Foundation Feedback Group (FFG) Thread

Governance-Meta
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Uniswap Foundation Feedback Group (FFG)

Authors: Uniswap Accountability Committee (UAC)

This forum post outlines the purpose and structure of the FFG.

Background

In March, the DAO passed two proposals, allocating a total of ~$165.5M to the Uniswap Foundation (UF) for facilitating overall Uniswap ecosystem growth and development.

  • $95.4M for UF-driven grants
  • $25.1M for UF OPEX
  • $45M for Unichain/v4 incentives

The UF’s mandate will span approximately 2 years, between March 11, 2025 - March 11, 2027.

Given the scale and duration of this funding, several delegates raised important questions during the proposal review process around how to maintain effective input, track progress, and ensure DAO visibility into how the UF is executing on its mandate.

In response to the feedback, the UAC collaborated with UF leadership to establish the Foundation Feedback Group (FFG)—a group intended to ensure effective communication and strengthen accountability between the UF and the DAO.

The FFG’s responsibilities include:

  • Tracking UF Roadmap Execution: reviewing the Foundation’s progress on the strategic initiatives articulated in Uniswap Unleashed, including incentive deployments, grant funding, and ecosystem alignment.
  • Driving Value to the Ecosystem: ensuring that capital is allocated to initiatives with sound justification, with a key driver being eventual value provision to financially vested entities via Uniswap protocol revenue, UVN staking fees, etc.
  • Surfacing and Contextualizing Key Updates: identifying key developments, challenges, or strategic pivots that are important for the DAO to understand and sharing summarized insights back to the DAO via forum updates/during community calls.
  • Providing an Additional Layer of Accountability: offering thoughtful, informed feedback to the UF on how it’s fulfilling its mandate, particularly in areas and topics that require additional discretion and care (like confidential partnerships).

Importantly, the FFG will not act as a board of the UF or an enforcement body, nor will it replace the Foundation’s existing reporting processes. Rather, it will serve as a high-context, DAO-aligned observer group—one that can offer an added degree of trust and reassurance that the UF’s work is progressing responsibly and that feedback from the DAO is being acknowledged and incorporated in a constructive way.

Group Composition

The FFG’s composition reflects a balance of relevant expertise, Uniswap ecosystem synergy, and strategic insight. Members include individuals with legal backgrounds, financial alignment, and demonstrated tactical acumen. The group also features delegates who have historically been constructive in their feedback and demonstrate a level of neutrality with the Foundation, as well as participants with specialized knowledge in areas such as market making, governance operations, and protocol development. Some members are former grantees or represent projects that rely on the Uniswap protocol for their success, ensuring strong alignment. Collectively, the group brings high context around Uniswap DAO operations and is well-positioned to provide thoughtful, informed oversight.

Miles and Ross from a16z:

  • Miles Jennings and Ross Shuel both represent a16z, a prominent Uniswap investor. As Head of Policy and General Counsel of a16z crypto, Miles has been deeply involved in shaping legal frameworks and policy approaches that support the long-term sustainability of protocols and DAOs like Uniswap. Ross focuses on governance design and network operations with a16z’s portfolio companies and is closely informed on Uniswap’s current and prospective status in the broader DeFi space.

Jesse and Jake from Variant:

  • Jesse Walden and Jake Chervinsky both represent Variant, an early-stage crypto venture firm. As the Founder and Managing Partner of Variant, Jesse has led the firm as a key investor in Uniswap, recognizing its potential to transform digital value exchange through DeFi.​ He has also been active in the broader Uniswap ecosystem, having co-authored the original proposal for the Uniswap Grants Program in December 2020. Jake is Chief Legal Officer at Variant, and has spent years working on the bleeding edge of DeFi law and policy, including as a resource for the Uniswap ecosystem.

Getty Hill from GFX Labs & Oku Trade:

  • Participating on behalf of GFX Labs and their delegators, Getty is the CEO of GFX and Oku Trade. Through GFX, he has been a delegate in Uniswap since 2021. Previously, he was working at a Chicago trading firm running on & off-chain delta-neutral strategies for three years.

