Thanks for your interest, nicoGD & uni123 & the people who liked the pitch.
#1 This forum is the first public space I’ve become active on, and it is currently the only one.
I will create accounts on other platforms, but for the purpose of announcing my voting decisions.
If you’d like to get to know what my thinking is, the best place to do so is through the forum:
The complete picture is available through my profile activity tab.
I also intended to keep a short version of my policy statements as the 2nd message in this topic. But, as it’s not editable, I’ll be making new policy statements messages and delete the old ones. It’s probably better anyway as it notifies you when a change has been made. I’ll try to make the first one of those closer to when the voting begins.
And lastly, I’m available publicly through this topic and privately through direct messages on the forum if there are any further questions you’re interested in my stance on.
#2 I believe the best way to follow the number of votes delegated to me will be through Dune analytics if you sort the addresses by the number of delegators.
My delegator count will rise closer to the date when the voting begins due to my own and my friends’ participation at the very least. So it will be trackable, but at the moment, the number is 0.
#3 As for skin in the game, I’ve committed most of my life’s savings towards the UNI liquidity mining program. I plan to continue participating in it as long as there is a BTC/ETH pair, and distribution rates are not wholly negligible. I’ve advised my friends to do the same thing and assisted them with it. I’m not sure if there is a way one could break the LP contracts through governance proposals, but it would immensely hurt my well-being if that was to happen.
When it comes to UNI, I do not possess any significant amount yet. I am a newcomer, and I’m interested in accumulating a larger UNI position over the long term. I think it aligns with my program well. I do not qualify as a past/present investor, but I do as a future one.
With me having around 1% of UNI I’d like to own, my interests would get hurt if, for example, a proposal that artificially pumps UNI price by introducing ponzinomics concepts would pass.
There is a reason why this is my first public appearance. It’s a combination of two things.
Firstly and shortly, I find the cause worthy.
And secondly, my path in life and things I cherish have forged me the way I find fitting for this participation.
This is the first public cause, where I feel like I could make a meaningful difference. So I’m going to be making it no matter how small the actual effect is.
Thanks for the response PO, you’re correct I had forgotten those with the Uni in LP won’t show on the vote list, and it’s a very important factor in Uni’s success.
For now I am delegating to gauntlet.network as they have the largest share of votes and will be first to be able to make new proposals, furthermore they have a good presence with research approach and clear accountability. 0x6626593C237f530D15aE9980A95ef938Ac15c35c
Please keep a presence here in the forums and I’m sure I will be looking to move my support at some points in the future.
Well, if you aim to increase the number of delegates who can make proposals, I believe you’ve made the right choice. Gauntlet network does have a reputation to lose, and they do stress tests as a part of their job. They’ve also stated that they’ll be politically neutral, which is a good thing for a proposal submitter.
For a community delegate like me to become a good proposal submitter, the infrastructure isn’t there yet. We need people who would write the code and audit those proposals, and we haven’t built those networks yet. So it’s good to have delegates who could do that on their own, at least for starters. And it’s good that they’re neutral.
I’m a different type of delegate though, my policy is not neutral, and my main job as a delegate is to vote according to my statements.
The first proposal is Up to vote: “Reduce UNI Governance Proposal & Quorum Thresholds”
The voting will end on the 19th of October. I’ll allow myself to vote starting from 18:00 GMT on 18th Oct (72 hours notice).
My plan is to vote against this proposal.
I’m against this proposal because it is a Rider proposal.
It looks like the Uniswap community supports reducing the threshold for making governance proposals, but there is no such thing in regard to reducing the quorum threshold.
I think the quorum threshold should not be lowered as it compromises the safety of the protocol. And I find it unethical to make such a proposal in a way it’s been made.
Edit: I’ve used some harsh words earlier towards Gauntlet. Now that they’ve abstained from voting on the second proposal, it’s time for me to reconsider.
I still see no valid reason for lowering the quorum threshold, and I find the analysis done to justify it as unfounded.
