October 2024 Voting Updates
[Non-Constitutional] Whitelist Infura Nova Validator
Vote: Whitelist Infura Validator
Type: Snapshot
We voted For this proposal—no reason not to support this since Infura has been supporting Arbitrum for a long time, is a well-known infra provider, and has great reliability as per their uptime stat.
Research on context and retention
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
Although some folks had privacy concerns, the data is at the end of the day are public and could yield interesting findings. It would be a different story if there was a more explicit profit motive associated with this—but there doesn’t seem to be. We also appreciate the AF for not making a decision regarding this without consultation of DAO members, since some may consider the data public but personal.
An EIP-4824 powered daoURI for Arbitrum DAO
Vote: For – Use ENS txt records
Type: Snapshot
We just wanted to provide transparency regarding why we voted For this proposal. The reasoning essentially stands the same from our previous comment on this post but is updated based on proper procedure :
“A go-to source of truth is a great idea. We are in favor of setting up a platform like this. At Uniswap, we’ve had experience with managing a couple of ENS subdomains under Uniswap.eth. This was initially set in place in order to give additional use grants to certain deployers who would request the DAO for the ability to deploy Uniswap v3 contracts onto a new EVM. This was only required while there was a BSL in place. Since April of last year, we continued similar record management to have a source of truth regarding the “real” Uniswap v3 contracts on each of the 23 chains that we’re deployed on. This has helped from a security and standardization standpoint. Therefore, exploring record management such as this for Arbitrum is beneficial as well.
Unfortunately, due to issues surrounding the procedure, we voted against this proposal. We will vote For a revised proposal though.”
LTIPP Retroactive Community Funding Selections
Vote: Do not fund
Type: Snapshot
We decided not to fund this initiative since we do not believe that we have the understanding nor view of the contributions the parties on the poll had on the LTIPP. These decisions are more prudently made by members who were in closer proximity to the stated parties. However, we are not against the concept of retroactive funding as a whole—it is too common that many contributors in the space don’t attain their fair share of compensation for their work.
Establishing a DAO Events Budget for 2025
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
Given the bit of disorder that came from multiple event-based proposals in the past couple of months, we welcome this proposal. Hack Humanity’s Bangkok proposal, for instance, came last minute and had to go through a formal governance process before having the capital in their pocket to the venue, etc. Last-minute event planning should ideally have been addressed after the one-off EthCC proposal. This preset budget for 2025 will ideally help with organization and foresight.
(V2) Arbitrum Research & Development Collective
Vote: Funded with 1.73M USDC + Council
Type: Snapshot
Our team voted for the $1.73M funding option + council. We are appreciative of the work that the ARDC conducted during v1 and are therefore willing to continue allocating resources to their efforts. Ascertaining the amount of budget to allocate for the program is not the simplest task without delving deeper into details, so we chose the least expensive option. This was also in part motivated by the new retainer model. Ideally, a retainer leads to more prudent capital allocation, which could justify minimizing the overall required budget.
GCP Council Re-Confirmation Vote for Tim Chang
Vote: Reconfirm Tim Chang to GCPC
Type: Snapshot
Although we don’t directly know Tim and John, we voted to reconfirm both of them based on the second-hand information that we have reviewed. Regardless of this decision, we still hold skepticism regarding the GCP as a whole and would like to see updates regarding clear progress. Since so much capital has been allocated to this, it wouldn’t be wise to not place competent individuals at the helm of the program.
GCP Council Re-Confirmation Vote for John Kennedy
Vote: Reconfirm John Kennedy to GCPC
Type: Snapshot
[Non-Constitutional] Funds to Bolster Foundation’s Strategic Partnerships Budget
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
We are in favor of this budget, albeit massive, needed for the continuous function of the teams strategies.
ArbitrumDAO strategic “Off-site” (online) updated proposal
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
We are voting in line with our snapshot support; looking forward to this online offsite.
Enhancing Multichain Governance: Upgrading RARI Governance Token on Arbitrum
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
The RARI token being upgraded makes sense and continuing our support.
[Non-Constitutional] Arbitrum DAO Delegate Incentive Program
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
We are voting in line with our snapshot vote, v1.5 should be a much more holistic approach to this topic.
Fund the Stylus Sprint
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
We are in favor of the new team members added to this proposal and are excited to see the success of the Sprint.
[Non-Constitutional] Arbitrum Token Swap Pilot Program
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
We voted For this proposal since 1) it’s a pilot program that will help iron out some of the specific operational aspects through trial 2) the practice of token swaps, done well, can be a means for effectively aligning protocols within an ecosystem, while simultaneously acting as a means of capital investment for the purpose of a direct monetary return.
Although the premise of alignment based on holding the native token of another protocol can be questioned, we believe that it has solid grounding. The lockup term here matters, of course. That’s why we would’ve liked to see a longer period where both parties are subject to a lockup, and once that cliff is reached, a gradual vesting process.
Each counterparty should also be treated differently. A token swap with GMX vs one with Thales would be very different, not only due to the relative size of each party but also based on their relative contributions to the Arbitrum ecosystem. In effect, the council is in place for the sake of underwriting, and even if this process could be relegated to the DAO, we believe that such processes are best conducted under the purview of a council. The future management of this capital is up for discussion, and in our opinion, is a point to discuss as soon as possible but need not be a blocker for this trial. It is a conversation that can occur while the due diligence for swaps occurs—more than likely we won’t be selling off our swapped treasury assets immediately due to contractual lockups.
There have also been concerns about swapping tokens with projects that lack potential upward trajectory. While this may be the case, token swaps are very much a combination of effective portfolio allocation and strategic alignment. Traditional companies, for instance, often take controlling interest in firms that they want to collaborate with, often to attain higher degrees of ownership across the value chain. In similar fashion, Arbitrum would be able to vote on the proposals of these protocols to ensure their alignment. The degree of governance that Arb DAO can partake in with these small DAOs is a fair concern.
To the portfolio allocation point, the amount of the swap would of course be lower for more risky partners. A protocol like GMX would likely warrant a larger swap due to their tried and tested nature—plus, the recent buyback+distribution program that they’ve been running only brings more value to GMX token holders. Alignment should also not be the primary impetus for token swaps, although not entirely disregarded, of course. This would mean analyzing projects that aren’t exactly Arbitrum native, which could also be a prudent practice from a pure investment return perspective. More blue chip assets from multi-chain protocols would benefit Arb’s treasury by ideally reducing its overall volatility, especially since smaller cap Arbitrum native tokens would only increase the Arb treasury’s beta to the $ARB token itself. Swaps with larger protocols can also help Arb attain a stake in the governance of notable DAOs.
September Delegate Incentive Program
The UADP received its fifth delegate incentive from the Arbitrum DAO’s Delegate Incentive Program.
A total of 4,000.04 ARB was sent to our multisig (0x8326D18edfC50B4335113C33b25116ec268FF3fE). This amount is based on a couple of criteria: snapshot participation, onchain participation, communicating rationale behind the votes, and productive forum conversation, based on the quality of the feedback provided on the forums.
This first initiative is a 6 month period with goals to renew it continuously. We are splitting these tokens in the following manner:
- 50% of the ARB stays with the UADP multisig for the sake of increasing the longevity of this program with the goal of one day self being self funded.
- 50% is split evenly among the two UADP contributors