# Uniswap-Arbitrum Delegate Program (UADP) Communication Thread **URL:** \ **Category:** Delegation Pitch\ **Created:** [October 28, 2023, 7:09pm UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-arbitrum-delegate-program-uadp-communication-thread/22185 "2023-10-28T19:09:34Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 2
**Author:** ![AbdullahUmar](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/abdullahumar/32/7920_2.png) [@AbdullahUmar](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/AbdullahUmar)\ **Post date:** [March 4, 2025, 1:54am UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-arbitrum-delegate-program-uadp-communication-thread/22185/24 "2025-03-04T01:54:23Z")
# February 2025 Voting Updates ### [Approve the Nova Fee Sweep Action](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xbd77b4faf99e06c7b4117e5dafaf5bb8f873bcffbb5c9d414a7ff745b6849f3a) Vote: For Type: Snapshot This is a really straightforward vote.It would recover all of the historical fees for the DAO and make the fee collection going forward a lot simpler. Additionally, some quality of life improvements as well, easy yes. ### [Non-Constitutional: Stable Treasury Endowment Program 2.0](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/13323456481927947871314500108227684550647495448005726995657704713229313956489?govId=eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4) Vote: For Type: Onchain Our two initial concerns with this proposal regarding its purview and the soundness regarding investing in more t-bills have been addressed and we are satisfied with the adjustments/responses. We are voting in line with our snapshot vote. ### [OpCo: A DAO-adjacent Entity for Strategy Execution](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/41351298371775353090222506531903916823291804644712693824312064183457809617851?govId=eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4) Vote: For Type: Onchain For a while, we have been fans of the OpCo. There are a couple of minor questions but overall, we are in favor of the vision and are voting in line with our snapshot vote. ### [Arbitrum D.A.O. Domain Allocator Offerings) Grant Program - Season 3](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/47215139570733026393508270943324710379923699871435188004224569883226292800465?govId=eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4) Vote: For Type: Onchain In line with our snapshot vote, we voted For this proposal due to the positive impact that the previous two seasons. Since Orbit is a vertical with paramount importance, its increased attention during season 3 is good to see. ### [Request to Increase the Stylus Sprint Committee’s Budget](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x45513bb63946582432afa7213bcb2677e877dabbd5722210efd5eaf45797031c) Vote: For Type: Snapshot Increasing a budget continually for programs, typically, is a net negative. Budgets are inherently meant to restrict the amount of funding allocated to given initiatives. But unlike most circumstances, we have decided to make an exception in this scenario due to the clear importance of Stylus on Arbitrum’s competitiveness. ### [Arbitrum Growth Circles Event Proposal](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xab1a7ff1a294882315f3beaa77fa0d4b2ec68633792046b941714108209ce737) Vote: Against Type: Snapshot We’d like to wait until the direction and results of the AVI program are formally assessed and completed. Until then, introducing this program feels a bit premature. Sure, there are aspects of this that have merit, and it’s a program that we would like to see put into place. But the specifics are not quite concrete, and the online nature of the program may not bring sufficient traction. This is partly why it seems the KPIs aren’t as clear/attractive. If the budget were to be reduced once AVI work is complete, we’re open to revisiting this initiative. ### [[CONSTITUTIONAL] AIP: ArbOS Version 40 Callisto](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x7cc26491a070c74c1a4ec5a9892571d31eb690015936a35b52c0d3a97bd5497f) Vote: For Type: Snapshot This was a straightforward Yes vote for us since the noted upgrades allow Arbitrum to keep up to date with innovations occuring on Ethereum. ### [Arbitrum Audit Program](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xebbcad364ae7f02797b9cd7f30c668907d479d4bb5ba7f5d775849822297a01d) Vote: For Type: Snapshot Higher degrees of efficiency can be feasibly achieved if functions such as audits can be brought in-house under the purview of the Arbitrum Foundation/OCL. Although we still believe that there are critical initiatives and vendors that should be more formally elected by the DAO and externalized to 3rd party teams, we believe that this program works well if made more “centralized.” If the ADPC would be using the AF’s experience anyways, it only makes sense from a resource allocation perspective to allow for AF to have closer control over the auditing program. ## January Delegate Incentive Program ​The UADP has not yet received its January delegate incentive from the Arbitrum DAO’s Delegate Incentive Program—apparently due to Safe issues. We will update the summed compensation for January and February in our March forum post. ---
**Author:** ![Juanbug](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/juanbug/32/9251_2.png) [@Juanbug](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/Juanbug)\ **Post