I still think that making a Rider proposal is unethical. Especially when it’s done so that a contentious proposal can pass. That’s not neutral.
Lowering the quorum threshold would still increase Gauntlet’s stake at Uniswap governance considerably. I don’t find that neutral either.
Abstaining from voting on UP02 is neutral, though.
I’m generally against airdrops as I view them as an inefficient way to spend resources
UNI holders don’t benefit from the airdrop
some bad actor signaling happened during the first proposal: no announcement + a rider that lowers the quorum to the ‘convenient’ number.
But when it comes to the essence of the Phase 1 proposal, it suggests rewarding past users of Uniswap that used application integrations on top of Uniswap, mainly MEW, Argent, and Dharma.
I do consider these users as Uniswap users.
All Uniswap users before 1st Sep 2020 received an airdrop of 400 UNI.
I think it makes sense to reward past users evenly. And I think it’s a small price to pay (5m UNI) to achieve a slightly fairer initial distribution.
Also, it does decentralize the supply distribution a little, which is a good thing at these early stages - not distributing anything would create a honeypot.
So I will vote Yes to the Phase 1 Proposal.
I do not benefit from it, I will not receive an airdrop.
As a matter of fact, I’ll be slightly worse off as it dilutes UNI’s value a little bit - but so will any other distribution, so we probably should be ok with that.
I think it is the right thing to do. And it aligns with the statements I made in my delegation pitch: this proposal does have a positive effect on community building, albeit it is somewhat sprayed.
However, I do not consider people who used Dex aggregators (mainly Kyber, 0x, and 1inch) as Uniswap users, so I will vote against the Phase 2 Proposal.
P.S. As my modus operandi part of the pitch is not realizable within the current system, I encourage you to view this topic more as a voting blog.
Self-delegating is currently a better option.
Delegating to me would mean that you’d have to trust my judgment calls, as you can’t revoke your votes once the voting has started.
I disagree , I think another airdrop is necessary. I made a transaction before the deadline and never got my airdrop. I think people who came after deserve a shot as well. Greater adoption, better long term results. IMO
Edit: this is my original stance, I have reconsidered it since. The explanation is in the subsequent post.
I will vote against the proposal to restart the liquidity mining program for the top-4 pairs with 50% of the rewards. I have posted a lot of thoughts and metrics in the topic, I’ll copy my conclusion here::
Overall, I have found no convincing argument to restart the program for the top-4 pairs.
Initially, the proposal seemed like a good idea to me, as I thought it represented the middle ground between the interests of different parts of the Uniswap Community. I have reconsidered my stance since.
Now it seems to me that there’s not much to gain here for all the major groups: LPs, Users, UNI holders.
It also doesn’t look like a good investment in isolation. The targeted markets are the ones where Uniswap either already has dominance or has no chance for dominance.
The program is likely to be inefficient in its primary purposes.
The increase in the liquidity retention effect is expected to be considerably lower than after the previous two programs.
We also know that increased liquidity doesn’t increase the volume or the average trade size, so excessive liquidity is not needed.
As for the community-building perspective, for the most part, we just invite LPs who left to come back temporarily.
The improvements to the user experience will be quite negligible and not worth the cost. If my estimations are correct, more than 87% of the trades on top-4 pairs happen with a <0.01% slippage already. For reference, the UI doesn’t show if the slippage is 0.001% or 0.009%.
Current liquidity providers on the top-4 pairs don’t get much from this program either: their APYs are likely to stay the same. Except they’re rewarded in respective coins now, and with the program, they’ll receive UNI instead.
The primary beneficiaries of this program are large LPs who left Uniswap after the program finished.
UNI holders pay for this program, and it sounds like a bad investment.
Sushiswap is not a competitor to Uniswap on these pairs, and the numbers there are not sustainable and likely have signaling purposes.
I also find it a bit questionable to view the restart of the initial program as maintaining the status quo. If someone proposed to repeat the original airdrop with a smaller size, it certainly wouldn’t be viewed as such.
