URGENT discussion on current vote: "Reduce UNI Governance Proposal & Quorum Thresholds"

[rabbidfly]

so much to process…

consensus was solved by satoshi at the intersection between cryptography and economics. but consensus of what?
“consensus of record” - trust in the integrity of historical events

what a better way to decentralize ‘history’. cryptography gives us the tech, and economic incentives through PoW gives us the feedback mechanism that hurts the most - money.

governance is different however. it is forward looking and experimental in nature. the consequences of decisions are unknown a priori. linear causality was taken to the woodshed. governance in this context is the ‘extraction of potential future financial rewards’. but is that really true? as a delegate who is responsible for the health of the system they are overseeing, how can they use cryptoeconomics to form good decisions, either as an individual or a cartel? long-term thinking occasionally requires short-term sacrifices, or investments, in order achieve a benefit. ‘benefits’ often rely on value systems that go far beyond ‘financial rewards’, and also feature ethical considerations like sustainability, fairness, lawfulness, etc.

i’m barely able to maintain a coherent thread, partially because this exploration into human social design is so new. let’s try and simplify. there are 2 modalities here.

1. system of record
   and proof using decentralized mechanisms (tech and incentives OR cryptoeconomics)
2. system of adaptation or advance
   and proof of value using retroactive mechanisms of a posteriori observation and study (PDCA)

#2 may very well become perverted if you attach economic incentives, because instead of trying to improve the system, delegates will engage in plutocratic behaviour to improve their economic standing. so instead, we have a voting-delegate system that relies on a different incentive paradigm - that of shared values. so, it’s no wonder that it also becomes subject to all the human vices that go with it.

Cryptoeconomics is not the answer for governance. It can’t be. The structure for human social advancement cannot be solved via the lens of economic constraint. in the end i offer no alternative except to encourage frequent experimentation, frequent failure, because the fuel for emergence is change. if agents in the system have the common good in mind, then i remain confident that we will incentivize beneficial adaptations. the essential question is and remains, how to incentivize this behaviour?

we need something new. perhaps cryptoanthroeconomics. the intersection of cryptography, humanity, and economics is likely to offer clues. cryptoeconomics was devised to ‘avoid’ human tendencies. it has limitations because, unfortunately, you can’t design the human out of the system.

[jumnhy]

Good points all around.

Economic incentives are insufficient. Even if you accept the premise in theory (I don’t) that market solutions can fix any problem, you have the issue of the human and all the unknown unknowns that humans bring to the table. While we don’t have a historical analog for DAOs and decentralized governance, we have numerous examples of the failure of the free market in the face of human ingenuity.

Ultimately, humans (for now) control the system parameters, and that means that a.) a complex system will display emergent behavior, heuristics for which are non-existent and/or ineffable a priori, and b.) in the final analysis, none of those parameters for the system exist in a vacuum.

On a practical note, to address the plutocratic equilibrium that everyone seems to be concerned about–

We can introduce a sunset/expiration date on delegated votes. In another thread, we’ve been discussing the necessity of allowing “undelegation” at will, but as a check on delegate power, we can find a balance between allowing for delegated/minimal agency voting (ie, individual holders don’t have to invest time and energy in following governance minutiae, and simply give their voting power to delegates they trust) and the perverse incentives for delegates towards plutocracy.

Thoughts?

[freezer]

I am unable to read through all of the comments, so forgive my digression. I do think the discussion on cryptoeconomics is productive, but I also think we should take a few practical steps to get the threshold vote re-voted on and passed. Until then Uniswap governance is at a standstill.

It seems like one of the initial reasons people voted NO against lowering the thresholds is that the ‘quorum threshold’ and ‘proposal threshold’ should be two separate votes.

Furthermore, ‘Retroactive Proxy Contract Airdrop — Phase One’ has now failed to pass (which seemed to be a major topic of discussion / fear of many in this thread)

Is there a process to re-submit ‘quorum threshold’ and ‘proposal threshold’ as two separate votes?

[jumnhy]

Holy shit, I just happened across this post today again, and I missed a HUGE point:

You said this, but I’m reiterating for my and anyone else’s benefit:

Quorum is % of total supply, but only votes that have been delegated prior to any proposal being submitted (self-delegated, or to someone else) can participate.

This is akin to bullshit voter registration requirements, and even more bullshit party registration requirements, in the United States. Not to mention that delegation incurs a gas fee (not a substantial one, but still… we’re already solidly in the plutocratic sphere by making 1 $-denominated shared = 1 vote, so it’s kind of insult to injury).

On the flipside, you do want some sort of threshold of the total supply to be involved in the governance process.

But functionally, you have scenarios where it is mathematically impossible to achieve quorum based on the levels of “voter registration”.

A couple thoughts on this:

1. Make the quorum threshold a function of the number of delegated votes
2. In tandem with 1.), require some minimum number of delegated votes required for any proposal to be proposed in the first place.
3. Delegation has a sunset provision, ie, lasts only for a given number of votes or a given period of time (I lean towards number of votes)

I’m not super thrilled about point 2, but I’m picturing something with a delegation threshold that was proportional to the amount of votes delegated, ie, if a bunch of votes are delegated, the quorum threshold is high, if not, the quorum threshold is low, with a system minimum established based on the required delegation count. Could borrow from Vitalik’s quadratic voting to temper some of the edge cases (ie, get the bare minimum votes delegated to propose, keep the voter participation super low to be able to pass something easily).

I’m not so sure.

From our previous conversations, I think I know what complexity would tell us about this: you can’t control every edge case. You can’t mitigate every governance risk. Be adaptable instead. And I agree with that, fundamentally, but making quorum a function of the total supply, while large chunks of the supply are locked up, and participation is limited to delegated votes (so some fraction of the fraction)… that limits our ability to adapt substantially.

[caideguang]

Support this proposal. At present, uni has many very good ideas in community governance, and there is no way to successfully propose. It is suggested to reduce the proposal standard.