date:** [March 28, 2025, 9:22pm UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-arbitrum-delegate-program-uadp-communication-thread/22185/25 "2025-03-28T21:22:51Z")
# March 2025 Voting Updates ### [TMC Recommendation](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xc37793b67f39a6af9e9434003205b1d9b67dd6f75638329045257be823da4f18) Vote: Deploy Both Strategies, Only Deploy Stable Strategy, Only Deploy ARB Strategy, Deploy Nothing, Abstain Type: Snapshot We are in favor of both strategies at this current point in time and think it’s both worth exploring. When distinguishing the difference between the two, we are in preference of the Stable only strategy as from a DAO perspective, we think long term a more stable allocated treasury and strategy will play off better for longevity. ### [[CONSTITUTIONAL] - Adopt Timeboost + Nova Fee Sweep](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/14881197137069494959448952699217598923721993392617887469969318742509097999570?govId=eip155:42161:0xf07DeD9dC292157749B6Fd268E37DF6EA38395B9) Vote: For Type: Onchain Voting in line with our snapshot votes, this is a necessary fundamental upgrade and we look forward to the new revenue generation mechanisms. ### [[NON-CONSTITUTIONAL] Arbitrum Onboarding V2: A Governance Bootcamp](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/41764616447638715300612914863093416410063619332654034338488569044333128121381?govId=eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4) Vote: For Type: Onchain While there are some new concerns, we are still overall in support and think this could bring in a substantial amount of new users and governance participants. ### [[NON-CONSTITUTIONAL] Arbitrum Audit Program](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/107606727309922720763027677505427395647796047780305505879344344641224024948240?govId=eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4) Vote: For Type: Onchain After the feedback incorporation, we are in favor of the Audit Program passing and look forward to new projects building on top of Arbitrum! ### [[CONSTITUTIONAL] Proposal: For Arbitrum DAO to register the Sky Custom Gateway contracts in the Router](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xdb22a77942eddfea9c826790ac03c3e54a34716c0a9bde846399cffe6046d256) Vote: For Type: Snapshot There’s not much reason to vote against this proposal. Without the need for allocating any funds towards this initiative, it makes it an easy Yes vote. We are in favor of further integrating a strong protocol like Sky into the ecosystem so that USDC adoption on Arb does not fall behind relative to Ethereum mainnet and Base. Additionally, the process for these bridge and router proposals, like was the case with Rari, should be better streamlined by the DAO. The current process is unnecessarily cumbersome. ### [GMC’s Preferred Allocations (7,500 ETH)](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xf9fd09839ad10b0bb16c97a1cc4618270ed4145a38561da35ac4afe84516a107) Vote: For, Deploy Capital Type: Snapshot The three chosen strategies in this proposal make sense from a risk-adjusted standpoint. For an initial tranche of this program, using Lido, Aave, and Fluid are strong choices that steepen Arbitrum’s relationship with well-known and trusted Eth protocols. We respect the decision to not dive directly into more risky strategies like LRTs or use leverage which would require active management. Speaking of risk curves, we believe that allocations to arb-native protocols, apart from larger ones like maybe Camelot, was a good choice. The mandate of the Growth Management track was to allocate ETH in a straightforward and secure manner. Hence, utilizing larger protocols is prudent. Later, we can add arb-native protocols. Let’s get our base set first. ### [2025 Security Council Nominee Selection](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/council/security-council) We allocated the entirety of our voting power to Hari (CEO @ Spearbit / Cantina). Due to Hari’s background in working with large clients like Coinbase and Uniswap, along with his technical expertise, we believe he is a good candidate to move into the next round of elections. ## February Delegate Incentive Program ​The UADP received December delegate incentive from the Arbitrum DAO’s new Delegate Incentive Program this month. A total of 7,277.79 ARB was sent to our multisig (0x8326D18edfC50B4335113C33b25116ec268FF3fE). This amount is based on a couple of criteria: snapshot participation, onchain participation, communicating rationale behind the votes, and productive forum conversation, based on the quality of the feedback provided on the forums. ---
**Author:** ![AbdullahUmar](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/abdullahumar/32/7920_2.png) [@AbdullahUmar](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/AbdullahUmar)\ **Post date:** [April 30, 2025, 9:05pm UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-arbitrum-delegate-program-uadp-communication-thread/22185/26 "2025-04-30T21:05:50Z")
# April 2025 Voting Updates ### [[Non-constitutional] ARB Incentives: User Acquisition for dApps & Protocols](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x7689f957c8cc37e991c7bed0f1d3dd3f6024a921b0bfbae5c897a09ab45c538b) Vote: Against Type: Snapshot We are generally in support of exploring ways for teams to institute more off-chain and traditional methods for acquiring users. In