Consensus Check - UNI should fund a political defense organization for decentralized finance

Marvin Ammori, again, the CLO of Uniswap Labs.

Providing a few more comments. You can read more about my background and thoughts above.

First, I am a big fan of innovative structures beyond traditional corporations. I am particularly in favor of choosing the right structure for the right task. Injecting a novel funding structure in the cryptocurrency political environment, unfortunately, is probably the last place to do it. When policymakers see novel structures, they will not assume transparency but the lack thereof! They understand 501(c)4 organizations and deal with them often and know their transparency safeguards, which nobody would have to reinvent or explain. New structures will likely confuse partners and policymakers and at the least add considerable overhead to most interactions in a pretty traditional town. If the choice is to be effective and trusted in policy circles or to be slightly more crypto-native, for this amount of money and with this much at stake I would choose more effective and we know a 501(c)4 can be effective.

Second, I expect some other proposals to distribute funds in tranches. That is not right for this proposal.

We are balancing several considerations, which include participation, trust, transparency and, most importantly, effectiveness in spending funds to advance these important goals (a constant topic in this discussion).

To tranche out the funds will dramatically weaken the organization’s effectiveness.

First, the crypto advocacy organizations would not be able to effectively compete in the job market against organizations that have obviously stable long-term funding versus short term trial grants. I have been involved in trying to hire people to organizations with uncertain funding, and it scares away a lot of the best people who have offers at other organizations with more stable funding. (This is another reason why the committee should not try to hire a full-time person now, as the hiring process is usually very intensive and fewer people will interview for a proposed role rather than a secure role.) Second, organizations in the space applying for funding won’t be able to appropriately make long-term plans without secure funding. Third, policymakers need to understand that their counterparties are credible repeat players. They know well-funded multi-year organizations are not fly-by-night operations. They will be extremely skeptical of and confused by a smaller fund that may be replenished based on ongoing votes. There is no need to hamstring or cripple these efforts.

Finally, the proposal to tranche seems inspired by the view that 1M is too much for the purposes here. As many of us have explained, that is simply not the case.

Trust and transparency can be addressed in the ways discussed by the committee in many comments above (frequent spending reports, budget, progress reports, community calls etc.). Tranching is another way to address them, but would undermine the fund’s effectiveness.

Finally, it is worth noting that 77% of votes in the Consensus Check have been cast in favor of the proposal. Even the small holders are overwhelmingly in favor, assuming nobody tried to game the system by voting multiple times (which would have no effect on the vote’s outcome). While there is some dissent, this process is designed to reach an outcome with a majority of holders and delegates–and not complete paralysis without unanimity. While the community comments, support, and suggestions have been very useful and the proposers and committee intend to incorporate the feedback — particularly around accountability and transparency — into the final on-chain proposal, I am delighted to see that there is such majority consensus in this vote among holders and delegates.


Marvin, dont you think its better to spin this project off as a whole new thing where proper funding can be allocated from every DeFi project?

Marvin, you make some great points here. Here at Tally we’ve been building a tool that I think could work perfectly for this situation.

One of your main points (which is very strong IMHO) is that tranching would undermine the funds Effectiveness. So what we we do optimistic governance?

In this case, Tally has built, for Uniswap via the Grants program, a tool call “Fail Safe” outlined by @monet-supply above.
This tool could be deployed such that the legal team would be able to make funding requests directly from a Timelock, which if unopposed, would be automatically released. The design of the Fail Safe is such that we could make the Uniswap Governance itself the entity which would have the power to oppose a payment.

This would be effective because:

  1. The Legal group has certainty on their funding. The funds are earmarked and only can be spent by the legal group. The group knows that if their funding request is not opposed, they will receive their payments of fund.

  2. To oppose a disbursement of funds, it would require a full Uniswap token holder vote. That means the social capital required to oppose a funding request would be equal to that of a full Governance vote. That should give you assurance that the funds are available because I think everyone here is aware of the enormous social capital needed to organize an effective vote that passes.