I will vote against the proposal.
I think the modified version leads to less decentralized distribution than the original, but I would vote against the original version too.
Even though I’m pro-distribution overall, and I think it’s ok if a distribution is somewhat inefficient, the inefficiency of this one is a bit too high for my taste.
We can do better, and nothing is pressing us to restart the liquidity incentives immediately.
I recommend listening to the 2nd Uniswap community call to everyone who missed it. There’s some quality discussion there. After hearing additional arguments, I’d like to adjust my stance.
I acknowledge that there is a strategic value to incentivizing the WBTC pool in the near future.
Addressing my previous arguments:
The market leadership argument is not entirely correct.
Uniswap is the leader in volume on WBTC/ETH pair, but it’s far away from leadership on BTC/ETH pair, of course - and this is a top-3 market in crypto space.
In terms of slippage on large trades, WBTC is the only pool that it makes sense to incentivize comparatively:
0,01% slippage seems like a good target to strive for.
As WBTC traders utilize the liquidity more in terms of trade sizes, additional incentivization would bring the experience on par with top USD pairs.
WBTC has the smallest number of makers and takers among the top-4 pairs.
This fact doesn’t imply the direction of incentivization, though.
Do we want to reward a pair with more makers and takers to decentralize the distribution? Or a pair with fewer makers and takers in hopes that the number grows?
WBTC-ETH pair is indeed the most responsive to liquidity incentives, likely due to the lower volatility.
Even though the retention of liquidity after the program is only 31%, the growth in Liquidity/Volume ratio compared to the period before the program is still quite substantial:
Another notable pair in this table is DAI.
As we can see, DAI gained the most out of the UNI program in terms of Liquidity/Volume ratio growth.
How we interpret these results is up to us.
In my opinion, the key difference between Sushi and UNI programs is that the first one incentivized a lot of pools, and the latter only 4.
Being one of the top four pools brought a lot of legitimacy to DAI and WBTC, which had positive feedback loops regarding LPs’ comfort to park their money.
The least successful pair in terms of gaining retention effects from the program is USDC.
The money that will go to the WBTC-ETH pool will likely stay there only temporarily for the program’s duration. And the large portion of the distribution will likely be received by large funds.
It then comes down to the decision we need to make - how strategically important it is for us to have big liquidity on the BTC pair.
If we find it crucial, we can opt to renew WBTC incentives repeatedly and keep that temporary liquidity.
The reasoning above would make me vote for the proposal that would incentivize only the WBTC pair.
There is no significant drawback on USD pairs in trading experience, they perform well without the program, and Uniswap doesn’t have a new niche to take with them. So I would vote against restarting LMP for them.
If I were to modify the initial proposal, I would take an even amount out of all USD pairs, not just DAI.
DAI pair in the initial program invited a bigger number of new LPs to Uniswap - and was a quite successful investment in general.
Overall it makes me neutral, so I willactively abstain from voting .
I believe both outcomes have their own merits and drawbacks, and I approve of both of them.
I know this is going back a bit, but I’ve been looking at delegates as I’m unsure how much time I’ll have to partake in governance now that I’m actively working on the codebase of Uniswap and other platforms.
To the first point, regarding proxy contracts… These users made a choice to use a different platforms, Dharma, MEW, Argent; now 1inch, etc. in order to choose convenience over actual implementation of the platform. In doing so they have provided the proxy with all of the distribution from liquidity and whatnot. DEX aggregator or proxy wallet/contract it’s the same. At any point these systems could develop a proprietary token for any number of utilities (such as Trust Wallet did with TWT recently).
In the same way that you’re asking people to delegate voting power to you, proxies asked users to delegate options to them in exchange for convenience. If I delegate my votes to you, and don’t like how you voted, I can change delegators, but I can’t change how my votes were allocated.
