Marvin Ammori, again, the CLO of Uniswap Labs.
Providing a few more comments. You can read more about my background and thoughts above.
First, I am a big fan of innovative structures beyond traditional corporations. I am particularly in favor of choosing the right structure for the right task. Injecting a novel funding structure in the cryptocurrency political environment, unfortunately, is probably the last place to do it. When policymakers see novel structures, they will not assume transparency but the lack thereof! They understand 501(c)4 organizations and deal with them often and know their transparency safeguards, which nobody would have to reinvent or explain. New structures will likely confuse partners and policymakers and at the least add considerable overhead to most interactions in a pretty traditional town. If the choice is to be effective and trusted in policy circles or to be slightly more crypto-native, for this amount of money and with this much at stake I would choose more effective and we know a 501(c)4 can be effective.
Second, I expect some other proposals to distribute funds in tranches. That is not right for this proposal.
We are balancing several considerations, which include participation, trust, transparency and, most importantly, effectiveness in spending funds to advance these important goals (a constant topic in this discussion).
To tranche out the funds will dramatically weaken the organizationâs effectiveness.
First, the crypto advocacy organizations would not be able to effectively compete in the job market against organizations that have obviously stable long-term funding versus short term trial grants. I have been involved in trying to hire people to organizations with uncertain funding, and it scares away a lot of the best people who have offers at other organizations with more stable funding. (This is another reason why the committee should not try to hire a full-time person now, as the hiring process is usually very intensive and fewer people will interview for a proposed role rather than a secure role.) Second, organizations in the space applying for funding wonât be able to appropriately make long-term plans without secure funding. Third, policymakers need to understand that their counterparties are credible repeat players. They know well-funded multi-year organizations are not fly-by-night operations. They will be extremely skeptical of and confused by a smaller fund that may be replenished based on ongoing votes. There is no need to hamstring or cripple these efforts.
Finally, the proposal to tranche seems inspired by the view that 1M is too much for the purposes here. As many of us have explained, that is simply not the case.
Trust and transparency can be addressed in the ways discussed by the committee in many comments above (frequent spending reports, budget, progress reports, community calls etc.). Tranching is another way to address them, but would undermine the fundâs effectiveness.
Finally, it is worth noting that 77% of votes in the Consensus Check have been cast in favor of the proposal. Even the small holders are overwhelmingly in favor, assuming nobody tried to game the system by voting multiple times (which would have no effect on the voteâs outcome). While there is some dissent, this process is designed to reach an outcome with a majority of holders and delegatesâand not complete paralysis without unanimity. While the community comments, support, and suggestions have been very useful and the proposers and committee intend to incorporate the feedback â particularly around accountability and transparency â into the final on-chain proposal, I am delighted to see that there is such majority consensus in this vote among holders and delegates.