The Failsafe project is built by Tally, it is OpenSource and paid for by Uniswap. It gives token holders the tool of last resort to intervene should their worst fears come true and the threshold to success is high enough that it would require the very supporters of this proposal to lose faith in the legal teams effectiveness. There is no need to return to governance quarterly to beg for new funds, the legal team can request funds at their leisure + necessity.

Why not consider a compromise like that? It seems like a 2.5m Uni Proposal threshold and 40m quorum would be quite enough to give the legal team certainty they have access to all the funds they need, while also giving token holders confidence that this really is a DAO.


I am still lost here.

Why would you NOT propose concrete goals each quarter, line item budget for them and submit them to @haydenadams and the board (@jamico) and token holders?

Do the regulatory leaders at places like A16Z, Goldman Sachs and Bank of America:

  1. Ask the board / management to set up a new organization that they control and has no legal, financial, or other backstopped accountability to shareholders or manageement

  2. Exit $30m of shareholder money to do it

Frankly, this sounds like exactly the “novel funding structure” that you say is inappropriate.

Why can’t Uniswap’s lobbying efforts be run like a normal regulatory reform organization within a normal operating company?

Why do you need to set up a separate entity with different controllers and ownership?


Same question for you @rleshner Would you support **exiting funds from the Compound treasury into a new entity that is not accountable to you, the Compound token holders or the Compound board?

Why would you not set up a subsidiary or another entity that has a direct reporting line - and is funded periodically - by you as the project leader, the VCs who have board seats in your operating company and the token holders?

@MattCorva-CS What would Joe Lubin do? Would he create a new entity with you, some other DeFi lawyers and your outside counsel as the board directors and fund it with $30m of ETH, and then exit?

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I think there are perhaps more “reporting lines” and “accountability” than is being given credit for given the broad skepticism. Could it be better? Sure. Let’s work on that. At the same time, this concept of micro-funding and milestones etc. isn’t tenable for a venture like this, particularly if you want to pull in the heavy hitters who are going to dedicate their time to make this possible. There needs to be a budget that’s approved, functional objectives (that can be modified), and perhaps a transparency framework beyond what’s already inherent in non-profits. I’m a pragmatic person, so I don’t think I share any of the concerns about this being a front to pay Uniswap or their investors legal fees (I’m sure they can pay their own, if they have any), so I’m inherently more trusting of the budget because I understand the cost of a project like this and I have confidence in those participating and the non-profit structure.

As for what Joe would do? I would encourage you to take a look at ConsenSys from 2015-2020. It is essentially a lot of exactly what your hypothetical asks as we worked to help grow the ecosystem around the globe.


$6-8m per year is outrageous for a new project like this. If you want to make this palatable, make it year-by-year and start with $1m.

What urgency? Do you know something that we don’t? Is there impending regulation? Have there been talks with regulators? I have not seen anything to indicate that urgency exists to jump into such a huge commitment. If you know something, you (or core team) need to share it.

What incentive does a member of the World Economic Forum have to work in the best interests of UNI holders? And what commitment do UNI holders have that this organization will put their needs ahead of all others in DeFi?

With that said, I’d like to propose a few edits to the existing proposal:

  • $1m budget for first year
  • Committee members subject to tokenholder approval
  • Core team & early access investors abstain from vote
  • No WEF involvement

Chris rocks! I think what Chris asked are all sensible for questions and concerns.

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With that said, I’d like to propose a few edits to the existing proposal:

  • $1m budget for first year
  • Committee members subject to tokenholder approval
  • Core team & early access investors abstain from vote
  • No WEF involvement

In my opinion, I think these edits would hobble the initial proposals goals to the point that it would make it not worthwhile at all.

My notes:

$1m budget for first year:

Just normal startup lawyers that service ordinary startups cost $1000 per hour. A $1 million dollar budget would give the committee a little under five months of runway for just one person. Once you add in the cost of taxes, accounting, filings, just normal day-to-day business costs for a legal firm, and you’re basically done before September. Edit: (I don’t know the right amount that should be spent per year, but I think $1m doesn’t sound like enough)

Committee members subject to tokenholder approval

I think the Committee should be judged as a group, if this committee thinks it needs these individuals to make the project work, we either support this group of individuals, or don’t do it. Doesn’t make sense to say, “Yeah let’s do it, but oh- you can’t use the people you think you need to get it done.” They need to have the ability to organize themselves in such a way that they believe they are setup for success.

