Thank you @Tane for the questions and considerations. The figures outlined in the proposal are scenario estimates rather than fixed forecasts. Capturing 50% of the TVL represents the bull-case outcome and therefore defines the final milestone. The milestone structure is intentionally front-loaded toward that 50% threshold so that the incentives and the revenue-sharing schedule are impacted once material traction is demonstrated.
GHO is proposed as the initial asset because its native fee mechanism provides flexible, onchain revenue that can be programmatically shared between the Aave and Uniswap DAOs from day one. Once Aave V4 is live, its modular architecture will allow additional assets to be integrated without re-engineering the core module, broadening borrowable options while preserving a clear fee-sharing pathway.
Under the current design, the insolvency risk is borne exclusively by the Aave DAO through its protocol liquidity. The Uniswap protocol is not exposed to such risk; its economic exposure is limited to the discretionary UNI incentives committed by its DAO. Consequently, the proposal already aligns risk with the party best equipped to manage it, while affording Uniswap upside participation through the shared-fee model described above.