Consensus Check - UNI should fund a political defense organization for decentralized finance

Circling back to my point about proof of work and transparency. A few people have stated that this kind of work has longer feedback loops, and that it would be hard to prove success before several years have passed. I want to push back against this by pointing out that it’s not so hard to create a slightly more structured roadmap, fund a few initiatives, and then simply report on that progress. Even that level of work and reporting would be better than nothing, and enough to show effective management.

Though people have mentioned above that DAOs and non-profits have transparency built into their structure, I’d prefer to get some of that transparency and reporting before funding an organization with $40M.

Strong agreement with @berlemeans surrounding his point #2. Additionally, even though I’m not an expert on costs here, I think his points on costs are worth noting.

Most importantly, I echo @rleshner’s concern regarding the precedent set here if this goes to formal proposal and passes a vote in the next week or so. To pass this so quickly despite how many specific concerns have been brought up would prove that the UNI treasury can be spent on short notice by any group with brand names and a directionally correct big idea.

Many people above are stating that this is the general kind of thing we should be funding, and then leaping to the conclusion that it’s time to fund this right now, before addressing the details. However, the details really matter here, and we want to get this right. If there were 3 separate groups all proposing the same thing, we’d obviously start comparing the details of their plans. But for some reason, since there’s only one proposal for this general idea, many have decided it’s time to pass it right away.

My sense from this thread is that everyone agrees this kind of committee is worth funding. In addition, everyone seems to agree that the members of this committee are some of the most qualified to do so. Therefore, it seems like the next step would be collaboratively hammering out some of these details before moving to a formal Yes/No vote.

With just a few more weeks of work to address the top concerns above and come up with a detailed plan that accounts for them, I’m confident we could get to a place where many of the No votes become Yes votes. But to pass this in the current state feels really premature, and detrimental to Uniswap governance by means of the precedents it sets.

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I totally agree with all the points you listed. The lack of clarity and effort on the OP´s side to adress them properly raises eyebrows and suspicion to say the least. But so far, the vote indicates the proposal would pass in a proper vote. So I wonder whats next? What will be the next big proposals that whales will push through? Perhaps it will allocate 50M UNI ASAP without proper clarity, rhyme or reason to some cause which benefits a wide variety of actors having Uniswap pay for it.

The saddest part about all of this is that the core idea of the proposal is good and valid, but the budget part is NOT. And it could be easily solved by having first a smaller amount of UNI allocated. When we see results, the governance can approve a bigger funding round…

I have an idea.

“Political defense” is a wrong category and it should never be about defending. We’re not fighting here. I think protocols should be inclusive of everyone and decisions should be done in a collaborative manner.

I propose making it a “Political discussion” and e.g. invite the members of the SEC to become the representatives of USA and participate in governance of Uniswap. Participate in the rightful governance process of Uniswap, that we have here in this very forum.

Why representatives of offchain governments are not posting their opinions here? They should.

Has anyone made sure that the 1M UNI allocated to a US-based non profit will not be taxed, leading to up to 350.000 UNI placed in the US GVT’s pocket? Why is an intermediary needed to just hold and re-allocate the funds? Why cannot UNISWAP fund lobbying and legal defense activities directly, upon proposal of a committee trusted by the Community and/or via its Grants?
I am not familiarized with US tax law, but have good experience with non profits in Europe, having helped dozens get instituted and properly registered. A quick look at the applicable legal framework, though, raises questions. Proxy Tax Tax Exempt Organization Fails to Notify Members that Dues Are Non Deductible Lobbying Political Expenditures | Internal Revenue Service
In my view, it would be optimal that any non profit related to Uniswap be rather “poor” and have an enhanced, but purely consultative and not decisive role about where expenses for political and legal defense go. Uniswap could then allocate sums directly where needed.
Political and legal defense are necessary. Including (and primarily) preventive political and legal work to protect DeFi from disproportionate interference and regulation. This is the only thing there seems to be consensus on.
Therefore a fund for an expert impact assessment of how this can be done in an optimal manner should precede the 1M Uni (or whatever sum) proposal for a non profit with a fixed BD which would attempt to influence “the right” regulation in the US (btw, not everyone agrees there should be any intense mobilisation to initiate -any- DeFi regulation at this point).