Core team & early access investors abstain from vote

I understand why this might be a nice provision to add, but I don’t get why the folks who might have the best perspective should be prevented from contributing their voting power. Perhaps their voice has an outsized influence, but so have been their contributions, no?
I’m also not crazy about creating classes of votes here, if they have access to their tokens, and it was always understood that they could vote, then they should be able to vote. Feels like weird engineering to construct the eligible voters based on the subject of the vote. It’s either token holder governance or it’s not. (But I’m sure this could be a WHOLE different discussion).

No WEF involvement

Again, why hobble the committee right out of the gate? I’m not an expert on the WEF, but if the experts we empower think it’s necessary to work with them, in order to achieve their stated goals, I think we have to empower them and trust their judgement.

As per this comment:

What urgency? Do you know something that we don’t? Is there impending regulation? Have there been talks with regulators? I have not seen anything to indicate that urgency exists to jump into such a huge commitment. If you know something, you (or core team) need to share it.

If there is urgency, maybe they can’t share it. That doesn’t seem unreasonable. Also reading between the lines, the fact that this proposal is being described in terms as urgent, seems to be a pretty good indicator that, yes, there might be something urgent that can’t be spelled out here in a public forum. Maybe it’s just someone had dinner with someone, a few too many drinks and something slipped out. That happens all the time. Doesn’t mean this is the case here, but it wouldn’t be an unreasonable conclusion. Certainly something has propelled someone to ask for $30 million and think that was a reasonable response.


I think this proposal should be considered from the pro/con point of view. Whats the risk versus reward calculation here? Clearly the risk is that they abscond with the $30 million and spend it on steak dinners and long weekends in DC hotel suites.

Sure. That could happen.

But the worst case scenario doesn’t seem like it has the potential to do any substantial harm to token holders or the Uniswap project at large. Sure we will be pissed they ran off with the money, but them being turning out to be rich scammers hardly makes my life worse if it were to happen. They could liquidate the tokens, drop the price by what, a couple dollars temporarily? Sucks in theory, but doesn’t harm us.

So then let’s consider how likely that is to happen. These folks are all well known individuals with careers that in their lifetimes could still net many multiples of $$$ more than this proposals value is worth- even though it’s worth quite a lot. In the grand Risk/Reward here- doesn’t seem likely for them to steal the money.

So the point is: It neither seems realistic they would outright be corrupt, nor that in the worse case scenario would any true harm come to token holders or the protocol.

So then lets consider the other side of the coin:

Let’s say we give them this enormous amount of money, and they work hard and fail. Thats the same outcome as doing nothing, so again, no real loss.

But let us say we give them this enormous amount of money, and they are right. We empower them with the trust and tools to do the job correctly, (See my and @monet-supply’s posts above for solid accountability tools) and low and behold: It works. They educate policy makers, help create a positive legal environment for DeFi, and now we’re on a path towards global success.

The upside here, the reward, is just so massive, that it dwarfs the potential downside. I personally would like to see them use the accountability tools that we have been building for them (All open source) which would empower them with the funds and certainty they need to build a kick-ass team, while leaving Token Holders with the ultimate authority.

Otherwise, I’ve come around, and I support this proposal and I think we should find a way to set this team up for success: both in our eyes and their own.


Great timing, this just hit the wire:


Put simply: there are people who see the sum as outrageous and there are people who see it as not sufficient enough…These are typical characteristics that such undertaking as this should be its own project funded by every large DeFi stakeholder.