Thanos from Keyrock:

  • Participating on behalf of Keyrock, a Global Crypto Investment Firm, Thanos has been leading the firm’s governance efforts. Keyrock, known for its expertise in market making, OTC, and options, has become a key player in global crypto liquidity. Thanos brings over 10 years of experience in the crypto space and is considered an expert in liquidity strategy and infrastructure.

kassandra.eth from Arrakis:

  • Participating on behalf of Arrakis, the sophisticated onchain market maker preferred by token issuers. Arrakis was created in response to the Uniswap V3 whitepaper and the growing complexity of effectively managing LP on DEXs. Kassandra has been building on and round Uniswap Protocol for the last 4+ years, and is a strong believer in robust, immutable DeFi infrastructure that unlocks truly permissionless innovation. Uniswap Protocol is the crown jewel of the app layer.

*The UAC will by default be a part of the FFG and is responsible for publicizing details from UF-FGG conversations.

Logistics

Cadence:
Every other month, with 4 total meetings occurring for the remainder of the calendar year.

Start Month: May 2025

End Month: December 2025

Meetings Format:
Unrecorded, private meeting between the stated group members and the UF to allow for candidness and the sharing of sensitive information. The UF will provide a high-level agenda and discussion points prior to each bimonthly meeting, allowing FFG members to prepare questions and flag concerns in a Q&A format, unlike the existing public Foundation community calls.

Approach to Communications:

  • The UAC, as a part of the FFG, will sustain a running forum thread with bimonthly meeting updates. This page will also allow the FFG to communicate any potential issues that they may be observing. Candidness in relaying sentiment to the DAO is imperative.
  • The FFG will not distribute confidential or material nonpublic information, such as unannounced partnerships. Instead, the group may relay obfuscated or thematic summaries that offer directional insight while preserving discretion. Again, the goal is to allow for an external body to verify that the UF is executing properly, without needing to share each and every detail publicly.

Cycling Members:
At the end of the year, the UAC will collect feedback from DAO members and evaluate the effectiveness of this group, reinstituting it for the coming year if successful. The operations and processes behind the selection of group members are subject to change based on learnings from this iteration.

8 Likes
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i support this but only 70 views in 5 days? we need to do something :wink:
maybe create a easy-to-read version? i can do this for free?
if you need help i am happy to help: dm me or sendmeyourcoin@gmail.com

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Let me get this straight.

We have the Uniswap Foundation (UF), which is funded by a group of delegates—many of whom know each other through private Telegram groups and in-person events. One group, the UAC, essentially greenlights UF’s funding by herding familiar delegates behind the scenes. Meanwhile, the UF dangles the idea of a protocol fee switch as a carrot to the community.

Then, when delegates push back with, “We want to be paid too!”—because, let’s be honest, most don’t actually own UNI personally— @Doo_StableLab rallies the top VC-backed delegates to secure compensation in UNI. The justification? The fee switch is supposedly imminent.

But surprise: the fee switch isn’t happening.

And yet, somehow, we’re still moving forward with paying delegates in UNI—for what, exactly? Button pressing?

This is governance theatre.

The UAC rarely challenges its own delegates. Being critical risks bad vibes—and worse, it might jeopardize the flow of funds.

Here’s some feedback:

We need more voices from actual UNI holders—people who bought the token and have real skin in the game. We need rotation in positions of power. We need value-driven contributors who are here to make meaningful changes, not coast for the next decade on six-figure salaries as UF board members.

Yes, we get it—you’re all friends with Hayden and the team. But can we please start taking DAOs seriously?

Let’s implement mechanism designs that prioritize users. Let’s challenge the entrenched structures. Because right now, it feels like user voices don’t stand a chance against the insiders already in place.

Also, I love how this post has 8 likes, but no one else has provided feedback. Everyone giving you a pat on the back for the nice post, good job. What are the value metrics to UAC doing its job, and UF? Can anyone actually lose a job here or be fired? Who keeps the accountable, accountable? The community/users/actual holders that have been silenced.

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I mostly agree with the concerns raised above by the community members in the replies. Transparency is key, and while it seems like the Foundation is taking some steps toward that, we need to see real action.

