[RFC] Uniswap Unleashed

Uniswap Unleashed

[Feb 16: additions to ‘Uniswap Foundation 2025 Priorities’ and ‘Top 10 Largest Projected Grants Allocations’ charts, described here]

The Uniswap community is entering 2025 with the momentum of three positive catalysts: a more collaborative regulatory environment, the launch of Uniswap v4, and the debut of Unichain. As we look to the months and years ahead, we see the potential for Uniswap Protocol and Unichain to cement themselves as foundational infrastructure for digital value transfer.

The Uniswap community has always pioneered—but pioneers don’t stay ahead by standing still. Achieving this vision will require more than just technological innovation; it demands strengthening network effects and evolving our governance system to fund, sustain, and grow the Protocol independently over time. We call for action, and for the broader community to work alongside us as we evolve Uniswap to its next era.

In the following proposal, we define four strategic priorities for the years ahead:

  1. Scaling network supply: Provide most capital efficiency across active EVM chains
  2. Scaling network demand: Create premier DeFi development platforms
  3. Equipping Governance and the community: Activate revenue
  4. Equipping Governance and the community: Onboard Protocol Core Contributors

In the following proposal, we discuss not only these priorities but also how we expect to achieve them alongside the community and how we, the UF, will measure our success. We also discuss our budget request to achieve these goals. Today we are also posting a request for incentives to support the growth of Uniswap v4 and Unichain. If approved, these funds would be managed, within pre-set parameters and onchain, by Gauntlet, while having control maintained by Uniswap Governance.

In this proposal, we are requesting an investment of $95.4M into the UF grants budget, and $25.1M to fund operations, for the next 2 years to fund these priorities. In a separate incentives proposal posted today, we request a $45M budget to support liquidity incentives.

We recognize and appreciate the size of this request. It reflects an investment into the success of the Uniswap Protocol and Unichain, and into value for the Uniswap community. Founded in 2022 with a singular focus on Uniswap v3, the UF now leads the growth of the developer ecosystem for a true developer platform in Uniswap v4, and an L2, Unichain. In addition, we are levelling up Governance to support long term sustainability with the creation of a Core Contributor program, new tooling like Conditional Funding markets, and more.

This proposal is an investment into the future of the Uniswap community. It is designed to match the scale of our mission while being backstopped by best-in-industry transparency reporting and an unrelenting drive to create value.

2024 laid the foundation for ecosystem alignment and value capture

Over the last year, we have worked hand in hand with our grantees, developers, delegates, and other supporters to lay a strong foundation to support us on the road ahead. As a result of that work, today we have achieved:

  • +800 hook developers from more than 60 countries, with dozens actively building production projects
  • +150 hook prototypes spanning a variety of use cases, in addition to an OpenZeppelin code library for developers to use as a guide
  • Nearly 100 infrastructure and DeFi partners for Unichain
  • Unistaker contracts, which allow Uniswap Protocol revenue to be earned through delegation, designed, engineered, and audited
  • A Unichain Validator Network (UVN) that advances decentralization and compensates its validators and stakers with 65% of chain revenue

Along the way, the Foundation has evolved to a team of 16 individuals, working across Growth, Protocol & Engineering, Governance, Legal, and Operations.

You can read more about our community’s accomplishments in 2024 in our Community Impact Report.

In 2025, the UF will chart new pathways for governance sovereignty and Protocol-aligned growth

The long term successes of the Uniswap Protocol and Unichain are tied not only to their network effects, but also the governance system which can sustain and evolve them.

For the Protocol to become the world’s infrastructure for digital value transfer, we must strengthen these network effects while equipping Uniswap Governance with more tools to interact with offchain entities and make effective funding decisions. If we are successful, we not only grow the Protocol and Unichain in the short term, but we create a mechanism by which Governance can continue to develop them over time and independently.

To grow network effects, we’re focused on cultivating both supply – liquidity infrastructure for both the Protocol and Unichain – and demand – developers, integrators, and interfaces. As with all network effects, the cultivation of one side drives the growth of the other, building a self-reinforcing loop.

Over a medium to long term timeframe, however, network effects can be disrupted by competitors. Uniswap Governance, with its control over the Treasury, must evolve to ensure the Protocol remains competitive. We are focused on equipping Governance with the tooling to make adaptive, high-ROI funding decisions without reliance upon any one entity over a long time horizon.

This year we have defined four strategic priorities to strengthen network effects and empower Governance to execute on high impact, long term decisions to keep the Uniswap community at the forefront of DeFi.

First we address supply, or how we will support the development of liquid markets across Uniswap Protocol and Unichain, respectively.

Priority 1: Provide most capital efficiency across active EVM chains

Uniswap v4 and Unichain, both recently launched, stand to significantly expand their respective market share through offering innovative AMM functionality and novel infrastructure. However, this won’t happen on its own. Today the UF has posted a proposal with longtime collaborators at Gauntlet to fund $45M in incentive programs. In that post, we also lay out the strategic rationale and tactical execution of those programs in detail.

Unichain and v4 have launched into a market in which there is intense competition for liquidity. For instance, some competing AMMs and chains spend upwards of $50M per month in native tokens to support liquidity. We take these factors into account in the design of our program.

Our long-term goal is not to put in place or encourage perpetual incentivization. Rather, lasting impact will come from strengthened organic demand to sustain liquidity. This brings us to our next focus, the demand side of the equation, our plans to support and grow our developer community.

Priority 2: Create premier DeFi developer platforms
Uniswap v4 has reduced the friction for anyone to innovate upon digital asset market structures. Thus far, our programs have directly taught 1,000+ developers to learn how to build hundreds of hooks. Unichain is similarly optimized for DeFi development, and allows for experimentation at all levels of the stack.

Our planned initiatives include funding programs, infrastructure, and education to support developers through the hook development lifecycle, as illustrated below. These programs benefit developers across all Uniswap v4 deployments.

We are excited to lead ecosystem development efforts for Unichain – a chain designed with DeFi in mind. Some of the Unichain specific programs we have designed include Developer Growth Programs (Infinite Hackathon, Retro Grants Program, and the Unichain Builder Open Call), a Unichain Infrastructure Allocation, a Unichain DeFi Partner Allocation, and an upcoming Unigames competition. We also support a global program of Developer Ambassadors and a full-time Developer Support team.