hindsight, supplementing the STIP/LTIPP with a marketing budget would have made sense. It’s important for dapps to define their distribution channels, along with the funnel pipeline from a user seeing a paid advertisement of X, for example, and being converted to deposit in a lending protocol or liquidity pool—this is superior to simply disclosing one’s onchain distribution strategy. However, all that being said, we do not think that this initiative should go forward at this present time. This should be supplemented with a future version of an incentive program, except this time around, while also incorporating effective off-chain user acquisition strategies. ### [OpCo – Oversight and Transparency Committee (OAT) Elections](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xb422848b0f53f9077444b922d553618e331f9abe7539ae4566ff84364d0fbd3c) Vote: Frisson, Marc Zeller, Chris Cameron (Paper): ⅓ each Type: Snapshot Our voting power was evenly allocated across the above three candidates. Since we foresaw AJ and Patrick already getting elected, we wanted to distribute our voting power to candidates other than them to make our vote more impactful. Having worked with Frisson in the past on multiple projects, and seeing him contribute to Arbitrum for a handful of years now, gave us confidence in electing him. Then, to balance the scales, we selected Paper and Marc as the other two candidates due to both of their candid and transparent approaches to DAO management. We respect their opinions and openness to call out issues when they arise. ### [TMC Stablecoin Recommendation](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xdd38e103e337b9e02a9d9ac73c2587db5be6cfb46506e13c0e897f7331895cf4) Vote: YES, Deploy Stablecoin Strategy Type: Snapshot Having been proponents of a strong stablecoin strategy from the start, we are keeping in line with that perspective, voting in favor of this proposal. Risk seems to have been addressed inherently within the strategies themselves, with decent yield attached to the total 15M ARB bucket, along with increased diversification across the select three vendors. Kpk, Avantagrade, and Gauntlet are all teams we’ve collaborated with before and have high confidence in their ability to deliver on their promises. The only downside here, of course, is that ARB needs to be sold. ### [TMC ARB Recommendation](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x9d13c56f911796a578812959f775092b3644901be17738a2d41c516d8a8f2e9b) Vote: Abstain Type: Snapshot Although we voted in favor of the stablecoin strategy, we opted to abstain on the ARB recommendation. There are benefits to strategies like covered calls, and we do like Myso generally speaking. However, right now, from a timing perspective, we are more comfortable with simply using a more vanilla stablecoin strategy and then revisiting the ARB strategies recommended in this proposal more towards a market reversal. We don’t think it’s the best idea to sell/earn yield on this ARB in this unpredictable environment. Our encouragement would be to look for alternative strategies in the meantime, perhaps those that are also cheaper in terms of fees. Again, we are happy to revisit this structure during different market conditions, sticking just to the stable strategy for now. ### [2025 Security Council Nominee Selection](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/council/security-council) We allocated our voting power to Certora and Michael Lewellin. We have worked extensively and seen great output from both in the past and believe they will continue to do a great job going into the future. ## March Delegate Incentive Program ​The UADP did not receive any rewards for the month of March. ---
**Author:** ![Juanbug](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/juanbug/32/9251_2.png) [@Juanbug](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/Juanbug)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2025, 5:12am UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-arbitrum-delegate-program-uadp-communication-thread/22185/27 "2025-06-01T05:12:35Z")
# May 2025 Voting Updates ### [Approval of STEP 2 Committee’s Preferred Allocations](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xd67d17db3bd230b163ce1f791d8712812446bced14ef2de875fd01ab3e2be3d6) Vote: For Type: Snapshot The committee’s preferred allocations are understandable and we think the logic is valid. Voting to approve their recommendations. ### [[Non-consitutional]: Top-up for Hackathon Continuation Program](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xbb7500b713ccf4eff3f2dcb61e3c9d8db5ed5628a4b2f891656a0c0de98907bd) Vote: Yes to Both Type: Snapshot Topping up the HCP and Leftover funds to the TMX is understandable and we think both should occur. This follows the spirit of the prior approved proposals and we believe the asl is very reasonable. ### [The Watchdog: Arbitrum DAO’s Grant Misuse Bounty Program](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/28485587559812799913134094629469849411398475232393607771326861344548198896843?govId=eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4) Vote: For Type: Onchain Implementing the misuse bounty setup is a beneficial move to bolster the integrity of the Arbitrum DAO’s grant allocations. By incentivizing the community to participate in oversight, it can help reduce profligate spending and utilization of funds, especially those that may be hard to track. With