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edit: It seems my forum privileges have been elevated, so here is the link: https://twitter.com/lex_node/status/1400424404643979267

I am a cryptolawyer and think this proposal could represent a watershed for cryptolaw in, I hate to say it, a bad way. All the lawyers involved are great and have a true passion for DeFi and cryptolaw, but that is not enough. People need to ask tougher questions about this, and I don’t agree that the urgency of the legal threat should override critical thinking or discourage urgently trying to achieve similar ends with more decentralized means. There are a lot of great ideas in this thread about how to do that–these should be followed up on and of course should still include the great lawyers who are proposed to work through this non-profit.

I unfortunately cannot post links here (why is that?), but on twitter (@lex_node) I have pinned a thread that I think this community should consider re: evaluating this proposal. Yes, I am an outsider and have no skin in the game on UNI, but I have almost 100% of my skin in DeFi and this proposal purports to be about DeFi more generally. You can find my disclosure of conflicts of interest here-it includes holding SUSHI.

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Some commenters have rightly asked whether the situation is as urgent as the proposal describes. I think it is, and here are just a few recent developments over the last few months that have brought /will bring additional scrutiny to crypto generally and defi specifically. We are up against a lot:

  1. FATF Draft Updated Guidance dramatically expands the definition of a “virtual asset service provider” specifically to attempt to regulate defi"

  2. Brainerd’s comments on “digital private money” and CBDC

  3. Treasury/FinCEN’s midnight rulemaking that would have required custodial crypto businesses to KYC unhosted wallets

  4. Colonial pipeline hack fallout: congressional scrutiny (one congressman floated “declaring” crypto unconstitutional) and WSJ op ed / bloomberg op ed call for ban on crypto currencies (latest ransomeware attack yesterday will bring additional scrunity)

  5. Financial times articles: Uni mention: “German and US regulators tighten focus on booming crypto” // “The rise of crypto laundries: how criminals cash out of bitcoin

  6. The WSJ this morning: “DeFi Is Helping to Fuel the Crypto Market Boom—and Its Recent Volatility: Decentralized finance differs from traditional banks because there is no centralized system. It can be risky.

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I’d like to point out that most members of the proposed committee still have yet to participate in the discussion in this thread.

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One of the political committee’s proposed members has clarified that it will take 2 years to see results. I’d say 1, if a coordinated action with sufficient funds and committment is in place. But. Acting like in a few weeks things will be different if today the specific proposal is voted, is undermining the community’s intelligence. It is urgent to discuss the matter and take it seriously. Not to hastily decide on vague proposals for putting in place intermediaries for intermediaries -which requires huge and, up to the present, unjustified sums.

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how do we know these lawyers are not byzantine actors? or have other interests involved? when creating a system, its important to get it right. this “board” will have almost all the power to make decisions. what if they suck at these decisions? being a lawyer and creating policy are two separate beasts.

TBH it kinda feels like Hayden has been threatened in some form and he is pushing this.

@haydenadams - I understand you may be in a difficult position, why cant we “start small” w/ $1 million USD (which is not small by any means - no law firm on the planet requires a $1mm retainer to start)?

What part of @rleshner comments are not proper?

It seems like this is an attempt to re-invent the wheel to personally defend uniswap which I am actually totally fine with but should have direct contact w/ Coin Center first as they have the most experience w/ this. Do any of these lawyers have significant experience w/ effectively implementing crypto policy?

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This is yet another very good point which remains to be addressed…A person familiar with the matter should chip in because this is huge

A report about the allocation of funds on the part of those proposing the project, a “sample statute” to be commented on by the community, a tax expert’s opinion, as well as answers to several questions (I asked many in the -actual- consensus check, which have remained unanswered) should be given to the community. An expert report about what might be the impact on the value of Uni and on the situation of the community and its members, should be considered absolutely necessary before any such project passes. For instance, in some jurisdictions, entities funding non profits may have to declare their members. If that was happening in US too, the choice of a non profit for this work could be considered a huge gateway to control whats happening here. Anything that may affect our rights and obligations should be fully scrutinized. I really don’t understand the lightness with which this is being promoted so far. Last, If 1M uni can fly from Uniswap’s budget “just like that”, because a part of the community lobbied and have their way to impose stuff on the rest, I (and I guess many others too) might conclude that it “does not feel very decentralized here”, or even think this is exploitative, manipulative and unsafe, and fly away.

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Reading back over the responses. This comment by Robert is very telling considering Compound Labs General Counsel is on the board for this proposal:

  1. Jake Chervinsky , General Counsel, Compound Labs & Strategic Advisor, Variant Fund. Jake serves as general counsel at Compound Labs and as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University Law Center.