Success in this priority means increasing the percentage of volume flowing to hooks on v4, growing the number of revenue-generating hook developers and integrators, and expanding Unichain’s builder ecosystem. Developer success would in turn not only sustain but grow demand for underlying liquidity, reinforcing our network effects.

However, sustainable growth also requires unlocking revenue and enabling Governance with the tools to ensure continued innovation and development. To solidify the Uniswap community’s place at the forefront of DeFi, we must also explore ways to empower and evolve our Governance system to align incentives, adapt to change, and sustain growth.

Priority 3: Activate revenue
We recently announced that 65% of Unichain net chain revenue would be earned by UVN validators and stakers, upon the launch of the UVN. The UF plans to develop and support the UVN validator and staker network, and explore supporting the development of UVN extensions later this year as well.

In addition to this step, the UF is also validating whether the creation of a legal entity (e.g., a DUNA), would be appropriate for Uniswap Governance. A legal entity may offer benefits to Governance including clarity on legal status, the ability to contract with other entities (like development teams), and more. If our vetting is successful and we believe the creation of a legal entity for Uniswap Governance is in its best interest, we would propose to Governance to implement a legal entity structure. If adopted, this step would pave the way for the potential introduction (or re-introduction) of a governance proposal for delegators to earn Protocol revenue. We could then create similar governance proposals for either select or all deployments of Uniswap.

Success here sets up the community up well for working alongside the UF in our last strategic priority.

Priority 4: Onboard new Protocol Core Contributors

To sustain itself over the long term, we must equip Uniswap Governance with the tools to fund and incentivize development teams and other initiatives to drive innovation and growth for the long term. To enable this, we are exploring the creation of a new community driven initiative – Core Contributors. While final details will be refined with delegates, our goal is to establish long-term, incentive aligned development teams responsible for advancing the Uniswap infrastructure.

  • A Core Contributor would be a development team tasked with developing core infrastructure for the Uniswap Protocol, UVN extensions, and more. This may include but is not limited to non-EVM versions of Uniswap, new hook protocols, and more.
  • A Core Contributor team would have a direct relationship with Uniswap Governance. Note that a successful governance proposal to create a legal entity (mentioned in Priority 3) would be required here as a prerequisite.
  • These Core Contributors should be incentive-aligned with the success and growth of the Uniswap Protocol and Unichain. They would likely be compensated in UNI vested over time.
  • To support the early development of this program, the UF might bootstrap an initial grant to potential Core Contributors. Through this grant, the team would prove their potential, and develop a relationship with delegates. Upon the completion of their work, the contributor might seek a larger, longer-term grant directly from Governance.
  • A potential risk to our success here is the ability for Governance to effectively select and size grants for Core Contributor teams over time. Conditional Funding Markets offer a potential pathway for Governance to use as a tool to fund these teams in the future. Our work in developing CFMs is early, but we are excited to learn from our experiments and develop this tool.

Grants and Operational Budget Projections

In this proposal, we are requesting an investment of $95.4M into the UF grants budget, and $25.1M to fund operations, for the next 2 years to fund these priorities. These figures are net of cash on hand. As mentioned above, we recognize and appreciate the size of this request. It reflects an investment into the success of the Uniswap Protocol and Unichain, and into value for the Uniswap community, and will be backstopped by best-in-industry transparency reporting and an unrelenting drive to create value.

Our program also demonstrates strong capital allocation efficiency. In 2024, our operational and grants expenditure ratio aligned closely with industry standards for leading foundations, at approximately 39% for operations and 61% for grants. Looking ahead, we project this ratio will improve even further, reaching an all-time ratio of 29% for operations and 71% for grants by 2026. These figures demonstrate a focus on maximizing resources for impactful initiatives while maintaining operational sustainability. Additional details can be found in the appendix.

Our projected grants budgets for 2025 and 2026 are $57.9M and $41.5M respectively, totalling $99.4M.

Our projected operational budget in cash for 2025 and 2026 is $24.8M. Projected UNI compensation over that time period is 1.5M UNI (or $13.8M USD at Feb 11 opening rate of $9.45).

Grants Budget

Our grant program, including each of the grants programs listed above, are focused on driving the success of and value for the Uniswap community.

Each grant includes clear performance targets that grantees must hit to unlock funding at key milestones. These targets include: notional TVL, notional volume, % market share of volume, number of developers onboarded, number of integrations unlocked, and more. If a grant fails to deliver its intended impact, we have the ability to terminate it early, and reallocate funds to other initiatives.

By holding grantees accountable to measurable outcomes, we ensure that every dollar spent strengthens protocol network effects or supports our goals of empowering Governance.

Operations Budget

Hires
Our team is currently made up of 16 individuals, focused on Growth, Operations, Legal, Governance, and our Developer Platform. You can take a look at our current team makeup here.

Over the next year, we plan to make at least 12 hires in order to support our achievement of the goals we have laid out. As mentioned above, our increase in team size reflects the increase in the investment we are making to grow and strengthen the Protocol and community.

To provide one example, our Governance team (currently 1 person) initially focused on Uniswap v3 governance. Looking into 2025, its scope will expand (or in some cases has already expanded) to include Optimism governance, Conditional Funding Markets, the Core Contributor Program, as governance activities related to Uniswap v4 and Unichain. Our hiring to build our Governance team reflects that.

Transparency & Accountability

As part of the Foundation’s commitment to transparency and accountability, we provide regular reporting on funding, impact, and financials, with recurring community and delegate IRL and virtual events.

In 2025, alongside a successful funding proposal, we will initiate a set of regular sessions with a small group of representative delegates to review and discuss the UF’s strategic direction and execution.

2024 Bi-Annual Impact Reports:

2024 Quarterly Financial Reports:

2024 Allocation Memos & Grant Announcements

Community Resources:

Delegate Events:

FAQ

Who is on the current team?
Our current team makeup is below.

What is your liquidation and treasury management strategy?
Our liquidation and treasury management strategy is designed to balance operational needs, market impact minimization, and a demonstration of long-term commitment to the community. We plan to gradually liquidate a portion of our holdings for operations and grant expenses with the goal of protecting against downside risk while maintaining upside potential. This approach will be implemented through vetted experienced organizations to ensure optimal execution.

To minimize our impact on the market and demonstrate our long-term commitment, we plan to hold ~50% of requested funds requested in UNI in the near term. This of course may change over time, however we do aim to maintain a portion of our treasury in UNI long term. We are also exploring the ability to stake a portion of our UNI holdings once staking becomes available.