Really, what a coincidence.
The same author has on the same day also published that early on Tuesday the World Economic Forum published a “white paper [which] is meant to act as a toolkit for regulators looking to understand the decentralized finance sector.” Article here
This same author noting that “The WEF does not intend to recommend specific policy actions for regulators, however. The document said it is more focused on describing what issues DeFi may address, as well as draw attention to certain areas on which regulators may need to catch up.”
According to yesterday’s WEF’s announcement, it is “The result of an international collaboration among academics, legal practitioners, DeFi entrepreneurs, technologists and regulatory experts, the report provides a solid foundation for understanding the major factors that should drive policy-making decisions.” and, although DeFi may, “according to its proponents”, be promising, nevertheless
“DeFi raises considerations related to consumer protection, loss of funds, governance complexities, technical risk and systemic risk. Significant incidents involving technical failures and attacks on DeFi services have already occurred. Moreover, questions remain about the actual extent of decentralization of some protocols – and associated risks, e.g. for manipulation – and whether DeFi is more than a risky new vehicle for speculation that may open the door to fraud and illicit activity.”

According to the proposal we are discussing here, the 7th member of the non profit’s Committee is " 1. Sheila Warren , World Economic Forum, Executive Committee (Cryptocurrency Lead). Sheila is trained as a lawyer who used to represent 501(c)(4) nonprofits such as Planned Parenthood and the ACLU. She now convenes experts on cryptocurrency regulatory issues at WEF."
Her picture is one of three figuring at the onset of the report. One can say she has had a pivoting role in it. But taking a closer look, one sees that the majority of the proposed BD members are somehow related to the WEF’s relevant report(s).
Jake Chervinsky, General Counsel of Compound, is a content contributor. of the just publicized WEF’s report.

Other Content Contributors are:
Nic Carter, Partner, Castle Island Ventures, USA
Tarun Chitra, Chief Executive Officer, Gauntlet, USA
Ann Sofie Cloots, Slaughter & May Lecturer in Company Law, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom
Jacek Czarnecki, Global Legal Counsel, Maker Foundation, Poland
Brendan Forster, Chief Operating Officer, Dharma Labs, USA
Katharina Gehra, Chief Executive Officer, Immutable Insight, Germany
Andreas Glarner, Partner, MME Legal Tax Compliance, Switzerland
Jordan Lazaro Gustave, Chief Operating Officer, Aave, United Kingdom
Siân Jones, Senior Partner, XReg Consulting, Gibraltar
Daniel Kochis, Global Head of Business Development, Chainlink Labs, USA
Joyce Lai, Member, New York Angels; Founder,, USA
Urszula McCormack, Partner, King & Wood Mallesons, Hong Kong SAR
Fabian Schär, Professor for Distributed Ledger Technology/Fintech, University of Basel, Switzerland
Lex Sokolin, Head Economist and Global Fintech Co-Head, ConsenSys, United Kingdom
Teana Baker Taylor, General Manager, UK,, United Kingdom

Content Reviewers of the WEF report include another 2 of the proposed Committee members (Marvin Ammori, Chief Legal Officer of Uniswap Labs and Sheila Warren, “Deputy Head, Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution, World Economic Forum, USA”).
Others are:
Marcos Allende Lopez, Technical Leader, LACChain, Inter-American Development Bank, USA
Sebastian Banescu, Senior Research Engineer, Quantstamp, Germany
Matthias Bauer-Langgartner, Technical Specialist, FCA Innovate, United Kingdom
Nicolas Brügger, Senior Policy Adviser, State Secretariat for International Finance, Switzerland
Jehudi Castro Sierra, Digital Transformation Adviser, Office of the Presidency, Colombia
Charles Dalton, Software Engineer, Blockchain, Crypto, and Digital Currencies, PayPal, USA
Maxim Galash, Chief Executive Officer, Coinchange, Canada
Oli Harris, Vice-President, Goldman Sachs, USA
Kibae Kim, Principal Researcher, Korea Policy Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution, KAIST, South Korea
Netta Korin, Co-Founder, Orbs; Founder, Hexa Foundation, Israel
Ashley Lannquist, Project Lead, Blockchain and Digital Currency, World Economic Forum, USA
Caroline Malcolm, Head, Global Blockchain Policy Centre, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, France
Rob Massey, Tax Blockchain, Crypto and Digital Assets Leader, Deloitte, USA
Paul Maley, Global Head of Securities Services, Deutsche Bank, United Kingdom
Xavier Meegan, Blockchain Intern, ING, Netherlands
Michael Mosier, Acting Director, FinCEN, USA
Michael Oh, Director, Office of Financial Innovation, FINRA, USA
Sam Proctor, Chief Executive Officer, Genesis Block, USA
Lane Rettig, Core Team, Spacemesh, USA
Richard Rosenthal, Risk and Financial Advisory, Banking Regulatory Specialist, Deloitte, USA
Lukas Staub, Senior Legal Adviser, State Secretariat for International Finance, Switzerland
Christoph Simmchen, Legal Counsel, Gnosis, Germany

