July 2024 Voting Updates
Approval of STEP committee recommendations
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
We have no complaints regarding these recommendations–it’s exciting to see the DAO diversify into these more traditional vehicles. We also feel that the team should have more leeway in the future when deciding these, so we don’t find it necessary to push this through a Snapshot vote (although it helps with visibility). All this, of course, hinges on effective and transparent communication regarding the progression of this initiative. It would therefore be nice to have the “We’ll also be writing up a lessons learnt post, for future guidance in running a STEP program” post sooner rather than later.
[Non-Constitutional] - Subsidy Fund Proposal from the ADPC
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
In similar reasoning to our snapshot vote, we are in favor for this subsidy fund proposal
[NON-CONSTITUTIONAL] Pilot Phase: Arbitrum Ventures Initiative
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
In similar reasoning to our snapshot vote, in addition to more clarity on reporting and a relatively smaller budget, we are in favor of the pilot phase for this proposal.
Improving Predictability in Arbitrum DAO’s Operations
Vote: Improving Predictability, Abstain, Against, Predictability, Approval Process
Type: Snapshot
We are a fan of the calendar idea, but do not think the delegate approval idea of 4 large delegates to give their stamp of approval before moving to snapshot is the most effective way in going about future operations.
Pilot for a Questbook Jumpstart fund for problem definition and DAO improvement
Vote: Abstain
Type: Snapshot
We understand the desire for there to be a more effective process behind incentivizing groups to create proposals. It’s unfortunate when an idea is put forth, that took numerous weeks or even months to iterate, and ends up being rejected, leading to no monetary compensation for such efforts. But compensating people to work on proposals without a clear way to measure success is a tricky task. Typically, the success metric is if the proposal passes or fails a vote. This also presents an additional adverse incentive for people to work on projects without having an explicit goal of seeing it through all the way to a successful onchain vote.
It’s often the case that the rejection of a proposal is emblematic of other issues. For instance, a proposal may be proposed at the wrong time–the DAO may not be mature enough to handle a given task. A proposal may simply not be unrealistic or overly ambitious. For example, the M&A initiative could’ve failed a vote even though it took months of effort to curate. Therefore, @Bernard & co. proposed to conduct a research initiative as a precursor to deploying funds. They overcame the funding issue by narrowing the scope from implementation to research. They also worked with the community, conducting numerous calls and reports. Same goes for the ventures initiative. In other words, if a proposal fails, it’s usually because the prosper presented something that is not right for the DAO, or the proposer simply didn’t work intimately enough with the community. If these aspects aren’t completed, then there shouldn’t be compensation.
All this being said, we do think some sort of bounty system could be present for accomplishing certain tasks. Therefore, we are voting abstain for this proposal. There is likely a better way of addressing the given problem statement. The DAO consistently has aspects that need to be developed, and much of the talent faces the cold start problem of even starting the research. Optimism is perhaps a decent DAO to look at regarding smaller scope missions.
Gaming Catalyst Program (GCP) Council Voting
Vote: Coinflipcanada, Devan, Greg, Sam
Type: Snapshot
We divided out voting power evenly among the following four candidates, aiming to allocate evenly across those who have proven to be strong representatives for Arb DAO and individuals who have gaming industry experience. coinflipcanada has demonstrated his valuable contributions in both the LTIPP and GCP processes. thedevanshmehta has been instrumental in leading the STEP initiative for diversifying the DAO’s treasury into RWAs. Greg (JamesLawton) has an impressive background in the gaming world, having worked for Sony, Xbox, and Activision–and is now in blockchain gaming. sam has a strong background in the marketing and growth sector of the gaming world, having recently worked on global marketing campaigns for games like Overwatch.