How does the Unichain Growth Reserve, mentioned in your recent UVN blog post, intersect with these plans?
When the UVN launches, 65% of Unichain net chain revenue will be earned by UVN validators and stakers for their work. Until the UVN launches, the UF will direct this chain revenue to support Unichain growth efforts through a Unichain Growth Reserve. Specifically, the UF will allocate these funds, net of applicable taxes, towards our Unichain growth programs. This may include our liquidity incentive program and our developer growth initiatives. Reporting on Unichain Growth Reserve inflow and expenditure will be provided in the Uniswap Foundation’s regular Quarterly Reports, and posted to the Uniswap Governance Forum.

What happened with the Unistaker governance vote last year?
While we were initially optimistic we would be able to pass the Unistaker upgrade proposal, various concerns emerged relating to liability, tax, and securities concerns as we continued our diligence and discussions. It might be possible to mitigate those concerns using different mechanisms than were initially contemplated such as the creation of, upon a successful governance vote, one or more legal entities for Governance. We are currently exploring and plan to publicly report on the potential benefits and risks of legal entity formation by Uniswap Governance.

What is the Router Incentives subsidy?
Our Routing Subsidy program is designed to incentivize swap routers, including solvers and fillers, to send order flow to hooked pools over a period of 9 months. If a router sends trades via hooked pool(s), it will be eligible to rebate up to 80% of transaction fees incurred on that trade.

Can you tell me more about the Foundation’s capital efficiency?
More financial data related to our capital efficiency is below.

Our capital efficiency today is comparable to that of other leading Foundations.
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Sources: Linux Foundation, Arbitrum Foundation, Mozilla Foundation

How has the Uniswap Foundation engaged in the changing regulatory landscape?

In 2024, the UF engaged informally with staffers of Congress members, the administration, and regulatory agencies, and crypto lobbying groups to advocate for DeFi to push for regulatory clarity, governance certainty, and builder protections. Recognizing the pivot from enforcement to dialogue, UF has engaged with the SEC Crypto Task Force, CFTC, and key Congressional committees to help shape DeFi policy. The UF is well-positioned to expand these efforts and excited to explore opportunities here in the next year.

9 Likes

Is it better to wait until Treasury gets formed and they have some clue as to the capital allocation between liquidity (from which your ask gets converted into fiat), stability and growth funds?

According to 3Q24 there’s still ~$25M in grant piggy-bank which if you maintain same spend rate should be 4x~$6M good for rest of year.

In Q3’2024, the Foundation committed $5.32 million in new grants and disbursed $1.49 million in committed grants.

By that time, I would hope treasury (even if not selected subfunds managers) would have some financial model of what safe/sustainable level of conversion from UNI to fiat won’t depress the price-levels. This ~$6M/Q is below your ask of $10-15M/quarter but I’d like to hear what treasury working group thinks (eg a loan rather than outright Santa Claus)

There was a grant issued to study the legal options in a prior UF round. If this is the conclusion can someone release the full document. A legal entity for the treasury takes priority over governance as it may need various licenses to operate which is time-consuming (eg no-action letters if using a conditional financing mechanism).

Governance Committee Legal Entity Exploration

Entity structure research and support for the incorporation for two Uniswap governance committees. Grant funded by the Uniswap Arbitrum Grants Program and facilitated by the UF.

Grantees: Cooley, Placehodlr

1 Like

karpatkey is supportive of the work the Uniswap Foundation has been doing over the past few years. The UF has consistently delivered high-quality outcomes while fostering a welcoming and engaging environment for governance participation. Their efforts have played a crucial role in shaping Uniswap’s ecosystem, ensuring it remains both innovative and inclusive.

With the introduction of Uniswap v4 and Unichain, we are already witnessing a key transformation in Uniswap, evolving from a protocol to a full-fledged developer platform. This shift has major implications for how we, as a DAO, steward Uniswap’s growth. Over the past year, the UF has demonstrated a deep and forward-thinking understanding of this transformation, proactively positioning Uniswap for long-term success. With the official launch of both Uniswap v4 and Unichain, the need to pursue multiple goals simultaneously—protocol growth, developer adoption, and ecosystem expansion—has never been clearer (or more challenging). The vision outlined for 2025 and 2026 aligns with this shift, and we believe it is a necessary and strategic step in Uniswap’s continued evolution.

We acknowledge that this funding proposal is a significant ask. The UF currently represents the largest expense for the DAO treasury, and this request further expands the DAO’s investment in the Foundation. We believe it is important to carefully evaluate the trade-offs of such an investment in the context of Uniswap’s long-term strategy.

Uniswap has one of the largest treasuries in the industry. At karpatkey, we strongly advocate for long-term sustainability and encourage our partners to leverage their resources with that perspective in mind. However, our primary goal remains scaling DeFi. While we agree that treasury mobilisation would be beneficial for the Uniswap DAO, we also believe it should be approached in tandem with growth. The Mobilizing a DAO’s Treasury report identified two north stars for the DAO: growth and sustainability. In our view, mobilising the treasury is an effective way to achieve sustainability, which includes supporting UF funding in the long term.

A key to achieving our other north star—growth—is identifying valuable contributors, fostering innovation, and encouraging high-quality contributions. We believe the Uniswap Foundation exemplifies this role. For this reason, we extend our support for their continued work and are in favour of funding them for the longer term.

1 Like

As someone who has had the opportunity to collaborate closely with the Uniswap Foundation in my role as a Uniswap Accountability Committee member, I want to share my perspective on their contributions to the ecosystem.

The UF plays a unique and challenging role—acting as a connector between diverse stakeholders while driving effective initiatives that benefit the protocol, platform, and broader community. Over the past year, their commitment to this mission has been evident in the high-quality initiatives they’ve delivered. Two that stand out to me personally are the Uniswap Foundation Subsidy Fund and the Hooks Incubator, both of which have had a tangible impact on fostering innovation and adoption.

Beyond their programs, I want to highlight the UF’s dedication to inclusive governance and community engagement. A great example is the recent DUNA roundtable, where delegates had a unique opportunity to educate themselves on a critical topic shaping the DAO’s future. Creating spaces for informed and constructive discussions is essential for Uniswap’s evolution, and UF has consistently enabled this.

Another initiative that impressed me was GovSwap. While it may have seemed like just a fun experiment at first, the Futarchy game at GovSwap Devcon proved to be an effective way to break down a complex governance concept, making the first CFM experiment much easier to grasp. This is exactly the kind of creative, hands-on approach that makes governance more accessible and engaging.

