Actually, I’m back!
Because I want to highlight how the changes proposed by HLSBFI address none of the accountability or governance issues raised in the other group and still fail to explain why this group is needed (versus a normal budgeting process used by a normal bank or crypto business).
Let’s walk thru this one step at a time:
- The name will focus on education rather than defense–the DeFi Education Fund.
There are two key points to see here:
This does nothing to change the fact that 1m Uni will immediately be drained from the treasury
This does not change that the organization has no concrete goals or objectives and that the board has an unfettered ability to use the money to do anything they like.
In fact, changing the purpose just shows how the proposers and board will change the mission to suit their goals - or justify their existence.
In case anyone has forgotten, Matt Corva said that public bank disclosures indicate regulatory spends of about $3m/year. Coin Center’s old budget was about $1m/year.
So a 1m Uni budget seems far too high. Solution? Expand the mission.
- The scope is broadened to include the funding of organizations and work promoting best regulatory practices among those in the DeFi ecosystem.
This one is even more startling.
Put simply, what does funding organizations and work promoting best regulatory practices" have to do with advancing the goals of Uniswap?
Read very plainly, it sounds like the new goal is to fund the very organizations that the board members/multisig holders are already part of outside of Uniswap and to hire them or their law firms.
For all we know, the board could use this new goal to fund the creation of a “report” which responds to the recent WEF report (that several of the board members helped to draft or review) which:
- Is written by organizations the board members are part of for a hefty fee
- Promotes the board members personal profiles and connections (including through the payment of fees from this new organization)
- Restricts Uniswap’s ability to operate
- Leads to Marvin asking for more internal budget and headcount to address concerns raised in the report
- Leads Uniswap to again hire board members and their firms or lobbying organizations to conduct more work
But what do I know? I am just a simple country lawyer.
- Beyond the considerable disclosure required for a 501(c)(4), the entity will publicly post monthly community updates on progress, grant allocation, tactics, etc… These updates will not only ensure trust but will also keep the community informed on when and how they can lend their voice to the policy process. When there are surprises, as there so often have been in the policy space, we will report why and how funds will be reallocated to address them.
This gives Uniswap’s token holders, board and management no control rights. So, once the proposal is passed, the Uni are gone.
- The 501(c)(4) will promptly hire at least one full-time staffer to manage the day-to-day operations of the organization with oversight from the board of directors and who will serve as the primary point of contact for the governance community.
This person will be paid by the new organization and report to its board. Why would we expect him or her to be anything but their mouthpiece?
- The 501(c)(4) will issue a detailed budget within 90 days of the proposal passing. Budgets, projections, and 5-year plans often must be revised and amended.
This sounds nice, but once the Uni area gone, the Uni are gone.
Which brings us to the fundamental question: Why not just hire a few headcount internally, submit a budget to Hayden each quarter, and keep the group accountable the way almost every other business holds groups accountable?
Why spend a lot more money to seed an entirely new organization (DAO) with a separate mission that is not aligned with that of Uniswap?