It sounds like there is a need for more clarity, which should have been laid out in the initial temperature check. Considering the heavy hitters from different DeFi project’s counsel (Aave and compound). Perhaps we should be asking for a “back to the drawing board” to law out more details, timelines, deliverables, and cost breakdown.

I also am finding it a bit confusing as it seems there are several forums going on at the same time for this topic, which is fragmenting the discussions into different places (i.e. dcinvestor’s comments in the other posting).

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@lex-node Most law school students take a class called “Corporations.”

The key innovation behind the corporate is the separation of ownership from control – i.e., the shareholders own the company, but the board and management directly control it.

This leads to the key problem you study in a law school corporations class: how do you regulate the actions of the board (and management) when they are not the owners of the company, and can potentially do things that help themselves, but screw the shareholders?

Usually, the ** bedrock principal is that the board should act on behalf of the owners. In fact, it has fiduciary duties to act that way under Delaware and most state corporate laws.**

Most of the case law you study revolves around this issue. For example, if the chairman of the board wants to take the company private, how do you set up the process? Or, if a member of the board wants the company to do a deal with a related party, how do you regulate that?

The usual answer is through hard and soft regulation, including forming a special committee that does not include the interested board member, securing fairness opinions from banks and accounting firms, and following a number of protective processes to prevent abuse.

For a governance token, this is probably supposed to play out with the members of the DAO or the management listening to what the governance token holders direct.

So, what is going on here?

[Removed picture of HLSBFI saying on Twitter that regulators won’t listen to token holders…and positioning themselves as who regulators will listen to]

What is my governance token worth …

… if an interested party can propose and lead the vote to take funds from the treasury?

… if the people who are directing the funds are opening saying the government will not listen to me - when they they are supposed to work on behalf of me, as a governance token holder?"

Let’s get real @haydenadams.

Does HLS Block Fi work for Uniswap governance token holders? Uniswap equity holders? Or for themselves?

How about after 1m Uni are drained from the Uniswap treasury and placed in a separate fund that none of us (including you) have any control over, and is proposed to be created with literally no governance?

This would stink to high heaven under Delaware corporate law. And HLSBFI surely knows this.

Why is it OK here? And what are my “governance” tokens worth?

My very honest answer is “not much” if a delegated voter and a block of interested parties can lead the charge to exit a big chunk of the treasury …

  • into a separate legal entity with no accountability to the governance token holders
  • pay themselves and their related parties salaries
  • hand out grants with no accountability to the project
  • pursue an agenda that they have EXPLICITLY stated is industry-wide (not related to the project)
  • openly state that the money will be spent to influence people who will not listen to our wants (which pretty directly implies they are not going to be acting on our behalf)
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There is an important distinction here - lobbying versus facing an enforcement action.

For lobbying, you can hire firms on retainer and push your policy agenda for $1m per year or less. Each firm will probably cost $50-100k per year (according to what I have seen elsewhere).

For an enforcement action, the sky’s the limit because the fines can be extremely high. However, for a project like Uniswap, you’d realistically just hire one or two law firms to create policies and procedures and to remediate the situation.

This would also cost no more than a few million. What would cost more than that are the fines.

These are mostly red herrings, @miller !

1 - FATF guidance largely seeks to regulate digital assets providers in ways that are similar to how it regulates people who handle USD cash. The latest developments have generally been seen as surprisingly favorable to crypto by many insiders.

2 - This is an issue, but it about crypto. Not about DeFi. So we are the tail wagging the dog.

3 - None of this has been implemented or is generally seen to be implemented quickly, and it is about crypto - not DeFi. Again, we are the tail wagging the dog.

4 - This has nothing to do with DeFi. It is also extremely unlikely that there will be a global ban on crypto and that has never realistically been considered by any US regulator

5 - Yet again, mostly about crypto and not DeFi

6 - Same as 5

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this is bizarre; the proposal is asking to trust 6 people with $40M worth of funds; of course their character is relevant

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Some clarification:

If you believe a person associated with a proposal is dishonest, lacks the claimed expertise, or has a conflict of interest - there would be a valid case to argue against the proposal on that ground. But you should have some very credible evidence to back the argument up.

Example: Individual X is not to be trusted because they were previously involved in a scam token.

