I don’t support this proposal.
On an high level
- This is an old playbook that many have already done - the Arbitrum, ZkSync and Aerodrome are examples of very expensive incentives campaigns with no fruits
- Fluid, the most serious competitor currently, is gaining market shares with 0 incentives. What’s the plan to compete for them?
- Base, the most popular L2, has managed to get marketshare with no user incentives
- What’s the plan to retain liquidity providers after the incentives?
Some additional clarifications would be important
- How is the expected TVL derived? What is the metodology for the forecast?
- Since this operation is really about renting liquidity, what is the expected cost for unit of TVL?
- What would be the criteria for pool selection?
- Incentivizing hooks is very generic. Hooks can have arbitrary logic on top of pools. I doubt that a mechanism like Merkl would be effective for all use cases
- What was the process in selecting these partners (Aera / Gauntlet)?
- How this is positive for tokens holders?
Lastly, I’d like to say that none of this addresses structural problems that could help Unichain growth:
- Interoperability across superchain
- Developing unique use cases for defi
- Improving native asset issuance on the chain (RWA, memes, AI coins). Native assets are the stickiest (see Base)
- attracting and funding more builders