An intimate understand of the UNI token and governance system – which is derived from the COMP governance system
A strong incentive to see Uniswap succeed, for the long term – it’s a Compound market, a crucial piece of DeFi infrastructure, and a product I use often
A well known record of safely building and guiding a protocol
I would prefer that UNI token-holders vote their own tokens; but if you don’t plan to, I’d like to offer my time and attention, to vote on UNI proposals on your behalf.
My framework for voting on proposals is as follows:
Risk mitigation – proposals should not introduce technical or market risks, before they have been vetted / analyzed / understood
Fairness – the proposal creator should not disproportionately benefit at the expense of other users
Open Mindedness – when in doubt, I listen to the community, ask questions, and make objective decisions that I feel are best
To delegate: 0x88FB3D509fC49B515BFEb04e23f53ba339563981
Disclosures: I hold a small (relative to my overall portfolio) position in UNI / cUNI.
Thanks for dropping by! I hope you’ll become as much of an asset to this community as you are to the broader crypto space. I have a few questions regarding your role as a delegate, and I hope you’ll take the time to address them.
You mention having an incentive to see UNI succeed in the long term. How do you view the conflict of interest between Compound and Uniswap as competitors courting liquidity providers?
I recognize that Compound is a money market protocol, and Uniswap is an AMM; they’re not directly competing, but certainly, both need liquidity to function well. For DeFi farmers, the competing incentives to move liquid capital from one platform to another are not sectorally driven; if you can make more in a money market platform than on a DEX, you’ll migrate there.
Recently, a 15M UNI bloc mobilized out of nowhere to vote on Proposal 1. Do you think that this bloc was created by borrowing UNI from Compound in an attempt to swing the vote? More broadly, how do you feel about the potential for Compound and similar competing lending platforms being used to execute governance attacks on other DeFi platforms–any ideas for how to build effective defenses against leveraged vote buying?
The flip-side of your status as Compound’s founder is your ability to influence both platforms towards symbiosis. I’m aware (marginally) that listings on Compound, and specifics of borrow limits, collateralization ratios, reserve rates, and interest rate curves are subject to rigorous risk investigation.
When working with the Compound community, what sort of “governance risk” analysis is performed when offering borrow capability for other governance tokens?
To cut to the chase: it seems like it’s a lot harder to acquire enough COMP on Compound to swing a vote than it is to acquire enough UNI, just on the face of it. Can you debunk this idea for us?
What are your thoughts on the recent defeat of Proposal 1? Would you support a.) lowering the quorum threshold? b.) lowering the proposal threshold?
I hope you can take my questions in the good faith in which they are offered. Thanks in advance for your response!
Do you support retro-active airdrops to Dharma or other DEX aggregators?
Will you re-instate existing mines before the initial window is up, and support the addition of an UNI/ETH mine?
Will you support activating fee switch as soon as possible? What do you want to do those funds? Do you a support a buy and burn program to combat inflation?
Lot’s of great questions – I’ll try to tackle them in order:
@Truffs I’m against modifying the rules of governance this early - it’s a newly launched system, and we haven’t truly had time as a community to observe what works, and doesn’t work yet. Changing the rules seems premature; by waiting until later, the community will have (1) more information, (2) a clearer vision of how things should change if they should change.
@Naught I’m not sure yet - generally indifferent. Would want to see what the community thinks, and why incentivizing liquidity in UNI is good for Uniswap (there’s already a lot of liquidity, for most users to enter/exit a position). It would have the effect of rewarding existing UNI holders at the expense of non-holders.
@jumnhy
(1) I don’t see a conflict of interest - there’s a huge amount of liquidity in both, and I think people often times significantly overstate the importance of liquidity / TLV.
(2) It wasn’t - pretty easy to tell with on-chain data (yay transparency).
(3) See above.
@melveyr I haven’t looked at any retro-active airdrop since there hasn’t been an on-chain proposal for one yet - but I would apply my framework above to analyze it. In general, I don’t have many “political” views for Uniswap - but maintaining the status quo (until the community can clearly articulate alternatives) seems appropriate, so I’d support maintaining the existing liquidity incentives (potentially with some modifications).
@chrisblec I have no financial or strategic relationship with Dharma, nor Gauntlet. Tarun (the founder of Gauntlet) and I invest in early-stage DeFi projects together (shoutout if you’re building something cool: check out https://robvc.com/).
I think most voters are more interested in voting for ideas/proposals rather than people. It’s hard to tell what you actually intend to do if we give you our votes. For example, I will vote for candidates that oppose airdrops for Dharma, but do vote for continuation of current mines. I don’t care who is behind that or how good of a person they are, just that they get those proposals through. If this was about voting for ‘people’ then obviously you are well respected, but to be honest that is not what I nor any other voter really cares about.
I’m from Chinese community,in our community,add UNI/ETH incentives is very necessary,let me explain.
As we all know,Compound and Cream have supported UNI as a collateral,Compound has 8.4M UNI and Cream has 3M UNI now,What is this indicate?8.4M+3M>10M,Big whales can easily borrow enough UNI to attack our community.Check this address:0x7b52f8029640B3D8a1A7E7E2DEaD673DB4f290fb,this man borrowed 5790000 UNI from Cream and Compound a few days ago,Nobody knows what’s he were doing.But if we have incentives for UNI holders,i believe the liquidity in Compound and Cream will drastically reduce.Our community will be stronger and safer.And we can set UNI/ETH pool a reasonable weight so people won’t FOMO UNI price,just for community safe.
Sorry for my poor english,looking for your reply!
Some points for community to consider in favor of ETH-UNI:
ETH/UNI incentives increases liquidity lock up. UNI is locked into the pool as a sink to the supply. The increased UNI liquidity depth allows price stability for future grants, airdrops, and other incentive measures; without moving UNI price drastically.
The current liquidity programs have the effect of rewarding non-UNI holders at the expense of UNI holders (current pools farm UNI to then sell in market). A UNI-ETH incentive pool balances this equation, while also lowering rewards for the non-UNI holder pools.
Any way to use my UNI to counteract as many delegations you get as possible?
– Against changing governance so early… its frickin Uniswap dude, this aint early. We live a year in a week these days. UNI power was so concentrated to handful of earliest backers by nature of the distribution scheme from the get go… without lowering quorum its beyond a colluded whales game— and you want to keep it this way? $120m USDC can’t help if there’s not enough to borrow to make a difference between Compound/Cream/+centralized borrow capacity (if any).
Tisk Tisk mr decentralization.
@Dharma if you’re reading this-- resubmit your proposal please. I was traveling and got the timing mixed up, I apologize. Wont happen again.
Anyone who has delegated to rleshner-- change your delegation to ANYONE else and I will match your delegation to the newly selected delegate. Send me your on-chain transaction of the change, I will match.
Up to 1.5M UNI-- while supplies last.
Legit anything but this. Omg save me Brad Stephens
As your focus is on Uniswap protection, could you please review the temperature check on increasing the voting delay?
This change’s primary goal as a protective measure is to allow UNI to get mobilized in response to suddenly emerged proposals.
There is a concern expressed, however, that launching a new Governor contract is a dangerous business.
@rleshner Has voted YES on the Dharma proxy UNI airdrop.
Care to explain why you thought it was a great idea to dilute the community fund by giving people free money? Especially considering how much holders are hurting currently?..