It is also not-so-insider knowledge that Argent will be doing a retroactive governance airdrop in the near future, I’ve heard but not confirmed that Dharma is as well.
UNI token is available on many exchanges now, as collective users of any of these proxies, I really think that it should be up to the proxy to determine if they care enough about their user base to provide them with UNI tokens. Any of these platforms could purchase UNI and distribute to users if they wanted to; they did not. Once we do a retroactive airdrop, we can’t take that back if that platform them goes and creates their own governance token. This could be bad for governance on Uniswap as a group with sizeable delegations in UNI and their own token can make proposals that give them more of a benefit. Which leads me into my second problem with this statement:
Regarding it decentralizing the supply, governance, and being positive for the community, I don’t think it’s so simple.
Say we do an airdrop to proxy users. We control the communication for Uniswap, but not for any of the proxy apps/wallets. They can—through a separate platform in which Uniswap holders are not using or privy to—make their own delegation pitches outside of the community here.
I think giving direct UNI governance to users of proxies will have the exact opposite effect of decentralizing the system, it’s introducing a vector very early in the governance process for proxies to broadly sweep delegation from their users and have a huge amount of say in Uniswap governance for the benefit of the proxy, not the users. We’re rewarding users who will, going forward be operating within a separate walled garden of that proxy’s dapp/wallet. This is a recipe for the formation of conglomerates and a very centralized system where we see 3 or 4 big groups controlling all the votes.
I don’t think that “fairness” or “equality” is grounds to authorize a retroactive airdrop to these users, nor do they apply here. Nobody has missed the train when it comes to crypto and DeFi… it hasn’t even left the station. There will be a plethora of opportunities for users who missed the UNI airdrop in the future; being loyal to a platform (or using them all) can pay off.
I think it would be a mistake to add a vector for centralization into Uniswap governance this early on. It would be a trivial matter for Dharma (not saying they will, just using them as an example as they’re the biggest name on this topic) to add a banner to their app saying “Delegate your UNI airdrop to Dharma.” Remember, people use platforms like Dharma, Argent for their convenience.
What’s more convenient?
Getting a UNI airdrop into your Dharma wallet, retaining ownership of the tokens, and clicking a button to delegate your UNI to Dharma to vote on Uniswap, or:
Leave the platform (Dharma) that you’re comfortable with, join the Uniswap governance forums, and go through the process of finding a delegate that aligns with your views while managing your UNI and other assets through the above-mentioned proxy.
Proxy users who missed out were rewarded already, with a convenient all-in-one DeFi app that didn’t require they really integrate into Uniswap to get the benefits of it’s existence. It’s just simply too early and easy for proxies to sweep their users into delegating UNI to them, potentially launching their own governance, and now having a big portion of the say in two platforms, turning Uniswap into the workhorse for whichever group gets the most delegates.
In the event of a future airdrop, there won’t be more happy Uniswap users, simply happy users of proxy apps who have enough assets to placate them while the proxy app gains voting power. Rest assured that it will not be individual delegates with most of the say, it will be a handful of these proxies with a lot of newfound voting power.
One of the best things to happen to crypto was the emergence of many different DeFi apps, we don’t have an obligation to make everyone happy, especially considering that over the next few months, 15 different apps will be following suit and coming out with their own governance token, many of which allowed users to use Uniswap via their platform.
None of Argent users were left out of the airdrop actually, if you provided liquidity to Uniswap through the Argent native integration you’d get the airdrop. Same if you used Uniswap through wallet connect. So to be fair it’s quite inconsistent for Dharma users to be left out.
Argent users who used Kyber and got their trade routed through Uniswap were not eligible but that’s totally unrelated to contract wallet or EOA.
Your point around delegation doesn’t make much sense to me. What would prevent Metamask, Trust wallet or Coinbase wallet to ask their users to delegate votes to them in 1 click? 100% of Uniswap users are using some kind of wallet.
I’m Argent’s founder, yet I had no idea we had plans for an airdrop you might want to double check your sources.