Similar attacks have been proposed with MakerDAO, in fact using the Uniswap pool MKR-WETH, perhaps combined with a flash loan protocol to drain a pool, pass a proposal such as mass liquidation of vaults to itself, and then return the funds.
While I am against centralized exchanges exerting undue influence on Uniswap, I am against censorship or safelisting addresses by themselves. Some general principles that might guide thinking in this area:
UNI governance currently cannot do much besides control the inflation / deflation of UNI, as far as I can tell, and this is dependent on the Uniswap team’s willingness to listen to signals of UNI holders. A governance attack from a CEX would take the form of either inflation by voting to grant more UNI to itself (followed by mass selling) or (mass buying then) deflation by voting to burn (other) UNI. Similar to MakerDAO’s security delay feature, we can institute a delay before voted changes take effect, ideally through automated contract, which would probably require another version of the UNI contract. However, token contracts are simpler to upgrade than the Uniswap protocol contracts themselves. Such a delay, e.g. 24 hours, would rule out flash loan attacks and make other attacks much more expensive.
Similar to a voting execution delay, we could propose requiring addresses to have held / staked UNI for some amount of time (e.g. 1 month) before being able to vote. This will not rule out CEX’s, but will slow down sybil attacks or other attempts to create many new accounts that coordinate voting together while eluding identification.
Require locking up UNI for a delay after a vote, such as 6 months or 1 year, to incentivize votes that increase UNI value for everyone.
Uniswap is a successful protocol that will continue to earn fees. I encourage individuals looking for a sustainable return to provide liquidity, and I encourage Uniswap team to give UNI some intrinsic value and non-trivial ability, such as the ability to change fee percentages, to insure against either token in a trading pair crashing, similar to how YFI holders earn a share of fees from that protocol. Give CEX’s, as well as yield farmers, a reason to HODL and not make short term moves by giving them a better way to earn returns.