We need to bring back the actual UNI community and get all UNI holders involved in governance. Right now, Discord is practically dead. Most messages come from bots, and UF’s presence there is almost nonexistent. We need active community managers and moderators helping out, answering questions, and keeping engagement alive.

Information is scattered across too many forums and channels. Proposals, governance conversations, snapshots, and updates should be actively shared on Discord, and we should see real time discussions happening there to revive the space.

The fee switch must go live and when it does, there should be major marketing around it. We increase staking, attract more contributors, make people care and also participate in governance later on. We need more real voices — actual UNI holders with skin in the game.

To the community: stop delegating to people who aren’t engaged or helping grow the ecosystem. Delegate to those who are present, active, AND community aligned!

I fully support the Foundation and the team — they’ve done great work. But the focus lately seems too zoomed in on big picture strategy while the grassroots community is being overlooked. Now that Unichain is live, that balance needs to shift. Let’s value UNI holders and the community more than ever.

Look at communities like Moonwell, Aerodrome, or Base. when you ask a question in Discord or on X, you get a thoughtful response from a team member, founder, or moderator almost instantly. I mention these not as comparisons, but as examples of what effective community presence and support look like in practice. So, please don’t get me wrong. I want to be productive. That kind of responsiveness builds trust and drives participation. It would be great to see that level of engagement here too.

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Look, I get your frustration. I do…I’m not just saying that. This isn’t a perfect solution, but it’s a step in the right direction. Further communication and clarity around the UF’s direction and execution now that their funding proposal has passed is important.

The UF led the charge for their own funding. At no point did the UAC give an outright endorsement to the UF proposal. The UAC is not responsible for the UF. There was never an agreement establishing that. We simply set this FFG group up as an additional layer of communicating with the UF since we found benefit in speaking with them—as did numerous other delegates—in a candid conversational format during their roadshow for “Uniswap Unleashed.” Some members of the UAC also did not vote For the funding proposals. There is clear separation between the teams and are not to be conflated. Information relayed from the FFG is to keep delegates informed and critical.

This isn’t just done for the sake of theatrics. Nobody is content with this status quo. And the UF isn’t being disingenuous with their intentions. The DAO has tried multiple times to get this through, and yes, large stakeholders may have thwarted the efforts. But if there was ever a time to follow through on this, it’s now. The UF has made that clear. If this promise is not delivered during their present term, the case for the UF persisting dwindles. Where are we in that process? Well, attaining more concrete clarity into that process is why the FFG in part exists. We will communicate as best as we can where we see the UF is doing well versus dragging their feet. Those comments will be posted in this thread and shared on community calls. Mind you, GFX and Keyrock are also a part of the FFG. They voted Against the Foundation’s proposals. We tried to balance perspectives in this group as best as possible. There are dissenting opinions—not just a herd of lemmings.

The idea that the UAC is just a group of friends greenlighting everything is not a cogent analysis. The UAC is made up of elected delegates who’ve repeatedly rejected or amended proposals—including UF-related ones.

UNI token holders are free to partake in governance. Who’s stopping them? Do delegates actively aim to deter token holders from voicing their opinions? Of course not—it’s more the case that investors often don’t want to get into the weeds of how DAOs function day-to-day simply because it isn’t worth their time unless their allocation is sizable. And the liquid nature of $UNI is that people vote with their feet and often do so quickly. If something disgruntles a token holder and they genuinely lose faith in the project, they’re able to sell. The fact that UNI’s FDV is as high as it stands is because there is clear potential, and the EV+ move for those investors is to wait out until something like the fee switch/UVN go live.

We’ve added a16z and Variant to the FFG because they are financially incentivized to see that Uniswap does well. They hold more tokens than almost anyone else. Sure, that also adds red tape around timing of proposals like the fee switch, but that’s the case with any large company. The more you invest, the more say you have in its operations. Plus, they’ve been invested since day one, despite the vesting schedule. There is of course the equity component that adds an additional layer of complexity. But the success of Labs and the protocol aren’t mutually exclusive. An investor allocated to both the token and the equity still are better off seeing both be maximally availed. This is not an endorsement of a two-tiered capitalization structure—just a statement.

