Understanding that Gauntlet is a large delegate, we aim to communicate our concerns with the program below.
Firstly, treasury delegation aims to solve a real problem. Unfortunately, it complicates measuring eligibility since DIP participation doesn’t necessarily indicate value or competence and increases vulnerability to governance attacks while reducing accountability to UNI holders beyond the DAO.
More critically, this approach deviates from the original intent of delegation, where token holders empower representatives who mirror their interests. Treasury delegation effectively transfers influence from UNI holders to delegates themselves, who may have a misaligned incentive to preserve power. Therefore, it is a requirement that any delegated treasury UNI has a programmable and automated end-period for delegation.
This broader issue is compounded by two dynamics: widespread apathy among UNI holders toward Uniswap governance and a misalignment between UNI holders’ interests and those of the DAO.
Have we analyzed organic delegation data from active delegates in round 1 to fix these dynamics? Perhaps a “matching program”—pairing organic delegation with treasury UNI—might better align UNI holders’ interests, bolster delegation, and resolve the quorum issue.
An even better approach would be to explore the re-engagement of active UNI holders post-DUNA and Fee Switch, including the potential for UNI staking and governance alignment that motivates UNI holders to be more directly engaged in delegation and DAO governance.
To summarize, we view treasury delegation as a band-aid solution to a much larger problem, but one that may be necessary to ensure smooth operations in the short-medium term.
Of course, we appreciate all the hard work by @Tane and others to bring this proposal to its current state.