[Temperature Check] - Activate Uniswap Protocol Governance

Thank you, @eek637, for suggesting this change to the community. This could be a turning point. While we may not agree on every detail, having the ability to “disagree but commit” can revitalize the Uniswap community and bring back excitement. Thanks to @eek637 for providing a common ground for us. I wholeheartedly support the proposal and appreciate everyone who has dedicated significant time to make it a reality!

On the proposal itself, I would love to learn more about the WETH decision as the rewards token.

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This proposal is very similar/copies Pauly’s Pond0x ecosystem. It has already been done on Uniswap for over 175 days. :frog: :fork_and_knife:
Over $500 million in swaps and $22 million given out in rewards to the community members. Cope harder.

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Really exciting stuff @eek637 and team! It’s been a pleasure to watch this proposal materialize and be able to contribute to it through Avantgarde Finance.

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  1. Will the staking have any lockup period for unstaking?

  2. Is there any regulatory concern about turning on the fee switch?

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I am not qualified to speak to the second question, but to the first: no. You can stake and unstake at will. But you only earn rewards while you are staked. Here are some docs on how the mechanics work:

https://docs.unistaker.io/architecture/staking-mechanics

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Exciting proposal! Incentivizing engaged delegates could indeed strengthen Uniswap’s governance. Looking forward to the Snapshot vote

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Think this is generally pretty great.

I think what’s missing here is some fees going to delegates who have a large amount of voting power and actively create & vote on proposals.

In other DAOs, there’s been a large amount of delegation, but the delegates themselves don’t participate or keep the ecosystem alive. If we incentivize delegation but not actual participation by top voters, we’ll be missing out on a lot of potential.

I’m sure there are some strange incentives there but wanted to call this out. Perhaps one solution is only rewarding people who delegated to someone who actually participates in governance.

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Yeah this was my thought as well FWIW…a16z has written some great things on directly incentivizing governance participation. Delegation feels like a poor proxy and there is a chance to do something a bit more innovative

I suspect though the point is just to do staking but they’re worried about securities laws issues so added the delegation bit for that reason alone. Which to be clear I’m also totally fine with haha, but it might save us all some energy to just think about it that way instead.

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This is definitely an interesting proposal and I think it is already visible here that there’s a lot of support and excitement. My view is that this grassroots support will only increase and it’s understandable why, UNI holders believe that the UNI token should concretely capture some value from the tremendous success of the Uniswap Protocol that it stewards. From this vantage point, I wholeheartedly agree and think the proposal is a great thing, I personally support the first step in this direction. But…

TLDR: In my opinion, for this to work well, there will need to be incentives introduced for Uniswap LPs in tandem, likely in the form of revitalized liquidity mining programs with the UNI token (open to other ideas as well).

Below is an in-depth explanation of why:

As a champion of Uniswap LPs (founder of Arrakis :wave:) this proposal needs to be balanced with the reality that the excitement apparent here is mostly around the UNI token having some value capture mechanism, and that this value is directly captured from Uniswap LPs pockets. Uniswap LPs support the protocol immensely and take a lot of risk / leak a lot of value to other parties, due to the nature of how Uniswap and all other current DEXs are designed (there is a huge amount of research and discussion going into next generation DEX designs that mitigate some of these problems, but today all the popular DEXs in production remain plagued with value leakage from LPs to arbitrageurs). Further, the Uniswap Labs user interface has already signaled it is increasingly open to reducing the amount that it’s precious non-toxic order flow is routed exclusively to the Uniswap Protocol. Basically, what needs to be addressed is how Uniswap LPs are going to also benefit from such an action, because if not, there remains legitimate risk that LPs will take their inventory elsewhere. If LPs don’t even lose access to Uniswap Labs order flow, then they really have nothing to lose and everything to gain by LPing on other venues. They avoid this new protocol “tax” and often gain further auxiliary token incentives used by competing DEXs to incentivize Uniswap LPs to move their inventory to new venues (famously the UNI token was actually released at least partially in response to just such a scheme by a Uni V2 copycat).

UNI holders and delegates will have financial incentive to maximize their earnings, by voting to maximize protocol fees. We’ve seen with other DAOs that once you introduce these direct financial incentives into what is voted on, it’s hard to reason with voters on any other metric (financial incentives are a hell of a drug). It seems clear to me that there’s basically no way for this to be a sustainable dynamic without also introducing new concrete incentives for LPs. After all, LPs are the bedrock of the protocol’s utility (you can’t swap on the protocol without having liquidity deposited by LPs to swap against).

Lastly there are some important technical questions in a world where Uni V4 is around the corner. AFAIU Uni V4’s flexibility makes it almost impossible to even enforce these protocol fees (you can write hooks in such a way that you try to avoid actual “swap fees” while still properly pricing liquidity and compensating LPs, basically hooks can try and get around the protocol fee which is something that definitely needs to be carefully considered by protocol engineers). In general we don’t want to create friction between LPs and UNI voters, and I see potential cat-and-mouse games once LPs can also customize DEX logic to their liking.

