Blockful's Delegate Platform

Delegation Pitch
1

Contact & Delegation Address Information

About Us

blockful is a fully independent and bootstrapped governance-security company dedicated to “holistic governance security, with and beyond code.” We combine our anticapture framework, years as a web3 development company, data dashboards, and social-layer analysis to help DAOs evolve from fragile to resilient systems.

Delegate Statement

Our mission is to safeguard Uniswap’s long-term security.

We have already audited UNI governance (funded from a UF grant), mapped risk metrics, and shipped a public dashboard (https://anticapture.com/uni) so every community member can see attack threats before they strike. Delegating to blockful means turning these insights into proactive, security-first votes.

Reasons for Wanting to Be a Delegate

  1. Security leadership – we created the Anticapture Framework and are currently service providers for ENS DAO to implement its findings, enhancing our governance.

  2. Data transparency – our dashboards surface token-distribution shifts, implementation safeguards costs, and governance health so voters act on facts, not vibes.

  3. Public-goods mindset – all of our systems are OSS;

  4. Critical Eye - we believe there are a series of checks and balances necessary for incentives inside a DAO not to become inefficient. We want to help Uniswap stay healthy by calling out what’s needed.

Skills & Areas of Expertise

  • Governance security

  • Smart-contract development

  • Community and Incentives

  • Cross-DAO participation

Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest

blockful currently serves as a delegate for Arbitrum, Optimism, ENS, Scroll. We are fully bootstrapped with no investor pressure behind the scenes to bias our positioning.

2

Grow Uniswap on Plasma

We voted for Uniswap to allocate $250K to the Plasma incentive program.

The rewards could bring more capital, attention, and liquidity to Uniswap on Plasma. Given its importance in the DeFi market in recent weeks, it is an expense that could bring short-term returns for Uniswap.

3

Protocol Fee Expansion: Vote 3

We voted FOR this proposal because it is a consistent extension of Uniswap’s already-approved fee framework.

The proposal does not change the protocol fee policy. It simply expands the existing fee collection and UNI burn infrastructure to BNB Chain and Polygon, while completing Celo’s activation after a previous execution issue.

Supporting this proposal helps align Uniswap’s fee implementation with its multichain reality. Since the protocol already operates across multiple networks, the fee infrastructure should be able to follow that footprint in a standardized way.

We also recognize that expanding to more chains adds new execution paths and infrastructure dependencies, so governance should continue monitoring the system closely.

4

Return 12.5M Delegated Tokens to the Governance Timelock

We voted FOR this proposal.

The proposal withdraws 12.5M delegated UNI from the Uniswap Foundation and other governance members, such as Anode, kpk, and Axia. These delegations currently come from the Uniswap DAO treasury.

We supported the proposal because Uniswap governance is now in a different position than it was before the creation of DUNI, the Uniswap DUNA legal structure approved on August 30, 2025.

Since then, delegated UNI has grown significantly. In less than three months, the amount of delegated UNI increased by 17.1%, adding 33M delegated tokens. In October alone, 31.9M UNI were delegated, mostly from addresses delegating their governance tokens for the first time.

This suggests that DUNI helped provide more legal certainty for delegates and encouraged more UNI holders to participate in governance, either directly or through delegation.

As a result, Uniswap no longer needs to rely as heavily on delegates whose voting power comes from the DAO treasury. The DAO now has large UNI holders actively participating in governance, bringing more skin in the game to the delegate set.

This is healthier than relying on treasury-backed delegation, which can create incentive misalignment between delegates and UNI holders.

However, we also recognize the main tradeoff: Uniswap may now depend on a smaller number of large delegates to reach quorum. Without the participation of professional delegates, the DAO will need to remain aligned and coordinate with UNI whales to avoid quorum issues.

Even with this nuance, we believe the proposal is a positive step toward a more aligned governance structure, where voting power increasingly comes from UNI holders rather than the DAO treasury itself.