A closer look reveals that this report was not created by the WEF alone, but "in collaboration with the University of Pennsylvania, an initiative of it which crowdfunded a billion.
There is also a so-called companion report (called: DeFi Beyond the Hype) just published in May, with Lead Author being David Gogel of dYdX. The BD of the proposed non profit includes the attorney "Marc Boiron , General Counsel of dYdX Trading. That WEF -UniPenn ‘companion report’ was also reviewed by, among others, proposed BD member Sheila Warren (World Economic Forum).

Maybe the proposed members of the Committee, who contributed to these DeFi global regulation inspirations, might wish to share their views about the relevance of the WEF’s papers with the present proposal.

In my view, as long as it is even conceivable that millions would just flow out of Uniswap, “to start with”, also inspiring thoughts about getting extra sums from other DAOs, we’re going to see a much more “relevant” journalistic coverage, especially as the time approaches for voting the proposal. The latter, as I understand, is already considered as voted for. Which would make a great case study.
This bulk of information might also answer some concerns about what could be expected to go wrong.

Urging Governments and regulators to take measures (or participating in such efforts) and then proposing oneself as the 40M solution to “defend” the space from regulation is, to put it lightly, of concern.


Thanks for the reply, @MattCorva-CS. I also agree that it’s unlikely this is a front to pay legal fees (there are plenty of other ways for everyone involved to cover them) and speculating about that sort of intent isn’t very helpful because it’s just not knowable.

What I find so troubling, however, is the governance structure and dynamic.

Regardless of intent, the proposal creates (i) a separate organization, (ii) with a separate board, (iii) no ownership by Uniswap’s token holders or equity holders and (iv) that works to lobby on behalf of “all defi.”

This is definitionally misalinged with Uniswap’s equity holders, token holders and management has no accountability to any of them once it is funded. In fact, the grant size is probably large enough to serve as an endowment if deposited into Yearn or a similar yield product.

So why would you do this?

Why wouldn’t you create a new entity that is accountable to Uniswap’s equity owners, governance token holders and management and fund it like a subsidiary or an oganization that operates on behalf of Uniswap?

For heavy hitters, what are you envisioning, and who do you think would decline to participate if there were funding / accountability milestones (like a corporate general counsel would have for running a litigation or a regulatory reform effort)?

Again, a lot of what strikes me as odd is the total lack of accountability and linkage of budget to needs.

For example, if Marvin were to run this project as a new business unit, wouldn’t we expect that he would ask for dedicated headcount, a budget for those headcount, and then submit quarterly requests for budget based on the needs?

For example, I could imagine seeking the following:

Annual Budget

A. Headcount

1x New head of regulatory affairs - $300k/year
1x New director of regulatory affairs - $200k/year
1x Admin assistant - $100k/year


B. G&A - $100k/year

Total Yearly Overhead - $700k/year

Quarterly Budget

Goal 1 - $200k
Goal 2 - $100k
Goal 3 - $100k

In this way, there would be routine accountability to Uniswap, you’d still have an annual budget that’s 75% of Coin Center’s and you’d be able to size and target the budget to realistically and transparently support Uniswap’s needs.

Does this sound about right to you?

  • DeFi holds great promise to reshape finance for the better.
  • DAOs represent a new form of social organization that has the potential to improve upon the shortcomings of previous ones, i.e. corporations and nation state governments.
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CoinCenter’s budget has been $1m/year for quite some time. Why does this fund need a budget that is 5-6x that of CoinCenter?

Fine, then the WEF involvement should disqualify this entire panel. There is zero reason that this committee should involve any politiclly controversial figures.

Core team & early investors can conceive a proposal, propose it, then vote it into existence without any community involvement. This completely negates the idea of decentralization. If they want to continue to participate the way that they are, then they should just admit that this is not a decentralized governance process.