Token holders. Delegates. Forum participants. Users. Etc. This isn’t a grand conspiracy set to quiet these groups—it’s a participatory system, albeit one with imperfections, sure. If one wants to see change, propose it. Draft an RFC. Run for UAC. Challenge a UF renewal budget. None of these paths are easy—governance takes time, and the processes can be irksome sometimes. But this forum exists so that anyone with a thoughtful idea and a genuine commitment to Uniswap can contribute. The door is open. What matters most is showing up, staying engaged, and turning critique into action.

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Thank you for the thoughtful response. Yes, my more recent comments come from a place of discontent, but also from a deep admiration for Uniswap as a protocol. What concerns me most is that the DAO structure seems to be replicating many of the same failures found in the traditional financial system.

The initial excitement I felt when using Uniswap for the first time came from its open access to code, its financial permissionlessness, and its potential to drive innovation capable of competing with the walled gardens of Wall Street. That’s why I’ve been so vocal about the optics surrounding the Uniswap Foundation, Uniswap Labs, and their relationship to the protocol.

There’s also the troubling fact that Flashbots and affiliated/unaffilliated block builders have profited enormously from MEV inefficiencies within Uniswap’s liquidity pools. This system has become extractive for anyone who is not a founder or developer.

The separation between Universal Navigation and the Uniswap protocol feels no different from the “accredited investor” barrier that limits access to financial opportunities. In some ways, it’s even worse—users who gave the protocol its value through usage and belief are now being treated like a piggy bank for expenses via the UNI token, while simultaneously serving as a revenue stream for Uniswap Labs.

Meanwhile, over the past few years, the Uniswap Foundation has wasted a significant amount of grant money on analytics tools and data platforms that virtually no one uses. Yet the same individuals remain in charge, now actively designing a foundation board system with minimal DAO input.

I hope the UAC and UF understand that users are not just trading—they are also the ones providing exit liquidity for your funds through liquidity pools. No matter how much UNI is used to cover expenses, if those pools dry up, the marginal utility of UNI—as a piggy bank—will continue to vanish.

My frustration stems from watching a once-promising pink gem of innovation and opportunity gradually be reshaped into a version of traditional finance even more flawed than the one many of us turned to crypto to escape.

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I fully support you, and I have always felt this way. I think the foundation should learn more from Aave and Maker. I now feel that the people in the foundation do not understand what DeFi is at all. It is just a group of professional managers who are managing it. They do not understand the feelings of the holders.

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I don’t understand why the foundation doesn’t promote the dividend and repurchase plan of UNI. Labs took 0.25% of the front-end revenue, which I think is understandable, but what about the protocol layer? Is it going to continue like this?

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Thanks for raising these points, @Userisky.

I agree that the DAO should strive for broad and meaningful representation. That said, active participation from UNI holders remains a broader challenge across the DAO space—not just at Uniswap. We’re seeing similar discussions emerge in places like Arbitrum DAO, and solutions for Uniswap DAO are being actively explored, such as Unistaker. However, the Foundation Feedback Group (FFG) was not designed to solve DAO-wide apathy or increase direct UNI holder participation in governance. Its primary role is to improve communication and accountability between the UF and the broader DAO.

That said, both the UF and UAC spent significant time discussing how to ensure the group includes a range of perspectives—balancing subject-matter expertise, protocol usage, and community context. Regarding UNI holders specifically, I’d note that while they are undeniably a key part of the ecosystem, their interests and incentives can vary greatly. There’s no requirement for long-term alignment with the protocol, transparency about holdings (including in competitors), or safeguards against insider activity. That doesn’t mean they shouldn’t be involved—but it does mean we need to be thoughtful about how.

Personally, I believe the FFG includes several individuals and entities who not only hold UNI but are also meaningfully engaged in the ecosystem and well-positioned to represent a diversity of DAO views. That includes, but is not limited to, a16z and Variant, two of the largest UNI token holders.

Completely agree—liquidity providers are essential to the health of the protocol. That’s exactly why entities like Keyrock and Arrakis, which have deep operational knowledge and relationships with LPs, were brought into the group.

I hope this brings additional context. Overall, appreciate the feedback—it’s through this kind of discussion that the DAO can continue to evolve and strengthen.