In the long run there may be some concerns around the legal responsibility of security council dynamics. It’s very easy to imagine a world where a DAO’s security council (or in this case, Veto council) is deemed legally responsible for the rest of the DAO, and so we’re a bit wary of this option.
The best solution in face of regulatory uncertainty may be to look for more implicit voting dynamics that make governance attacks more difficult. Thus, we’d like to see further exploration of the proposal staking method. A couple immediate thoughts:
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Is there any situation where the DAO could find itself “bricked”, as in unable to push any more votes because of a new hostage situation?
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The other possible problem for proposal staking is that a non-malicious controversial proposal could still be slashed. While we don’t think that people will go about slashing proposals they don’t like, it’s a possibility.
Still, generally speaking, we’re in favor of the latter, though how would this be enforced operationally? This cannot be done on Snapshot, so there would have to be a specific Tally integration for this to be possible.
Ultimately, this all falls back onto voting dynamics. Compound’s problem was that it had some very large delegates that were inactive, and while incentive programs are great for maintaining participation among key delegates, there will be ways to usurp those programs as well. Thinking aloud here, but maybe we should rethink participation in the DAO, as in have some fall back system for which non-voting delegates can have voting power redistributed upon a certain participation threshold. This wouldn’t be forceful with their own voting power, only voting power delegated to them from other parties.