Thank you for the clarifications. A few points still need tightening before we can credibly claim the proposal aligns risk-adjusted value for the Uniswap DAO.
1. Quantify “new” vs “shifted” TVL
Your thesis hinges on incremental TVL, not deposits that merely migrate from existing Uniswap pools.
Could you share concrete data from past LP-CDP launches (Maker G-UNI vaults, Pendle PT markets, etc.) showing what % of TVL was net-new after 2, 6, and 12 months of incentives?
Without that baseline we can’t attribute future Uniswap revenue to this integration alone.
2. Front-loaded incentives: yes, but with guardrails
I agree a cold-start bonus is required. The issue is magnitude versus proof-of-life.
Below I keep your four-stage design but (i) restore the triggers to total borrowed, not TVL, and (ii) trim the unconditional spend.
| Phase | Unlock condition (total borrowed) | Current ask | Suggested cap |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bootstrap | Contract deployed and audit passed | 1.62 M UNI* | 0.50 M UNI |
| Growth | Borrowed ≥ $ 50 M | 0.30 M UNI | 0.30 M UNI |
| Flywheel | Borrowed ≥ $ 100 M | 0.30 M UNI | 0.30 M UNI |
| Scale | Borrowed ≥ $ 500 M | 0.30 M UNI | 1.20 M UNI† |
* 0.524 M UNI grant + 1.100 M UNI initial incentives = 1.624 M UNI.
† Cap remains 1.20 M UNI if the DAO prefers to keep the full four-tranche pool; otherwise it can be lowered proportionally.
Result: unconditional up-front spend falls to ≈ $ 3.2 M (0.50 M UNI × $6.3) while leaving upside room once real borrowing materialises.
3. Symmetric skin-in-the-game
If the DAO keeps the original 1.62 M UNI front-load (≈ $10 M), a matching commitment from Aave DAO (in AAVE or GHO) would align incentives and mute “vendor-financing” concerns. Has the Aave community signalled appetite for a treasury match?
4. Revenue-share dynamics
Your model assumes an 8.65 % GHO rate and a static 50 % split. What happens if
- GHO APY drops below 4 % (revenue halves)?
- Borrow demand plateaus at $ 300 M?
A sliding-scale rev-share—e.g., 70 % to Uniswap while net protocol revenue < $ 10 M / yr, ratcheting down to 50 % above that—would protect downside while preserving upside.
5. Risk-management disclosures
Given the insolvency risk Aave takes on, can Gauntlet or Chaos provide a preliminary risk-parameter sheet (LT, RF, liquidation bonus) for the first three LP pairs you expect to list? That will let delegates gauge how realistic the $ 500 M borrow ceiling is.
I’m encouraged by the constructive dialogue and remain open to flipping my vote once the above items are addressed. Let’s keep iterating toward a package that is both capital-efficient and mutually accretive.