Beyond their structured initiatives, the accessibility of the UF team is another aspect I deeply appreciate. Whether it’s discussing DUNA, Uniswap v4, or the UVN, their willingness to engage directly with the community fosters an ecosystem of growth and inclusivity—something that is far from common across DAOs.

In conclusion, I believe the UF is doing an excellent job, and I fully support their funding renewal. Their work has been instrumental in strengthening Uniswap’s ecosystem, and I look forward to seeing their continued impact.

1 Like

I believe that this proposal, with its request of $120.5M as a lump sum plus $45M in incentives, is missing clear, measurable KPIs on which the DAO can base its decision to move forward. The list provided appears to represent high-level priorities rather without specific, actionable performance metrics.

Feedback on the Priorities and how they can be improved by providing KPIs:

  1. Scaling Network Supply: Provide Maximum Capital Efficiency Across Active EVM Chains
  • Growth in Uniswap Protocol (v2-v4):

    • Feedback: This priority is vague without a KPI.
    • Suggestion: Define measurable targets such as a percentage increase in market share, user adoption, or trading volume across each chain. For instance, “Achieve a 15% market share increase on [Chain Name] within 12 months” would be a more actionable KPI.
  • Growth in Unichain DEX Volume and DeFi TVL:

    • Feedback: Without baseline target nor target objectives, it’s difficult to evaluate progress.
    • Suggestion: Establish the baseline target and set clear targets like “Increase DeFi TVL by 20% quarter-over-quarter” or “Capture 10% additional DEX volume compared to current levels within the next year.”
  1. Scaling Network Demand: Create Premier DeFi Development Platforms
  • Hooks Comprising 30% of Uniswap v4 Orderflow:

    • Feedback: This is a clear target.
  • Top Hook Development Teams & Unichain Apps/Protocols Being Revenue-Generating:

    • Feedback: The term “revenue-generating” is ambiguous in this context.
    • Suggestion: Define what qualifies as revenue-generating (e.g., a minimum monthly revenue threshold) and clarify whether this revenue is for the protocol or for the teams involved. For example, “Achieve a minimum monthly revenue of $X for top hook teams, contributing Y% to overall protocol revenue.”
  1. Equipping Governance and the Community: Active Revenue
  • Governance Vote on Uniswap Protocol Revenue to be Earned by Delegators:

    • Feedback: It is unclear whether this refers to revenue from a fee switch or revenue from all products.
    • Suggestion: Clarify the scope.
  • UVN Validator and Staker Network Developed and Supported:

    • Feedback: The term “supported” is ambiguous.
    • Suggestion: Define this KPI clearly—does it mean the network is live, fully deployed, and continuously maintained? A measurable KPI might be “Deploy the UVN Validator and Staker Network by Q4 and achieve 95% uptime over the subsequent 12 months.”
  • Unichain Top 5 L2 by Chain Revenue:

    • Feedback: While this is a dynamic objective, providing a baseline metric or target revenue figure would make it measurable.
  1. Equipping Governance and the Community: Onboard Protocol Core Contributors
  • Three New Core Contributor Teams Onboarded:
    Feedback: The objective is clear.

Overall Recommendation:

While these priorities outline a vision for growth and improvement, they do not serve as actionable KPIs because they lack specific baseline metrics, clear numerical targets, and defined timeframes.


General Concerns:

  1. Uniswap Foundation Involvement on Revenue Sharing & Decision Making:
  • Staking:

    • Concern: The Uniswap Foundation should not be involved in staking activities.
    • Explanation: Involving the Foundation in staking could create conflicts of interest or centralize power over token economics.
  • Participating in the Fee Switch:

    • Concern: The Foundation should not be part of the fee switch process.
    • Explanation: Participation in the fee switch might lead to biased decision-making or misallocation of funds. By remaining separate, the Foundation ensures that fee-related decisions are made transparently and democratically by the DAO or a designated governance mechanism.
  • Delegation of Tokens:

    • Concern: The Foundation should not delegate tokens to avoid potential collusion.
    • Explanation: Allowing the Foundation to delegate tokens could lead to conflicts of interest where their influence might sway decisions in favor of their interests. This separation is intended to maintain impartiality and prevent any group from exerting undue control over DAO decisions.
  1. Mechanism for Token Buyback (“Right of First Refusal”):
  • Concern: The Foundation should clearly communicate how it plans to sell UNI tokens and offer UNI token holders the opportunity to repurchase these tokens, similar to a “Right of First Refusal” condition.
  • Explanation: Transparency in the mechanism for selling tokens and allowing buybacks ensures that all stakeholders are aware of and can trust the process. This approach protects token holders by giving them the first opportunity to reacquire tokens, thus avoiding potential market manipulation or unfavorable sales practices.
  1. Clarification on Unichain:
  • Ownership and Context:

    • Concern: It is unclear if Unichain is owned by the DAO, and there is insufficient context regarding its functionality.
    • Explanation: The DAO has received minimal information on Unichain’s operational context and its overall purpose. The current understanding seems to be that the DAO is indirectly benefiting (or receiving a “kickback”) for funding this initiative without a complete overview. This lack of transparency can lead to misunderstandings about responsibilities and benefits.
  • Entitlement of the Unichain Growth Reserve:

    • Concern: The current description implies that the Uniswap Foundation has an entitlement to the Unichain Growth Reserve without proper approval from the DAO.
    • Explanation: This point should be clarified because, as written, it appears to be a unilateral decision rather than a proposal subject to DAO approval. For proper governance and accountability, any entitlements or allocations—especially those involving significant funds or reserves—should require explicit DAO approval.
4 Likes

Thank you @devinwalsh and the whole Uniswap Foundation team for the comprehensive and exciting proposal!

We support the general direction this proposal outlines, as the Uniswap Foundation has consistently delivered impactful work that elevates the entire ecosystem. The advent of v4, in particular, represents a major innovation capable of pushing the boundaries of what Uniswap can provide. Such significant innovation also calls for further planning and effort from the core contributors including the Foundation, especially as the ecosystem expands to accommodate new area of DeFi. We appreciate the Foundation’s role in fostering these new capabilities and dedication to making the success growth happen with the community and contributors. We want to ensure that, as the ecosystem grows, it remains underpinned by a robust governance structure and clear execution strategies.

