Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 4
Vote: FOR
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The Delegate Reward Initiative has been beneficial in promoting governance participation. A new cycle with the updated criteria will be beneficial in upkeeping governance participation and meeting quorum, especially in the wake of large UNI holders undelegating from key delegates.
The new criteria is balanced and compensates the activity of delegates more pro-rata than previous cycles. Additionally, the 1,000 UNI holder criterion promotes further alignment between delegates and the DAO.
Address Update
Due to an undelegation from our original address calblockchain.eth, we have been voting from our old address blockchainatberkeley.eth and will continue to do so for the future.
Establish Uniswap Governance as “DUNI,” a Wyoming DUNA
Vote: FOR
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We believe the establishment of DUNI brings a much needed legal framework and protection for delegates. Granting delegates limited legal liability is a next step forward in ensuring that Uniswap’s governance can operate with certain clarity. Additionally, DUNI provides the legal infrastructure and confidence needed to explore and implement mechanisms like the fee switch.
However, we raise concerns on the vagueness in the time to execution in the proposal. While we understand at the moment it is unrealistic to expect a thorough timeline, we are looking forward to the quarterly and annual financial updates as mentioned from the Foundation. Further breakdown and spending of the significant $16.5m UNI funding is also essential for complete transparency.
All in all, it is for the best interests for delegates and the DAO as DUNI provides significant legal protections and clarity. There is little drawback to this proposal and potentially provides infrastructure to execute value accrual for holders. Therefore, we are voting in favor of the proposal.
Launching Uniswap v3 on Ronin with co-incentives
Vote: FOR
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Ronin recently announced the transition to an Eth-aligned L2 and committed to becoming the primary hub for gamification on Ethereum. An official Uniswap deployment on Ethereum and co-incentivization of liquidity will establish Uniswap as the canonical DEX on Ronin and strengthen Ronin’s defi ecosystem.
The proposed 2:1 incentive commitment highlights Ronin’s commitment to building robust and long term liquidity through Uniswap and is fair to both parties. While Ronin currently has a TVL of $58m at the time of writing, the $1m RON and $500k UNI commitment seems a valuable investment to bootstrap liquidity and TVL. Additionally, Katana V3’s volume has ranged from $60m-$100m for the past quarter, and points to meaningful volume for Uniswap as the canonical Ronin DEX.
CalBlockchain is voting YES for this proposal.
GLI — Treasury delegation Round 2
Vote: FOR
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The quorum situation has been in discussion for many months, and needs a current band-aid solution. With major UNI holders undelegating their voting power, it is necessary for the DAO to try experimental solutions to alleviate this deficit in the short term. While not optimal, treasury delegations offer an immediate solution. When more votable supply is introduced or another potential solution is identified and the quorum problem is resolved, the TD should be immediately discontinued.
However, a DAO vote of delegates raises concerns of conflict of interest and centralization, with delegates potentially consolidating influence and coordination. While subjective, we agree with @SeedGov’s proposition of ranking delegates based on participation, so that delegates with more activity are retroactively given voting power.
We would also like clarification on how the delegation cap (2.5M) was established.
Currently, it is of utmost importance of maintaining the integrity of the quorum with short term measures. CalBlockchain is voting FOR for this proposal.
GLI — Incentivized Delegation Vaults
Vote: FOR
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As mentioned above, we are in favor of trying out more experimental approaches to resolving the quorum situation short term. The budget ask to build is relatively small and not a loss to the treasury even if IDVs are not utilized. Additionally, the ask for 180,000 UNI for incentives has the potential to reactivate idle voting power. We think these numbers are fair investment in incentivizing more voting supply for the quorum.
CalBlockchain will be voting in support of this proposal.