I suppose the 2 models are the Brussel mandarinate ( a self-perpetuating group of elites) vs Isreali knesset (unstable coalitions). The first tends to foster deep complicated rules which require high degree of professionalism which tends to create barriers to entry for new delegates. The 2nd is more inclusive but because the voting power is highly fragmented it creates vote trading to get sufficient quorum for anything to get done.
There is the 1st order effect which is to overcome voter apathy … paid delegates may encourage the mandarinate but I’d also point out the reimburse gas as determined by number of new wallets delegating is another mechanism (akin to financing parties pro-rata to voting participation wt\ith cutoffs)
The 2nd order effects are not as obvious but basically you end up with entrenched interests (think lobby groups) and little contestability on new governance ideas. In particular participants from global south would find gas fees high relative to their PPP so will see treasury doled out to the squeakiest wheel.
Also it is possible to “buy” votes just by say investor whales supporting a few veto delegates as meat puppets. How to encourage both turnover (term limits) and institutional knowledge retention (avoid same old debates) is going to be non-trivial