I really want to see the Uniswap Protocol succeed. From the beginning I have been captivated by the potential and by the groundbreaking research and engineering that is the Uniswap Protocol, a shining jewel of the ethereum application layer. I think this is a step in the right direction because the proper alignment between Uni Protocol, Uni LPs, UNI holders, and Uni Labs really needs to be investigated more. Onchain trading is currently going through a metamorphosis and Uniswap Protocol could remain at the center of it, but this isn’t preordained, retaining network effects around Uniswap liquidity depth will be incredibly important.

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Very exciting day for the protocol. I think this proposal makes a lot of sense and the timing is right for a variety of reasons. It’s a great first step towards a revenue model, and there will definitely be some learnings to apply to v4 as the community migrates over.

I still am skeptical that the fee switch in its current form is viable as a sustainable, growth-oriented token model. Delegates have a limited canvas to influence the success of a governance-lite protocol like Uniswap, and it’s hard to make the case that the value created by elevating the best delegates exceeds the value extracted from LPs as a result of the fee switch, especially when LPs are still struggling to make risk-adjusted returns and liquidity is increasingly being routed off-chain (UniswapX, Cowswap, etc.).

I don’t have a good answer for how to design a productive token model for Uniswap, but I think it needs to serve as a direct financial coordination mechanism and it needs to operate on the “meta-protocol” layer. That could mean using the token to direct liquidity across UV4 instances on different chains. That could mean backstopping a decentralized version of an intents protocol like UniswapX. That could mean building a discovery + reputation mechanism for long tail assets/pairs.

Delegates are very important to Uniswap, but I think there is a danger in assuming that protocol delegates influence the success of a protocol like shareholders of a corporation do. Uniswap is immutable code and blockchains are much different than c-suites.

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There’s an ongoing proposal discussion about rewarding delegates. Would appreciate a feedback :pray:

https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-uniswap-delegate-reward/22909?u=doo_stablelab

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Than why do you vote against?

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We are not voting against and in fact, it’s not even up in the vote so one can’t vote for or against yet

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Agreed, there should be an incentive for active LPs actually, not only for active delegators and voters.

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After GFX Lab’s attempt last May to activate the fee switch, we are thrilled to see the Uniswap Foundation and ScopeLift work closely to deliver an elegant production-ready proposal. We are particularly intrigued by the staking system introduced.

If it wasn’t obvious already, you can count on our support!

@bendi. Thank you for your and your team’s efforts here. Question for you. Is there a reason the V3FactoryOwner does not have a function to set a new owner to UniswapV3Factory? If delegates someday wish to transition to a new system, it would be necessary to do so as it is today. Or do you envision this proposal as a permanent change to the protocol?

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This is an extremely exciting development for the Uniswap community and im gonna be supportive of this

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The level of groundwork to get this discussion started is amazing. Thank you for that!

Thinking ahead, the price of staking and delegating tokens on L1 and the lack of composability of UNI tokens staked in the rest of DeFi will likely be the largest issues here. While these technical considerations don’t seem to be just yet on the table, I believe that addressing them now would probably make building the necessary infra to facilitate this more straightforward.

I’m also interested in the legal strategy of the DAO to eventually distribute these tokens to stakers. The recent fee switch discussions were stopped because of these legal considerations, so what’s the plan this time?

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tl;dr manage fees globally and open up updating them to the latest value for any pool

in uniswap v2 a global protocol fee is controlled from the factory, which is a sound design.

in the current design of v3 factory owner setFeeProtocol needs to go through governance for each pool. this results in a very cumbersome situation in case uni holders decide to turn on a global fee switch, since a governance proposal can only contain 10 actions.

unlike v2 pools, where protocol fee is fixed at 1/6th, v3 pools allow to set the fee ranging from 1/10th to 1/4th, or even different fees for the pool constituents.

a likely outcome is the community will come up with some global fee value applicable to all pools instead of micromanaging each of them. in this case it would be reasonable to set a global protocol fee in the factory owner and then open up V3FactoryOwner.setFeeProtocol to enable or update the fees for any pool. interested parties would then run it through all the pools that yield any significant fees.

one possible edge case is reducing the fees after they have been set high. in this case a rational actor is not interested in updating the values for the pools, and a manual update might be needed from an entity like uniswap foundation.

https://github.com/uniswapfoundation/UniStaker/issues/64

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Many thanks for this. Can you provide some background on the reasons to suggest WETH vs UNI as payout token?

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The overall proposal is really interesting. I am excited to see the switch get turned on, and thank you to those who contributed to that! From the delegation aspect of this proposal, I am curious about some aspects.

Specifically, we propose to upgrade the protocol so that its fee mechanism rewards UNI token holders that have delegated and staked their tokens.

I like the mechanism of intertwining staking alongside delegation to receive rewards. Was there an exploration of a small portion of the fees being used to incentivize active delegates too?

After the delegation contracts are reset, a UNI holder can stake and delegate to anyone and receive staking rewards. It doesn’t matter if the delegate is active or not right? If so,there could be more voting power delegated but not actually be used - It’s unlikely for this to happen, but how else do you plan to encourage delegators to delegate to active delegates?

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