What is not valid is attacking an individual’s character for an unrelated and (typically) emotionally-charged social issue.

Example: Individual X is not to be trusted because they previously voted in favor of a given abortion, climate change, immigration issue, etc.

I want everyone putting in a good faith effort to have a voice and be heard, so most moderation will be me directly messaging you if I feel it will be helpful. I will (very rarely) delete posts that are clearly not in good faith.

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I’m Marvin Ammori, the CLO of Uniswap Labs. Since other committee members have commented somewhere publicly now, I figured I would add my voice.

For background, I spent much of my early career as a lawyer fighting for internet freedom and a more decentralized web. I lived in DC for over a decade and was privileged to work on many of the signature internet freedom cases of the era, including the net neutrality fights, some privacy and encryption fights, and some of the copyright/web 2.0 fights. And, while 20/20 hindsight is strong, the truth is we could have lost many of those fights over the internet’s future and were overwhelmingly expected to. But we won most of them.

So I saw what it takes to win. In many of these campaigns, I would help quarterback, direct, and allocate funds and resources. I even worked alongside some of the legendary engineers who helped design the initial internet protocols and across party and national lines. I have worked on policy more than most lawyers and on a bigger stage. I have put in 10,000 hours (twice over) on shaping policy and educating policy makers usually against long odds. It doesn’t mean I know everything, but it does mean I learned at least a few things the hard way. And I try to apply that every day in what I do now alongside this incredible community.

A lot of policymaking is surprising, counterintuitive, and completely bizarre. I understand why some people are confused. I also understand why people, like Matt Corva at Consensys, who have devoted so much time over five years in the policy arena, strongly support the proposal.

I support the proposal and think others should. I am reassured for several reasons:

  • This money will be well-allocated. The concern over “too much” or “too little” money seems to really be a concern that money will somehow be wasted, either through incompetence or (some suggest) nepotism or worse. I know many of the people on the committee and I know they are well-suited to manage this process. There won’t be some mad dash to over-invest or misuse funds. They have expertise, are committed to the growth of this space as evidenced otherwise in their own careers, and are also bound by fiduciary obligations, which cannot be taken lightly (as these folks know). We live in a world of imperfect alternatives, but, if you are going to trust a group, I don’t think there is another group of people I would trust more to make these allocations. (If there is simply no group someone would trust, then that is a different point regarding structure and tactics.)

  • We are not at the “seed fund” stage for politics. We are more like at the “Series F” stage. For those who think that the size of the proposal alone suggests mismanagement, this is simply (a fraction) of what it costs to win. Politics is sometimes an adversarial game, much like sports or litigation. If you had to beat, say, the LA Lakers at home … you can’t do it on a $2 million dollar budget. There is no point fielding a team of amateurs that will definitely lose, so you have to go big or go home. The top trade association bosses make over $2M each year (it is pretty sickening but there is often much more at stake, and democracy is better than the alternatives). Many of the most persuasive lawyers who lead teams that win these fights earn more than the average professional athlete. The proposed fund here is actually much too small to hire many of those people, but it could support the hiring of more good, hungry junior talent and a few targeted big hires–as needed on specific topics for limited hours–to field a solid team that can win consistently over time. This team could cost-effectively educate policy makers so that the community does not have too many last-minute, rushed, fire-drill, major threats. There will still be some unexpected major threats, and rebuffing those is where much of the budget will go. That cannot be easily predicted. The “seed” stage time for funding crypto policy was long ago; I was a consultant on a project for Coin Center back in 2015 and I remember having the luxury of time and seed stage budgets.

  • There will be a full-time hire. Someone has suggested we should name a full-time staff member because the committee members are busy. This is a great point. This overhead is necessary and there will be a full-time staff hire for the 501(c)(4) to focus exclusively on this organization and grant proposals. There would be a process to vet, select, interview, and hire the best person for the role. Interviewing the best people, likely in DC, willing to leave their current employers … is not something that could be done publicly. But doing so is probably the best way to identify and select talent.

  • We should agree to move quickly. The industry has had a bit of a grace period at least in the US. The administration change, appointment process, and hiring have given everyone about a 4 month break since the last major battle in January. This relative quiet was a happenstance … things are not going to stay quiet. Now the new administration is settled in. If this committee were funded today, it would also have to spend weeks hiring an initial staff member, reviewing proposals, analyzing strategy, etc. so that these funds are allocated the most effective way by Fall 2021. So the sooner that process could start, the more likely the industry can get ahead of some issues.