We’d like to share the following feedback and request clarifications:

KPI and overall metric goal to be achieved

We agree with this perspective and believe that setting clear, measurable, and objective goals along with KPIs is essential for the DAO to accurately assess initiatives and achievements for each prioritized objective. As @Pepo mentioned, some initiatives are missing baselines and/or defined KPIs, and we’re also interested in understanding the north star metric for the overall initiative.

Unichain ownership

As Pepo and others have highlighted, we believe there needs to be greater clarity around Unichain’s governance structure under the DAO, especially given that its initial launch appeared to proceed independently. We would like more information on whether Unichain will be placed under the DAO’s control, how resources will be allocated, and what the longer-term plan is for its operational oversight.

Two-year term vs. shorter term

We also question why the proposal requests funding for a full two-year period and whether a more incremental or milestone-driven structure might be preferable. While we recognize that multi-year funding can provide stability for long-term initiatives, a phased or check-in based process could improve accountability, encourage iterative feedback, and help align with the rapidly evolving needs of the ecosystem. If the two-year scope is essential, it would be helpful to see more details on how success will be measured, on what cadence progress will be reviewed, and how the community can stay involved in guiding the Foundation’s priorities.

2 Likes

What clarity do you need? Unichain is not govern by the DAO. That is evident on chain, just read the source code.

I think this proposal is okay and I support. The Uniswap Foundation lead all activities for Uniswap development like the Uniswap Hook Incubator and the Uni staking. I would rather give the tokens to a single organization than one-offs to different DAO “professional governance organization” who work for many different DAOs and not just Uniswap DAO.

Stakers and validators are going to be very seperate entities, one being token holders and the other being hardware and software operators. Both groups have different interests that will be competing for their share of this revenue stream (65% of Unichain net chain revenue will be earned by UVN validators and stakers for their work.)

What is the validator take rate? Is it fixed or is it variable for each validator? If there a maximum, or can a validator set up for a 100% take rate?

This relationship needs to be clarified in the proposal so stakers have a better model to evaluate the proposal.

Why is Aerodrome team member alt posting in the Uniswap forum :rofl::rofl: Hey, bro, this is real DeFi happening here, I don’t think you will understand. Don’t you have some insider trading to get back to? :rofl::rofl::rofl:

GO UNISWAP! GO Uniswap Foundation! Let’s WIN!

1 Like

It’s great to see Uniswap Foundation prioritizing hook adoption as a major goal for v4! Given that the aim is for 30% of v4 order flow to come from hooks, can we consider using some of the incentives to support this transition? I have made a larger post inside of the RFC on liquidity incentives here https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-uniswap-unleashed-unichain-and-uniswap-v4-liquidity-incentives/25250/6?u=dakotah

TLDR:
-Strategies like Bunni rehypothecation can help make liquidity stickier by boosting organic APY even after incentives are gone.
-Bunni’s new referral program allows UF to recapture up to 5% of swap fees on referred liquidity, which could help offset initial acquisition costs.

Thank you @devinwalsh for this comprehensive and insightful post on UF growth plans for the next two years!

As a project that has been the beneficiary of the Uniswap Hook Incubator and the Uniswap Foundation Security Fund, I cannot emphasize enough how important these were to accelerating our development of hooks from both an educational and financial standpoint.

Having gone through the incubator, we are also much more aware of the vast potential of V4 due to its gas optimization and limitless flexibility. The potential for groundbreaking innovation is all there, but that potential will be highly dependent on growing the number and quality of hook developers and having the proper routing infrastructure in place.

So I largely agree with the level of investment this proposal places on builders and infrastructure as well as the hiring of more developers and engineers. Best of luck!

I’m genuinely supporting its vision. The focus on creating a more collaborative regulatory environment, alongside the innovations of Uniswap v4 and the debut of Unichain, lays a solid foundation for transforming digital value transfer.

The four strategic priorities, scaling network supply and demand, activating revenue, and onboarding core contributors, are exactly the kinds of measures we need to drive sustainable, long-term growth. What really stands out is the balanced approach: it’s not just about cutting-edge technology but also about evolving our governance and regulatory strategies to build trust and credibility. By exploring legal entity formation and enhancing off-chain interactions, the proposal smartly tackles the hurdles to institutional adoption.

From my perspective, aligning technological innovation with proactive regulatory evolution is key to setting a new standard of transparency and maturity in DeFi.

I’m excited to see how these initiatives will shape the future of Uniswap and the broader DeFi landscape.

Hi all - I’ve adjusted our proposal to include more detailed success metrics at both the UF and grants program levels.

Specifically, I’ve expanded the “Uniswap Foundation 2025 Priorities” chart with clearer metrics and added a “Target Impact” column to our “Top 10 Largest Projected Grants Allocations” chart.

We’ve intentionally set ambitious, high-impact targets. Some we will exceed, and some we may fall short on despite best efforts. However, they will serve as our team’s benchmarks for success and accountability as we drive forward.

2 Likes

This is one of proposals where I genuinely don’t think delegates can, in the short term, properly analyze all details of the the proposal including budgets and works. For now, our question is more on the scope.

Questions

  1. I understand that the team wants to devote more resources to hooks but at the same time, there are already quite many hook protypes already built it seems like, wouldn’t it be ok to see if those 150+ can actually contribute or widely used before committing more resources to it?
  1. I am curious why grants for these members are decided directly by governance while other much grants are decided by the Foundation. The details of this set up of “prove their potential” seem ideal in both ways whether to be used by Governance or the Foundation.
  1. In terms of budget, there are quite big devotions to public good. While I understand the pathos behind such, is there both practical reason for such? At the end of the day, users use other DeFi protocols or L2s due to their access and/or incentives. I do think reputation matters but Uniswap already has a wide recognition.

Comment:
In terms of overall budget, as leading L2s do have large budgets to be competitive, we recognize that either way the budget will likely to be large.

1 Like

I have some questions (skip toward the end for those) to clarify my position, as well as initial feedback, while I’m still considering the proposal.

Context

It’s impossible to look at such a request in isolation, without looking into previous performance of the UF. My subjective and opinionated view is that the UF, back in 2023, was supported on these main tasks:

  1. Help bring v4 and other strategic innovations to the market.
  2. Prepare the groundwork for a fee switch.
  3. Provide guidance to the DAO and ecosystem, defend against regulators that were demonstrably hostile at that point, lobby for better regulations, etc.
  4. Support the ecosystem building around and on top of Uniswap.