Entropy Advisors: Exclusively Working With Arbitrum DAO
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
We are voting For this proposal due to the need for DAOs, especially those behind an entire ecosystem of applications, to invest more time and capital in operations. Entropy’s leading team has a strong track record in working with DAOs and conducting intimate due diligence on various protocols. At the end of the day, if Entropy can help minimize net costs, including the costs paid out to Entropy, then this partnership is a net positive. Full-time contributions to a DAO are not very common, and there will likely be a need for more immersed individuals contributing to DAOs–especially if the DAO would like to over time become less reliant on a singular Foundation. We’re curious to see if this proposal prompts similar teams to apply for such partnerships. Exclusivity to a particular DAO is also uncommon. Many paid contributors aren’t able to run their businesses if they don’t have diversity across numerous ecosystems–which could create incentive misalignment.
There are aspects of the proposal that we have reservations regarding, however. The list of previous proposals that the team has proposed assumedly took three people maximum to conduct. A team of 10 people does sound a bit overkill. Employees are expensive to manage. Perhaps it’s better to hire 2-3 new people, perhaps focused more on the technical and data analytics side. That would round out the team pretty well, while prioritizing quality over quantity. Specialized expertise can be consulted on an ad-hoc basis, and the Entropy team can always leverage the Arb community for attaining opinions and perspectives on certain proposals. This lean setup would potentially cut some of the overhead. The whole legal, tax, etc side of this proposal is currently one of the justifications for the large budget. It’s questionable if the DAO should be covering these entity formation and overhead costs.
Furucombo’s Misuse of Funds
Vote: FOR - Ban Furucombo from the Arb
Type: Snapshot
We voted to ban Furucombo. If a project receives tens of thousands of dollars from the DAO, there is no reason for unsatisfactory comms and reporting. The STIP bridge itself was rejected due to Furucombo’s lack of reporting. The sheer amount of time it took for the team to respond to this request demonstrates a lack of decorum. Even if the team isn’t officially banned, they’ll struggle to attain funding from the DAO in the future due to reputation issues. Instituting an official ban should disincentivize other teams from committing similar infringements. We agree with other delegates that there should be a more clear means by which the AF/ DAO hold entities responsible.
Change Arbitrum Expansion Program to allow deployments of new Orbit chains on any blockchain
Vote: FOR - Any blockchain network
Type: Snapshot
We are in support of expanding the deployment of Orbit chains to alternative networks. This is an opportunity for Arbitrum to increase its presence on numerous other ecosystems, while simultaneously attaining more sources of revenue. The success of a couple of these new Orbit chains could amount to decent inflows–although this is currently a premature assumption.
Yes, Arbitrum is Eth-aligned, but broadening the use of Orbit does not necessarily cannibalize the success of the EVM. It’s not like restricting Orbit development to Eth is materially increasing the competitive moat for Ethereum. The signaling here is simply that using Arbitrum’s technology is a ubiquitous resource, regardless where you decide to build–and for using this framework, you pay Arbitrum a cut. Such openness is the case with various other competitors. If the magnitude of pull that Orbit technology had towards drawing builders to Ethereum, then this would be a different conversation. As it currently stands, the impact Orbit has in terms of bringing value to Ethereum is not significant enough to justify forgoing development on alternative networks. We stand by this perspective as long as the Arb Foundation doesn’t largely divert their attention and resources to helping devs spin up Orbit chains on other networks. If the overhead related to expansion is too large, which the AF should be transparent about, then the DAO should revisit this topic.
June Delegate Incentive Program
The UADP received its fourth delegate incentive from the Arbitrum DAO’s Delegate Incentive Program.
A total of 4337 ARB was sent to our multisig (0x8326D18edfC50B4335113C33b25116ec268FF3fE). This amount is based on a couple of criteria: snapshot participation, onchain participation, communicating rationale behind the votes, and productive forum conversation, based on the quality of the feedback provided on the forums.
This first initiative is a 6 month period with goals to renew it continuously. We are splitting these tokens in the following manner:
- 50% of the ARB stays with the UADP multisig for the sake of increasing the longevity of this program with the goal of one day self being self funded.
- 50% is split evenly among the two UADP contributors
We will communicate future monthly delegate “scores” and incentives in this thread going forward.