  • All committee members are strongly aligned with the interests of the Defi industry. Regardless of strategic preferences and tactics, we are all on the same team and striving for a fairer, more accessible, safer future of finance. While the committee does not claim to represent the industry as a whole, the committee does include three head lawyers from some of the world’s leading Defi projects who think about and work to advance these issues every day with considerable real responsibility.

So to summarize:

  • If you had worried that 1M UNI is too much to allocate effectively in the policy education process … that’s unfortunately just not the case. If this were a sports match, our side would not even be fielding enough players. To support a winning team on this field, this budget is a great start.
  • If you had worried that the committee needs to prove they know how to allocate money with a small amount before being trusted with a multi-year grant and mission … you have better evidence than that. This group has demonstrated the necessary experience and expertise over many years. Plus, you simply can’t recruit busy people of this high caliber to join a committee with an ineffective, tiny amount of money. They would spend their time doing something else more effective than that committee.
  • If you simply oppose having a specific group of people allocate funds, and think that there is a better way to allocate these funds to the policy process, you may be right but I doubt it. I’ve been part of many dozens of different policy efforts, all with different organizational structures. Here, a dedicated group with expertise could move most competently, most cost-effectively, and just as transparently on cost without harming the process by leaking too much of the strategy. This is a plan that would work well. Maybe another plan would work marginally more effectively, but I have not seen people put forward or coalesce around a concrete plan for a novel political grant-making structure that solves every problem without creating others–nor a structure that has any precedent for success. No plan is perfect, and you can try to poke holes in any of them, but this plan has a good chance of working. To the extent ideas emerge for new forms of political organizing, activism, or coordination, this committee should fund at least some experimental policy tactics for anyone from the community who wants to apply.

All that said, I agree with many of the suggestions.

  • “Defi Defense Fund” does sound too defensive. I have been talking with the other committee members and we like the many suggestions to focus on education. We think that something like Defi Education Fund is much better. Open to better branding too.
  • We agree that frequent community updates on progress, grant allocation, tactics, etc. are essential. These updates would not only ensure trust, but will also keep the community informed on when and how they can lend their voice to the process. Ensuring that policy-makers are well informed goes beyond an “inside” game and requires the participation of many more people. It is important not to waste people’s time so that they get involved in ways that have the maximum impact, at the right time, reaching out to the right policy makers. We will provide updates and, where feasible, require grantees to do the same directly.
  • The committee should put out a detailed budget within 90 days of the proposal passing. Of course, budgets, projections, and 5-year plans often must be revised and amended. As Mike Tyson famously said, “Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth.” When there are surprise punches, as there so often have been in the policy space, we should let you know why and how funds will be reallocated to address them.
  • I agree that this Fund should protect the Uniswap protocol and educate policy-makers on its benefits. It can not be a slush fund at all, let alone for any other causes. But the Uniswap protocol stands on the shoulders of giants in a complicated web of composable code. Threats or misunderstandings about unhosted wallets, cryptocurrency, Ethereum, and decentralized finance protocols will impact the potential for the Uniswap protocol, so they must be considered. As a matter of strategy, much of the funding may go to supporting and educating policy makers about these lego pieces to protect the Uniswap protocol.
  • As noted above, I totally agree on a full-time hire.

I hope people find my views as useful as I have others’ and I look forward to continued discussion.

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We appreciate the hard work of @hlsbfi in bringing this proposal forward. We think it’s a good start, and wanted to offer some feedback that we think might enhance the idea further.

1. Crypto Native Approach. We agree with the policy objectives of the proposal. However we would encourage the community to consider other, more novel ways of achieving them. Rather than recreating the existing policy infrastructure (or indirectly funding it using the UNI treasury), we think this initiative has the potential to create something unique. In particular, something that is lacking from the current landscape and is uniquely enabled by the underlying technology. In other words, a more crypto native approach.

What would that look like? For starters, it would formally be instantiated as an onchain DAO, which at a minimum would provide better transparency, tooling, and interoperability with the rest of the DeFi ecosystem. But more important than its technical form, the project would also take on the more collaborative and community-focused ethos that characterizes DAOs and DeFi governance today. It would seek participation from community representatives of every major DeFi protocol. And it would build consensus from these representatives on key matters. We think this type of architecture would lend greater legitimacy to the organization’s decision making and allow it to more credibly speak on behalf of the broader DeFi community.

