of the programs have finished. Once the rewards cease, we likely need to wait one or two months before we can analyze how the rewards performed and their lasting effect. It would be preferable to create a standard report that can be completed post-rewards, and then Forse could be the entity that puts the reports together.

As we discuss analyzing the rewards program, we should revisit that the core goal of the URGP was to increase Uniswap’s market share by deploying to emerging chains so that Uniswap could secure a strong market position in the event the chain scaled. In some cases, the DAO also invested in existing deployments such as BSC, zkSync, and Base to boost our existing market position.

The success of individual chain deployments has less to do with Uniswap and more to do with the overall success of the chain. Our assumption with the program was that two or three of the chains would go on to become major deployments for the DAO and, post fee-switch, generate significant revenues for the DAO.

Where the DAO would benefit from analysis is when making decisions regarding follow-on incentives for chains. However, with everything we have learned over the last several months, we would be against follow-on incentives (today) unless the chain pledged to match the incentives or made an attractive proposal for the DAO to consider.

Lastly, we could add a section to the Uniswap reports that Oku has been writing focusing on the deployments with rewards if delegates would find that helpful.

[Doo_StableLab]

Hi everyone, thanks for the suggestions and votings, we will take a good amount of time to incorporate feedbacks and ensure the concerns are addressed.

[Doo_StableLab]

@GFXlabs

For $70K, and assuming a generous $300/hr, the DAO would be paying for 233 hours

233 hours might sound a lot but for four analysts and product team members to work on it, it would be 58.2 hours per person, which divide into 3 months, would be 19.4 hours per month. And divide further by the 4 chains, that’s 4.8 hours per chain per month.

For example, GFX charges $45k for the initial integration for one chain which using the same logic would be 150 hours for one chain. But in reality, several members work on it over months so it would be reasonable.

[Doo_StableLab]

@GFXlabs

As others have pointed out, only a handful of the programs have finished. Once the rewards cease, we likely need to wait one or two months before we can analyze how the rewards performed and their lasting effect. It would be preferable to create a standard report that can be completed post-rewards, and then Forse could be the entity that puts the reports together.

This is a fair point that we will consider.

@Userisky

Data collection and analysis teams have been funded by the Uniswap Foundation in the past without much success. Many of those tools either do not work or the sites are no longer active. Why will this be different?

This I don’t necessarily agree as many of these data including by Gauntlet has been used to guide the future plans for Uniswap DAO.

@Userisky

I am concerned about the direction where large delegates support other delegate projects to avoid upsetting potential votes on their own projects in the future.

This I also disagree, for example, delegates have voted against proposals by other delegates (In fact, for this proposal, we ourselves voted against our own proposal). I remember we voted against some of GFX’s proposals but GFX doesn’t take it personally. The same for us not taking it personally when delegates vote against it or abstain.

[Userisky]

Thank you for the response. I interpret the Gauntlet data differently, as they proposed encompassing deliverables as part of an experiment. For example, they suggested conducting a thorough report on whether UNI incentives are successful for specific pools.

I view this proposal as something between what the Uniswap Foundation would fund as a grant to a data analytics startup and a separate analysis proposal needed for this L2 incentive work. The structure of this proposal seems to be: “A door was opened with the L2 incentives proposal, but now we want money for a preliminary analysis using our analytics service to determine the success or failure of this program.”

The initial proposal should have included a requirement for those providing the data to conduct an “end-of-program” analysis of its success. It doesn’t seem right for a proposal to pass only for the UNI DAO to then become hooked on an introductory offer to an analytics program.

Regarding delegate alignment, this is a genuine risk for the future, especially as delegates become more social with each other at events, workshops, proposal discussions, and collaborations. I’m not saying this is happening now, but for some proposals, I see a lot of likes from delegates who do not engage in the proposal discussions.