With v4 and Unichain out, I’d say the first task has been successful. In contrast, while nice work was done on the fee switch—and it’s not exactly the UF’s fault that it didn’t happen—the fact is the fee switch is still not here. I believe the UF also did a lot of good behind the scenes on the third task. With the changes after the US election, that task has lost much of its urgency compared to back then. Even so, we still don’t have the Uniswap DUNA, and we don’t have regulatory clarity yet. The ecosystem support has been a mixed bag too. While I realize that many or most of the grants handed out since 2023 are still in progress, there’s often limited information on how they’re going and on their evaluation criteria and KPIs. This is disappointing because I was hoping for more transparency on those aspects.

EDIT: I was pointed out that the 2024 Community Impact Report shared by Devin in the opening post includes details on previously issued grants (their status and main achievements). My bad for missing that. The situation is better than I was assuming.

Current Priorities

Going forward, subjectively I would put these as the current priorities:

  1. Attract economic activity to Uniswap v4 and Unichain.
  2. Continue support for strategic innovation in the ecosystem.
  3. Have a path toward sustainability of the DAO and UF.

In my view, the UF’s plans shared here score highly on the first point, okay on the second, but mostly gloss over the last one.

I’ll share feedback on the liquidity incentive programs under that post, and focus on the remaining two points here.

Sustainability and size of the funding request

The Uniswap Treasury Report assumed these numbers:

Summing up 2025 and 2026, we get $87M in total predicted expenditure. These numbers include not just UF’s budget and grants but also the DAO’s own spending (e.g., incentives, service provider fees, delegate compensation), which is substantial. Optimistically, let’s say the DAO cuts its expenses to $3.5M per year, leaving $80M for the rest.

In contrast, the current UF request is:

  • $99.4M for grants
  • $25.1M for ops
  • $45.0M for incentives
    ——————
  • $169.5M total

This is more than double the expenditure predicted in the report.

Moreover, even with the assumed $87M figure, the treasury report argues that:

  1. It’s impossible to generate sufficient operational income for the DAO to become sustainable.
  2. Therefore, the DAO will have to rely on non-operational income from the stability fund.

The fund is assumed to yield 10% APR in the base case, and Uniswap is assumed to retain its share of market volume. Both assumptions are not exactly conservative.

This brings me to the next point: the prediction of Uniswap’s continued market share may be too optimistic. There is a clear trend of DEX volume moving away from Ethereum and its L2s. For the first time in the chains’ history, Solana DEX volumes have started to dominate. While we can hope this will reverse and that v4 and Unichain will help, it’s not guaranteed. This seems like the time to be conservative and double down on what works, as well as think of how to leverage Uniswap’s specific strengths, rather than ignore the risks and expand. (One can argue that Solana’s volume is “faked” and thus not relevant. However, a much higher proportion of Ethereum’s volume comes from arbitrage than on Solana, due to Ethereum’s much larger TVL, so the argument can cut both ways.)



Grants allocation and ops budget

Grants

  1. Core Contributor program. Uniswap has existed for six years with just a single core contributor (Labs) who has done an excellent job creating value for the ecosystem and, so far, has been self-sustaining. Bringing in three more during the next two years, funded by the DAO, is a significant shift. Perhaps I don’t see all the details, but based on the information provided, there isn’t enough justification to spend $15M on this.

  2. Public Good hooks. I fully support this, even if the size is debatable. Many useful hooks will be hard to turn into businesses; funding them will bring a lot of value to the ecosystem.

  3. Chain-specific hooks. If these hooks are not public goods and can be monetized, it might be better to do VC-style investing and ask for future equity or tokens instead of just handing out grants.

  4. v4 Infra. I support this; the only question is the size.

  5. Router Incentives. Similarly, I support this if there’s the budget.

  6. Unichain Infra. This is less clear. Ideally, Unichain should be self-supporting from the fees it generates.

  7. UF Subsidy fund. I support allocating budget for hook audits.

  8. Conditional funding. Earmarking $4.5M for “experimentation” seems excessive. Why not experiment with $45k or $450k instead? Moreover, if the CFM experiment turns out to work well, then the other grants and DAO incentives can be distributed through it. There’s no clear justification for spending an additional $4.5M just to test the mechanism itself.

  9. Unichain DeFi partners. I can see the benefit, but the comments from points 3 and 6 also apply.

  10. University Research. While I support this and $4M is not large for universities, it may still be too high. The Ethereum Academic Grants Rounds used to be only $1M per year.

I would be more supportive if the UF had an excellent track record on grant allocation, publicity, and accountability. At the moment, it feels like the UF hasn’t fully done its homework before returning to ask for more funding. Many of the grants listed under “2024 Allocation Memos & Grant Announcements” have limited or unknown success. Meanwhile, obvious community needs sometimes don’t get funded. For example, my go-to research on empirical performance of Uniswap AMMs includes papers from universities and external orgs like Ambient, the former zkSync research team, Flashbots, the Bank for International Settlements—but none from UF-funded grants. Incentives such as TLDR have funded general DeFi research that’s not always connected with Uniswap.

EDIT: As mentioned above, the 2024 Community Impact Report includes some details on previously issued grants (their status and main achievements). I retract some of the criticism above.

Ops budget

In my view, there are signs of scope creep. I cannot support nearly doubling the team size to take on additional tasks that were not in the original mandate. While I see how getting involved in, for example, Optimism governance could be helpful for Unichain, it shouldn’t be a core part of the UF’s responsibilities in my view.

Questions

  • How do you see the sustainability of the DAO and UF playing out?
  • Do you have a plan for recovering Uniswap’s market share from Solana, ideally not by copying them but by building on Ethereum’s strengths?
  • Have you discussed co-sponsoring grants and incentives with the Labs, given that they will directly capture frontend fees from increased v4 usage, as well as collect some percentage of sequencer fees from Unichain?
7 Likes

Thanks for outlining this strategic roadmap, I am generally supportive of the direction. However I’d like to suggest a few points of improvement.

As other delegates have already mentioned:

  • there are some conflicts of interest which need to be addressed
  • There is a lack of clarity on the roadmap for transitioning to a multi-chain future
  • adding a mechanism for retroactive funding of contributors who have significantly impacted the ecosystem

Additionally, the proposal hints at the potential for cross-chain liquidity pools but does not elaborate on the technical or governance challenges involved. How will liquidity be shared across chains? What tools or partnerships will be needed to make this seamless?