This “Policy DAO” could still elect leadership and engage in all of the same functions described in the proposal (just in a more transparent way). But it could also do things that existing industry groups (who lack this sort of community-level buy-in) frankly cannot do. For example, you could imagine it doing something like creating and publishing a set of best practices for new projects to follow. This could include things like security practices, code audits, financial reporting, disclosures, user safeguards, and so on. Many of these things are already done by the leading decentralized communities today (see the quarterly reports published by the Yearn and Maker communities as a great example). This would just be a way to formalize those practices a bit further and publish them for everyone to benefit from.

But critically, rather than being dictated by a small few, these practices would be sourced from the participant developer communities, deliberated up through the governance process, and published on an open-source forum like Github for everyone to read. An initiative like this would go a long way towards demonstrating to policymakers a good-faith effort at industry self-governance. It could also meaningfully level-up the development and governance practices of new projects and communities entering the space.

Point being, this is merely an example of something enabled by this type of cryptonative model - there are undoubtedly others. We think the proposal should lean into these aspects, rather than shy away from them. Doing so will allow it to add something both valuable and new to the policy landscape.We’re happy to help the community brainstorm ideas and build an architecture that embodies these principles.

2. Take an Inclusive Approach. Building on the prior point, the strongest form of this initiative would be one that has buy-in from all of the protocol communities that it purports to represent. This doesn’t mean the full list needs to be defined up front, but there could be ways to condition/stagger the disbursal of funds on obtaining some minimum degree of buy-in across the industry. We suspect there would be broad interest from other communities throughout DeFi. Assuming that’s right, this should be brought forward as a coordinated effort across a number of communities to start, and not a unilateral one. We’re happy to help drive those efforts.

3. Brighten the Message. Finally, the initiative should take on a much more positive message! The current proposal feels negative and defensive. For example, referring to it as the “DeFi Defense Fund” or a “political defense organization” is likely to engender hostility with policymakers and undermine those engagement efforts. We would also recommend striking all the references to “political lobbying” and things of that nature. The focus from the get go should be on the positive aspects of DeFi and the ways it’s an improvement over the legacy financial system. This is ultimately a messaging point, but it will go a long way towards determining how the group is perceived. We can also help brainstorm ideas here as well.

We look forward to working with the community on these points.

Jeff Amico
a16z

For further important information, please see [https://a16z.com/disclosures/].

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Hi all,

I’m loving the thoughtful discussion on this topic. Overall, it seems like there’s fairly strong consensus that Uniswap should fund outreach and advocacy. Protocol participants face an uncertain and potentially hostile legal environment, and educating policymakers could help avoid damaging conflicts down the road.

But it seems there’s less consensus over the amount of funds requested, and the oversight structure. The 1 million UNI requested would represent the largest DAO expense to date, and after approval Uniswap governance would have no direct control over the use of funds. Uniswap governance could approve incremental funding in smaller amounts, but there’s some concern that a minimally scoped initiative would be less effective or risk running out of money before fulfilling its mandate.

One potential solution is to add an oversight mechanism to the distributed UNI, allowing governance or an appointed admin to revoke funding if necessary. At Tally, we’ve been working on a project funded through Uniswap grants to enable this sort of direct on-chain oversight: Safeguard.

How it works:

  1. Funds are placed into a Safeguard timelock contract, controlled by an executive multisig.
  2. The multisig signers (eg potentially the committee members listed above) would submit a transaction to transfer a portion of funds out of the timelock - these funds could be sent to the organization’s legal entity account at an exchange to be converted to fiat. At the same time, they will communicate details and justification for the transaction to the community.
  3. If the transaction is suspicious, goes against community sentiment, or has insufficient information, a guardian mechanism can cancel the transaction while it is queued in the timelock. The guardian can also revoke funding and authority from the multisig entirely if needed.
  4. Assuming it is not cancelled during the timelock period, the transaction is executed and funds are sent to the intended parties.

This mechanism is highly configurable, and can support a variety of approval flows to suit the needs of governance. I think Safeguard could offer the best of both worlds for committee funding:

  • Optimistic governance - additional funding tranches are approved/released by default unless an objection is raised
  • Concrete oversight - governance can block transactions or retrieved remaining funds if the committee loses community support

I’m happy to answer any questions, and look forward to further discussion on this important topic! :slight_smile:

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