FFG Meeting #2 Summary (July 2025)
This second FFG report provides updates on key initiatives, including the DUNA (Decentralized Unincorporated Nonprofit Association) structure, protocol fee switch, Unichain growth, and the expansion of Uniswap v4 through hooks. The summary below is a composite of meeting notes and post-meeting thoughts by FFG members and the UAC.
TL;DR
The second FFG meeting was structured across two separate calls: one dedicated to discussing the DUNA (Decentralized Unincorporated Nonprofit Association) and the other focused on a broader discussion around the DAO, Unichain, and Uniswap v4.
Key highlights that emerged are:
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The DUNA proposal is live on the forum, with a target of Q3 2025 for an onchain vote. The Fee Switch proposal is expected to follow closely after, although the timeline has been slightly pushed since our last FFG update in May.
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There is the expectation that, if approved, the DUNA structure will lead to a change in the governance turnout, with increased voter participation.
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The Uniswap Foundation reconfirmed outperformance over the initial goals set for the Unichain liquidity mining campaign.
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While the liquidity mining campaign is expected to contribute to the initial growth, liquidity retention is highly dependent on the hooks and projects being built and used. The Uniswap Foundation is working on supporting hook teams for their long-term success, with priority given to hooks offering innovative use cases and/or strong distribution channels. The goal is to cultivate this ecosystem on Unichain and eventually replicate the learnings on other chains.
DUNA and Fee Switch
The July FFG meeting included a call to discuss the upcoming proposal to implement the DUNA structure, along with a line-by-line review of the DUNI Association Agreement.
With the DUNA proposal, Uniswap DAO is setting a precedent as the largest and most high-profile DUNA launched in the US. Due to the sensitive nature of this topic, we’ll hold back from providing a summary of this part and reference the UF’s proposal to the community instead. The UF confirmed a target of Q3 2025 for such a proposal to move to an onchain vote, with the Fee Switch proposal expected to follow closely after.
Outstanding Dependencies:
Outstanding dependencies for the adoption of the DUNA structure and further discussion on the Fee Switch proposal include:
- The technical development for the Fee Switch activation is currently underway. A change to the initial design caused delays on the initial timeline. This change enables support for hook-generated fees within the overall fee switch architecture. This streamlines the process of collecting fees from hook projects.
One of the commitments that the UF made was exploring revenue-share agreements with grantees/partners in their latest renewal. The diverse environment of hooks, especially those with a custom accounting framework, provides Uniswap with an assortment of potential revenue streams. In order to incorporate hook-related fees into the broader “fee switch architecture," the DUNA and fee proposals will be conducted separately, with fees being instituted at a later date this year.
Broader Implications:
While there are other DUNA-powered DAOs, Uniswap is the most advanced DAO to adopt such a legal structure. For this reason, the way the Uniswap DUNA (called “DUNI”) is structured is specifically tailored to Uniswap and its particular needs and challenges.
While the Fee Switch is a core function unlocked by the DUNA, the structure enables much more than revenue activation. For example, the DUNA enables the DAO to more effectively interact with the offchain world. The DUNA framework introduces a clear and legally recognized system for appointing agents and administrators to act on behalf of the DAO, without transferring decision-making authority away from governance.
Agents, such as the Ministerial Agent, are empowered to carry out non-discretionary, non-managerial, governance-approved actions that require legal or operational execution in the offchain world. This can include executing contracts, hiring service providers, transmitting payments, or filing regulatory documents, tasks that the DAO cannot perform directly through smart contracts.
Administrators are appointed to perform specialized functions, such as tax compliance, financial reporting, or operational management. Their authority is strictly limited to the scope defined by governance and can be modified or revoked at any time.
By formalizing these roles, the DUNA structure allows Uniswap Governance to engage in essential offchain operations, such as contracting with law firms, treasury managers, or auditors, while preserving onchain governance as the sole source of policy, budgetary, and strategic decisions.
UNI Delegation and DAO Voting
As detailed in the Governance Logistics Improvement forum post, token-denominated voter turnout has steadily declined from an average of nearly 60 million UNI in its early years to approximately 45 million UNI today. As a result, the second major topic discussed in the second FFG meeting is the state of UNI delegation and DAO voting.
A16z, a participant of the FFG, clarified that the token delegations they retracted in June are due to internal structural changes. Whether the retracted voting power will be redelegated or not is still unclear, and no timeline for potential redelegation was provided.
If the DUNA is established, the Uniswap Foundation expects it will lead to a change in the governance structure, with a shift in delegation trends. There are currently legal challenges to DAO participation, which affect token holders’ voting behaviour. As a reference point, there are currently approximately 190 million delegated tokens, but only approximately 45 million are regularly used for voting. Direct voting participation and/or delegation from previously reluctant token holders might increase as a result of the DUNA due to enhanced legal protection.
Unichain and Uniswap v4
Finally, a third topic of discussion during the FFG meeting was Unichain and Uniswap v4. Once again, we looked into the evolving Liquidity Mining programs on Unichain and Ethereum, as well as the infrastructure and ecosystem being developed around Uniswap v4 hooks.
Liquidity Mining and Liquidity Retention:
The Uniswap Foundation reconfirmed outperformance over the initial adoption goals set for Unichain. Considering volumes as the most important metric, the program achieved $13.3 billion by the third month of the campaign. The Gauntlet team summarises additional metrics here.
The liquidity mining campaign is set to kick off the flywheel for both Unichain and Uniswap v4, with the primary goal of cultivating sticky liquidity and a healthy financial ecosystem. The UF is actively working with Gauntlet on incentives for vanilla and hooked pools, constantly adjusting to optimize results. Following the initial three months, the campaign’s focus has shifted more towards hooks to reduce mercenary capital even further. While the liquidity mining campaign is expected to contribute to the initial growth, liquidity retention is highly dependent on the hooks and projects being built and used.
More broadly, the UF is working on supporting hook teams for their long-term success, prioritising hooks offering innovative use-cases and/or strong distribution channels (e.g. Euler). As part of this, they are dedicating resources towards building the infrastructure required to make hook teams successful. Because of hooks’ unique nature, using off-the-shelf solutions isn’t always possible; instead, tailored tools are needed to accommodate each hook. Examples include custom incentive distribution systems and hook-specific analytics tools to track routing correctly.
So far, the primary focus has been on Unichain. The key reason for this is that the UF’s vision is to build a playbook on supporting hook builders. Since this is a trial-and-error process, it is a funds-optimisation strategy to implement the playbook on Unichain first rather than simultaneously testing across multiple chain deployments. The UF plans to expand the growth strategy among other large chains once the playbook is strong enough to enable an efficient and effective use of funds.
Revenue Sharing Between Hooks and Uniswap:
The UF believes that if DAO funds are leveraged to support a hook project, a benefit needs to be returned to the DAO. Accordingly, the Foundation signed a revenue-sharing agreement with the hook-project Bunni and is open to repeating this with other hook projects.
For technical reasons, projects might build their own custom accounting instead of leveraging the default system. From a design perspective, this enables greater flexibility for their hook. However, custom accounting hooks are not subject to v4’s internal protocol fee. Through its partnerships, the UF aims to guarantee that a fee element is included in the custom accounting implementation so that hook-generated fees can be collected and reused as incentives or directed to the fee switch function.
The UAC will continue monitoring the progress of these initiatives and will provide the next update following the September FFG meeting. We welcome feedback from the DAO and broader community.