  • Discussion time: First of all, for a budget of $120M plus $45M more to support liquidity incentives, we understand that more time should be given to the discussion, it is a very important amount that cannot be discussed in a short period of time, we need to give all delegates and the community time to analyse and internalise all aspects of the proposal, ask questions to clear up their doubts, read the feedback and comments from other delegates, the responses from the proposer, etc. If we have learned anything from other DAOs, it is that rushing proposals that involve large amounts of money is not the most appropriate, a clear example of this is the GCP in Arbitrum of 200M ARB and the sums of money that have been spent by the OP in Grants. We therefore encourage and request the debate to be extended as long as it needs to be without rushing it or bringing it to a vote prematurely, as there is a lot of money at stake in these proposals.

  • 2 year budget: We would also like to ask why the budget is required for the next 2 years instead of 1 year? Two years is a long time in crypto and many things can change. If there has been any evaluation and analysis to justify requesting a budget for such a long period of time, we would like to know what has been taken into account for that and what is the justification for it. Otherwise, we would really like to see a one year budget with one year targets, and at the end of that period assess whether the targets have been met when requesting and approving another annual budget request.

  • KPIs: Regarding the KPIs that several delegates consulted on, we see that you added a ‘Target Impact’ column to our ‘Top 10 Largest Projected Grants Allocations’ chart, but those are final KPIs, i.e. targets to be met for the entire 2-year budget requirement. Given that the budget requirement is for 2 years, we understand that better defined and intermediate targets should be added to allow us to assess whether the funds are having the impact that justifies them.

  • Payments subject to KPIs: Related to the above, we do not believe that it would be prudent to release the required $120M in one single payment, but that it should be included that the funds would be released on a regular basis, e.g. every 6 months or every year, following the presentation and evaluation of the compliance with the interim KPIs.

  • Reports: Regarding the reports, we understand that it is not enough to commit to “regular reports” and to meet with a small group of representative delegates whom we do not know who they are or how they were selected, but for transparency and accountability reasons, an obligation on your part to submit regular reports should be included in the proposal, clarifying the frequency of their presentation, e.g. bi-monthly, quarterly, etc.

  • Governance Scope:

We’re pleased to see the Foundation considering a potential expansion of the governance scope, as this was a concern raised by several delegates during Devcon. However, it’s still unclear how this will be implemented and what the DAO’s specific role and level of involvement will be in these matters. If the DAO (i.e. tokenholers, delegates, SP, and other stakeholders) is expected to “invest” in this and continue to support the Foundation in all these areas, its participation should be more clearly defined.

2 Likes

First off, thank you to everyone who has engaged with this proposal thus far. We have read through your comments and questions, and are sharing our thoughts and responses below.

First though I want to reiterate that this proposal is about shoring up the Uniswap ecosystem’s long term competitive advantage.

It is not a request for charity, or public goods for public goods’ sake.

This is a strategic investment to sustain Uniswap’s leadership in DeFi for decades to come.

Specifically, we are proposing:

  1. A commitment to growth. While the catalysts at hand – with a new US administration, the launch of Uniswap v4, and Unichain – present an opportunity to generate massive growth, that opportunity is not guaranteed. The Uniswap Foundation is poised to help drive this work at the scale needed to drive results. We cannot assume v4 or Unichain will win based on technical innovation alone -- we must support their respective flywheels.
  2. A commitment to long-term sustainability. We have heard your concerns about sustainability. To us, sustainability means two things: the ability to create value, and capture that value, over time. Our proposal encompasses both. Specifically, we are focused on the ability of Governance to create value over time (Governance influence over Protocol development through Core Contributors, Conditional Funding Markets, and legal entity formation) and to capture it (activation of fees).

Below, we double-click on some specific topics that have come up over the last week:

KPIs & Accountability

We appreciate your comments requesting clearer metrics by which to hold the UF accountable, and by which to track certain grants programs. We have since plugged in 1-year target impact metrics that we aim to achieve in our “Uniswap Foundation 2025 Priorities” and “Top 10 Largest Grants Allocations” tables.

As we support the four strategic pillars we’ve laid out above, we expect to see growth in market share, TVL, volume (and hook volume), and across our developer community.

Uniswap Treasury

We appreciate the work that the Treasury Working Group has done to lay the groundwork for Governance Sustainability – it is a useful precedent involving all delegates. We note that our proposal and the UTWG’s Report share North Star objectives– growth and sustainability. Specifically:

  • Growth: the DAO should allocate its treasury resources to propel the continual adoption of Uniswap and deliver value to relevant stakeholders in the process; and
  • Sustainability: the DAO should be a self-sustaining entity, able to cover its future costs in perpetuity.

Karpatkey, one of the authors of the UTWG proposal, reiterates these goals in their comment above, and stated “In our view, mobilising the treasury is an effective way to achieve sustainability, which includes supporting UF funding in the long term.”

Unichain’s Role & Governance

As for the governance of Unichain – Unichain is subject to the Optimism governance process for its technical upgrades, just like every other member of the Superchain. The UF has already laid the groundwork for Uniswap community participation by securing a seat on the OP Security Council. Further, we are excited to lean on the expertise of the Uniswap delegates who are active at Optimism to build a framework for ourselves and our delegates to advocate for our community’s interests in that process.

Unichain stands to create value for our community in a few ways. We believe it is the L2 best suited for all DeFi Protocols, including Uniswap v4. We are excited to see hook developers, swappers, and LPs alike benefit from their usage of Unichain. We also look forward to the deployment of the UVN, upon which the community may choose to run a validator, or stake, in order to earn revenue to support additional initiatives.

Hooks Commitment

v4 has the potential to subsume entire categories of DeFi into the Uniswap Protocol via hooks. They are a unique technical differentiator which, if fostered properly, can cement our competitive advantage. To maximize the opportunity presented by hooks, it is integral to support every stage of the development lifecycle:

  • Ideation: 100s of hook developers learn how to build hooks through the Uniswap Hook Incubator (UHI) and sponsored hackathons – with many going on to build long-term on v4, Unichain, or both
  • Building: our Public Good and Chain-Optimized Hook Allocations provide a strong foundation to iterate upon high potential use cases, while our tooling and infrastructure make it easy to put together a finished product
  • Testing: the UF Security Fund subsidizes audits, mitigating the risk of hooks being hacked
  • Growth: once a developer has deployed, we support them in growing distribution with grants into routing infrastructure, routing subsidies, and more

In addition to our efforts across the developer lifecycle, we also work hand-in-hand with blue chip protocol teams and DAOs across the space to support them in integrating hooks.