“Experts”? There are no experts here. WEF has a stated goal to execute a “Great Reset” of society and is highly political. There is zero chance that WEF will be acting in the best interests of tokenholders. Their stated goal is to act in the best interests of “the world”. That is not at all conducive to this capitalist experiment.


Here at Gauntlet, we try to focus our participation in governance on outcomes we know well - market risk management and parameter optimization. We often abstain from votes like this, but after careful internal discussion we are supporting this proposal**

There has been great feedback, much of which we hope is addressed, but that can happen before or after the proposal passes. However, the value of creating greater regulatory certainty in the space is very high, and we need to bias towards action here. Our team met with the CFTC in 2019 and regulators have had every intention of creating a regulatory environment in which crypto can operate for quite some time. However, the regulatory “progress” over the past years has been limited to a few misguided efforts like The STABLE Act. It is clear from our discussions with knowledgeable parties that creating regulatory certainty will be a herculean task. While the sum requested is large, the sum needed is even larger. DeFi should expect this to be the first of many such requests, not just to the UNI community, but to other large DAOs in the space as well. Many of the options discussed, like a small budget to fund an exploratory committee, do not provide a clear path to creating meaningful progress. This is a hard problem, and we shouldn’t kid ourselves when considering other options.

If you look at Uniswap governance, there have been two proposals passed since it was deployed last year. The Uniswap DAO is a $7B organization that has, for all intents and purposes, done two “things” in 9 months. You could chalk this up to token holders being fiscally conservative, but calling this conservative is a euphemism that obscures a somber truth - the DAO is in a state of almost total stasis. Protocols like Compound have been more successful, with 30 or so proposals passed in that same time period. But don’t be mistaken - even 30 “things” is almost nothing for an organization of this size, which could have a tremendous impact not just for UNI token holders but on the world itself. DAOs need to take more risk, but this risk should be justified by a real chance of an outsize reward. The regulatory risk in crypto is one of the largest impediments to adoption and this Political Defense Organization is a group of people with decades of experience advocating in Washington effectively for improved technology policy. There are no guarantees, but the chance of success here is very credible. Gauntlet hopes this is the first of many more proposals that think big and take a swing at hard problems like regulatory risk.

If we had one piece of feedback, it would be that compensation for PDO employees be denominated in UNI (or other DeFi protocol tokens), so that there is better incentive alignment. After all, the PDO should provide value to UNI holders and this would cement that commitment. However, this is not blocking feedback - we trust the committee members to balance this with other tradeoffs that arise. This trust might be misplaced, but we have much reason to think it’s not and we are willing to take the risk that we are wrong here. In the end, if you don’t risk being wrong, you don’t ever have a chance to be right. This could be a step forward, not just for UNI, not just for DeFi, but for decentralized organizations to enter a new era of faster and greater progress.

** Of course, when the final proposal is published, we’d have to re-evaluate in the face of any material changes.


Watching the blitz in Washington on crypto. I have changed my opinion. I am now in favor of lining the pockets of who ever we need. Expand the proposal to be more ambitious. Funds for a free market. This is the cost of doing business. Al Capone knew that paying off all officials, was more profitable long term. :stuck_out_tongue_winking_eye:

Thanks to everyone for the discussion. To address a few questions since my last post:

Re: the urgency of moving forward, there really isn’t anything confidential you need to know to understand the difficult policy environment we’re in now. It was all over this week’s news. Take the speech from CFTC Commissioner Berkovitz on Tuesday, for example. He said:

Not only do I think that unlicensed DeFi markets for derivative instruments are a bad idea, I also do not see how they are legal under the CEA…Apart from the legality issue, in my view it is untenable to allow an unregulated, unlicensed derivatives market to compete, side-by-side, with a fully regulated and licensed derivatives market…For all these reasons, we should not permit DeFi to become an unregulated shadow financial market in direct competition with regulated markets.

