[Governance Proposal] Uniswap Unleashed

Requests for Comment
5

I believe that this proposal, with its request of $120.5M as a lump sum plus $45M in incentives, is missing clear, measurable KPIs on which the DAO can base its decision to move forward. The list provided appears to represent high-level priorities rather without specific, actionable performance metrics.

Feedback on the Priorities and how they can be improved by providing KPIs:

  1. Scaling Network Supply: Provide Maximum Capital Efficiency Across Active EVM Chains

  • Growth in Uniswap Protocol (v2-v4):

    • Feedback: This priority is vague without a KPI.
    • Suggestion: Define measurable targets such as a percentage increase in market share, user adoption, or trading volume across each chain. For instance, “Achieve a 15% market share increase on [Chain Name] within 12 months” would be a more actionable KPI.

  • Growth in Unichain DEX Volume and DeFi TVL:

    • Feedback: Without baseline target nor target objectives, it’s difficult to evaluate progress.
    • Suggestion: Establish the baseline target and set clear targets like “Increase DeFi TVL by 20% quarter-over-quarter” or “Capture 10% additional DEX volume compared to current levels within the next year.”
  1. Scaling Network Demand: Create Premier DeFi Development Platforms

  • Hooks Comprising 30% of Uniswap v4 Orderflow:

    • Feedback: This is a clear target.

  • Top Hook Development Teams & Unichain Apps/Protocols Being Revenue-Generating:

    • Feedback: The term “revenue-generating” is ambiguous in this context.
    • Suggestion: Define what qualifies as revenue-generating (e.g., a minimum monthly revenue threshold) and clarify whether this revenue is for the protocol or for the teams involved. For example, “Achieve a minimum monthly revenue of $X for top hook teams, contributing Y% to overall protocol revenue.”
  1. Equipping Governance and the Community: Active Revenue

  • Governance Vote on Uniswap Protocol Revenue to be Earned by Delegators:

    • Feedback: It is unclear whether this refers to revenue from a fee switch or revenue from all products.
    • Suggestion: Clarify the scope.

  • UVN Validator and Staker Network Developed and Supported:

    • Feedback: The term “supported” is ambiguous.
    • Suggestion: Define this KPI clearly—does it mean the network is live, fully deployed, and continuously maintained? A measurable KPI might be “Deploy the UVN Validator and Staker Network by Q4 and achieve 95% uptime over the subsequent 12 months.”

  • Unichain Top 5 L2 by Chain Revenue:

    • Feedback: While this is a dynamic objective, providing a baseline metric or target revenue figure would make it measurable.
  1. Equipping Governance and the Community: Onboard Protocol Core Contributors
  • Three New Core Contributor Teams Onboarded:
    Feedback: The objective is clear.

Overall Recommendation:

While these priorities outline a vision for growth and improvement, they do not serve as actionable KPIs because they lack specific baseline metrics, clear numerical targets, and defined timeframes.

General Concerns:

  1. Uniswap Foundation Involvement on Revenue Sharing & Decision Making:

  • Staking:

    • Concern: The Uniswap Foundation should not be involved in staking activities.
    • Explanation: Involving the Foundation in staking could create conflicts of interest or centralize power over token economics.

  • Participating in the Fee Switch:

    • Concern: The Foundation should not be part of the fee switch process.
    • Explanation: Participation in the fee switch might lead to biased decision-making or misallocation of funds. By remaining separate, the Foundation ensures that fee-related decisions are made transparently and democratically by the DAO or a designated governance mechanism.

  • Delegation of Tokens:

    • Concern: The Foundation should not delegate tokens to avoid potential collusion.
    • Explanation: Allowing the Foundation to delegate tokens could lead to conflicts of interest where their influence might sway decisions in favor of their interests. This separation is intended to maintain impartiality and prevent any group from exerting undue control over DAO decisions.
  1. Mechanism for Token Buyback (“Right of First Refusal”):
  • Concern: The Foundation should clearly communicate how it plans to sell UNI tokens and offer UNI token holders the opportunity to repurchase these tokens, similar to a “Right of First Refusal” condition.
  • Explanation: Transparency in the mechanism for selling tokens and allowing buybacks ensures that all stakeholders are aware of and can trust the process. This approach protects token holders by giving them the first opportunity to reacquire tokens, thus avoiding potential market manipulation or unfavorable sales practices.
  1. Clarification on Unichain:

  • Ownership and Context:

    • Concern: It is unclear if Unichain is owned by the DAO, and there is insufficient context regarding its functionality.
    • Explanation: The DAO has received minimal information on Unichain’s operational context and its overall purpose. The current understanding seems to be that the DAO is indirectly benefiting (or receiving a “kickback”) for funding this initiative without a complete overview. This lack of transparency can lead to misunderstandings about responsibilities and benefits.

  • Entitlement of the Unichain Growth Reserve:

    • Concern: The current description implies that the Uniswap Foundation has an entitlement to the Unichain Growth Reserve without proper approval from the DAO.
    • Explanation: This point should be clarified because, as written, it appears to be a unilateral decision rather than a proposal subject to DAO approval. For proper governance and accountability, any entitlements or allocations—especially those involving significant funds or reserves—should require explicit DAO approval.
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