Treasury & Liquidation Strategy

Our goals for our liquidation and UF treasury management strategy are threefold:

  1. Fund operations and grant-making
  2. Minimize impact on UNI token
  3. Demonstrate alignment with the community

As we note above, we plan to maintain approximately 50% of our Treasury in UNI over the short to medium term, and to continue to maintain a portion of our Treasury in UNI over the long term. We are also exploring the ability to stake a portion of our UNI holdings once staking becomes available.

To support us in treasury operations, we have onboarded with three established trading and advisory firms. We are confident we can implement strategies that fund our operational and grants needs while minimizing market impact on an ongoing basis.

Why a Two-Year Budget Term?

Some of you have asked why we request a two-year budget, rather than a one-year budget.

From an operational perspective, we would not be able to attract and maintain a talented team with less than 1 years’ runway. Startups generally aim to operate with at least 1 years’ runway at any given time.

From a grant-making and ecosystem-building perspective, there are multiple reasons why a two-year term is superior to one year.

  1. Stronger long-term commitments from partners – We are best equipped to attract the best teams as grantees and contributors if we are able to commit to longer term support (financial, technical, marketing, and otherwise), and to quickly extend successful grants without going through additional governance processes. If we can’t commit to an extension of a successful program due to the governance process, someone else will. For grantees whose initiatives do not produce the intended impact, on the other hand, we have before and will continue to end grants early in order to reallocate funds to more productive uses.
  2. More cost effective – Many infrastructure providers offer better deals for multi-year commitments. If we renegotiate annually, we will receive worse terms.
  3. Continued full accountability – We will continue to publish quarterly financials and biannual impact reports, and to showcase grantees on a regular basis. We also look forward to setting up regular sessions with smaller groups of delegates to review our direction and execution.
  4. Support UF sustainability – with more initial funding, the UF may have the option to begin to stake its UNI once that opportunity becomes available. We are excited to pursue this, and hope it may fund a portion of our ongoing funding requirements, so that we may require less funding from the Treasury in the future.

Final Thoughts

This proposal is about positioning the Uniswap ecosystem for long-term leadership. Investing in growth today will allow us to maximize the opportunity this moment presents, and to capture and rechannel value for years to come. We appreciate the engagement and look forward to continued discussion.

3 Likes

I appreciate the improvements done in this section.

The Foundation’s failure to consider the UTWG report at the time of drafting this proposal—whether through negligence or lack of collaboration—raises serious concerns. This is compounded by UTWG committee member Karpatkey’s comment, which demonstrates nothing but bad faith. Their remark fails to raise a single question about the discrepancies between the UTWG’s report and the Foundation’s funding request, which is 2-3 times larger than expected.

Karpatkey has claimed their role on the committee is limited to crafting the framework, after which they will step down to avoid conflicts of interest tied to their willingness to become treasury operators. Yet, their current actions reveal an ongoing conflict that undermines the whole process.

Based on the comments made by Devin, I formally request that the Foundation cease all efforts related to Unichain, as it presents a clear conflict of interest with the DAO.

The DAO doesn’t have any ownership over:

  • the chain
  • fee distribution
  • anything related to it (including how they are handling the UVN as the “Uniswap Growth Reserve”)

And because of these reasons, Unichain is NOT a product that will be supported by the DAO.

Regarding the hooks section, I believe the work has been highly effective despite the limited budget allocated. I appreciate the effort put into this, and I’d like to see the Foundation continue supporting teams to successfully launch their hook projects.

Additionally, I think the Foundation should take a more active role in improving routing accessibility for hook developers. While teams can attract users and increase TVL on their hooks, pools without proper routing remain underutilized and struggle to gain traction.

Regarding this section, I note that none of the concerns raised by delegates above have been addressed. I want to emphasize the critical need for transparency here and underscore why the questions posed by colleagues remain highly relevant.

It would be helpful if the Foundation could share the names of the firms already engaged. Could you clarify whether these firms will be responsible for managing the sales process?

I support the need for predictability for retaining talent within the Foundation. However, it seems the Foundation struggles with accountability and transparency, which may explain why some are questioning the deal’s timeframe.

1 Like

Given our role in the UTWG, we have received questions about this proposal over the past few days. Below is a clarification of our view on the Uniswap treasury and the UF funding request.

As karpatkey, we firmly believe mobilising the Uniswap treasury would benefit the DAO and its larger ecosystem.

Over the past few years, we collaborated with leading DAOs in the industry to help them optimally leverage their treasuries to support their goals. Often, these goals aren’t limited to long-term sustainability but rather include ecosystem growth.
The DAO will remain in charge of defining these goals and deciding whether to mobilise the treasury to achieve them. Based on the interviews conducted as part of the UTWG research, two recurring objectives have emerged: growth and sustainability.

We want to reiterate that mobilising the treasury is an effective way to achieve these goals. For example, implementing a Stability Fund would effectively contribute to the project’s long-term sustainability by diversifying the assets and leveraging them for revenue generation.

In parallel, the DAO should ask itself: what do we want to use these funds for? Looking at past proposals, the answer appears to be funding core contributors that positively impact the Uniswap ecosystem.

To clarify, we would favour supporting any core contributor positively impacting the Uniswap ecosystem. For example, in the Arbitrum DAO, we firmly supported Entropy Advisors despite them not being the official foundation.
That said, the UF is currently the main core contributor to the Uniswap DAO, and we believe their previous work positively affected both the DAO and the ecosystem.

Regarding raising questions about their funding request, we believe the proposal explains the discrepancies.
Specifically, the UTWG report assumed operating expenses growth of 20% and 12%, respectively, for 2025 and 2026. Similarly, it assumed grant growth of 15% and 11%, respectively, for the two years. This forecast is based on the guidance provided in the UF’s second round of funding in 2023, along with their historical expenditures.
The present proposal has a larger scope, with additional emphasis on governance, infrastructure and routing. This is reflected in a steeper growth rate for operating expenses and grants in 2025.

@pepo It seems the questions you are raising are not really about the single expenses and why they are higher than expected but rather about the legitimacy of expanding the scope (e.g., including Unichain).
We agree clarity on the relationship between Labs and the DAO needs to be improved. And, we agree Unichain’s launch could have benefitted from a closer discussion between these two parties. However, the fact remains that Unichain is now live. The question is: do we want to embrace it or do we want to fight it?