Thankfully Commissioner Berkovitz doesn’t speak for the entire CFTC, but it doesn’t take much for a speech like this to turn into new anti-DeFi guidance or rulemaking. We need to make our case to the CFTC now, not twelve months from now. The same is true for Congress, as you can tell if you listened to Senator Warren and her colleagues during yesterday’s Senate Banking Committee hearing.

Re: conflicts of interest, I think DeFi projects in general are incentive-aligned to the point that there’s no conflict in advocating for them as a category. The difficult question is how to define the category, which determines the projects that fall within our scope. This is something I’d want community feedback on, but not something I view as a conflict. For me personally, having worked on DeFi policy for a couple years now, I don’t anticipate any conflicts between my day job and my work here. If a conflict did arise, I’d handle it according to my fiduciary duties, abstaining or recusing myself if necessary.

Re: transparency, we’ve said a lot here about the steps we’ll take to keep the community informed and engaged. Because of the nature of the work, there may be some details that aren’t appropriate to publish online (advice of counsel, litigation strategy, etc.), which is why I said “as much public transparency as possible” in my last post. Regardless, I’m confident that we can and will share more than enough information for the community to assess our progress.

Re: WEF, I can’t tell anyone what to think about the organization, but I will say I hold Sheila in high regard and think she would bring a unique and valuable perspective to the program. She led the WEF’s DeFi Policymaker Toolkit project which resulted in solid work product, and from what I know, her views on DeFi are well-aligned with the community.

Re: funding, I agree with the comments from @dennisonb and @jmo on the size of the request. As I said before, I think the total amount is justified given the magnitude of the challenge. Still, I don’t think Uniswap has to fund it all at once, or alone. I support a smaller initial funding amount than proposed, with the expectation that we’ll make future requests from Uniswap and other protocols.

Re: accountability, I support governance having an oversight mechanism to keep the 501(c)(4) accountable, as long as it doesn’t discourage other protocols from contributing as well (such as if Uniswap has special oversight privileges). I don’t have any particular preference as to how oversight is achieved; perhaps a limited initial funding amount with the ability to deny future requests is sufficient.


this is really so fucking stupid its ridiculous

the price of uni keeps going down in satoshi’s, the price of solana keeps going up

there’s a reason for that (uniswap usa based, solana is not)

the fee switch isn’t turned on, there’s no discussion of it

and you want to allocate more money than hayden used to build uniswap to lawyers

its a joke

the uniswap protocol is now controlled by lawyers if this goes thru

satoshi would vomit

i love u hayden, but i sold all my uni and since then it just looks like its getting worse

definitely wont be back if htis goes thru and jake is the de facto leader … lol, couldnt be any more uninspiring … not hitting jake, but lawyers suck. devs rule. sad state of affairs …

good luck boys, i wont be joining u


Agreed, that the DAO has been slow to act.

Thing is, why would we seek to solve the slowness problem by giving $25m of of cash, with no strings attached to the lawyers Uniswap has used in the past and who got us here?

Isn’t the slowness to act a result of their failure or inability to execute?

Isn’t the fact that they seem to be blindsided by the recent CFTC comments a result of their lack of familiarity with futures and derivatives law? Aren’t any OFAC issues they face the result of their lack of familiarity with the areas at issue?

Moreover, what have Uniswap’s lawyers been doing for Uniswap for the past few months - other than pitching us to give them 1m Uni … and working for other projects?

To test how much this should cost, I reached out to the market a bit.

I learned that you can hire Consensys’s primary outside counsel for securities law lobbying and Bitfinex’s primary outside counsel for under $500k/year. @jamico @DCinvestor

Why don’t we just hire these firms, who are actually experts and have a proven track record of successfully producing results, for a mere 100k Uni…and actually solve the problems that Uniswap faces?

How is this not a better option than giving 1m Uni to the very people who have gotten us here - and are on the payroll of other projects, will have no accountability to the Uniswap token holders, investors and management and are pretty clearly behaving opportunistically here?

Let’s take off the kid gloves, folks.

We can get the same sorts of results as CeFi exchanges by hiring people who will actually for Uniswap for 1/10th the money. They just won’t be the guys you heard of on Twitter. They will be actual experts. And they will have actual duties to serve you, the client.

I’m out.

Good luck to all of you. It is now only your money.