a DAO as large as Arbitrum, it’s certainly difficult to keep a close eye on everything that’s happening. Adding an incentive for folks to flag issues is therefore helpful. ### [DeFi Renaissance Incentive Program (DRIP)](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x0b62de171fbff7a81833f9ebb44b9747189264d7a2cf95e3446223b1c413d2b0) Vote: For Type: Snapshot The incentive freeze period has lasted long enough in our opinion. Although ARB price has since not recovered, we believe that it’s important to explore effective and prudent means by which activity persists and even increases on Arbitrum. The more goal-specific approach that Entropy laid out makes sense to us. This is more akin to the grant programs that Optimism gives out, where specific, yet wide enough, incentive programs are prescribed to a select group of grant recipients. We must also disclose that our team represents Uniswap DAO and are therefore compelled to vote in favor of this proposal, as it will allow us to facilitate further volume on Uniswap v4 on Arbitrum. This relationship, we believe, will be symbiotic for both Uniswap and Arb as it will increase the proliferation of hooks on the L2. ### [[Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x2d4089d72617eb137d6ee7ab9ae9efbe3cd1e0fcff48df24b926ce6259b734d3) Vote: For Type: Snapshot We supported this proposal, albeit with a degree of reluctance. Quorum is something that ideally should not be tampered with much. The reason for increased voting difficulty based on higher votable supply is a feature—not a bug. Dynamic quorums and treasury delegations are band aid solutions. However, the quorum margin erosion over the past couple of months has been so drastic that we feel compelled to see the existing quorum reduced for the sake of being able to pass important proposals. Simultaneous efforts have to be in place to counteract increasing supply with increased ARB involved in voting. We should optimize for the long-term. ### [[CONSTITUTIONAL] AIP: ArbOS Version 40 Callisto](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/13108804573775967668959825241666341617107666532012387058509418598838035461528?govId=eip155:42161:0xf07DeD9dC292157749B6Fd268E37DF6EA38395B9) Vote: For Type: Onchain We voted in favor of this proposal as it allow Arbitrum One and Nova to keep up to date in concert with Ethereum’s Pectra upgrade. ## April Delegate Incentive Program ​The UADP did not receive any rewards for the month of April. ---
**Author:** ![AbdullahUmar](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/abdullahumar/32/7920_2.png) [@AbdullahUmar](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/AbdullahUmar)\ **Post date:** [June 30, 2025, 11:03pm UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-arbitrum-delegate-program-uadp-communication-thread/22185/28 "2025-06-30T23:03:32Z")
# June 2025 Voting Updates ### [Adjust the Voting Power of the Arbitrum Community Pool & Ratify the Agentic Governance Pivot](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x9ea3f5ef5b6c838ffc24430bb927baa13bf25dcf5f444358e89f0958bb41a5e7) Vote: Reduce delegation to 100k Type: Snapshot Although the direction of the EH project has shifted more prominently towards agentic governance as opposed to purely enabling individuals to band together and attain representation on a larger, more impactful scale, we are in support of seeing the agentic vision play out. Reduction of the total delegation amount to 100k enables further experimentation—plus we believe the EH team has attained strong enough goodwill on Arbitrum over the past year. ### [Wind Down the MSS + Transfer Payment Responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x1de2707ab4cf792721544a8f82eee98535c16ce437ba2ac95a78c85c20b6d8b0) Vote: Wind down the MSS Type: Snapshot Allowing the MSS to be deprecated due to the existing issues is in our opinion a fair step. The AF is likely the best entity to take on this role for the time being, however, measures regarding transparency and proper disclosure should be top of mind for the AF. Since the AF is already involved in aspects like compliance checks for various payment programs, they should easily be able to adopt the MSS responsibilities. And in the future, a transition should be made for this system to run under the jurisdiction of the OpCo. ### [Reallocate Redeemed USDM Funds to STEP 2 Budget](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xfd373c58adbb013a05c778b71ccffb19e5bbefb8a100232f67eced33c58e22f7) Vote: For Type: Snapshot Mountain Protocol unwinding makes the redemption of these funds obviously necessary. Since the capital that was allotted to USDM was already a part of the STEP program, we are in favor of rolling over the capital to STEP 2. ### [Updating the OpCo Foundation’s Operational Capability](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x65b2b835f03bc18aa401b88702145e6b7686e8d7ddddfd956837251f8a7a7da1) Vote: For Type: Snapshot This updated purview for the OpCo in our opinion is a fair extension—regardless of the potential overreach in the responsibilities, as mentioned by many delegates. Our perspective is that the OpCo will function with maximal efficiency if it is given a strong enough degree of flexibility while not undermining transparency. Discretionary spending and authorization to enter into agreements with vendors is well and good—as long as these matters are disclosed in a timely and justified manner. Constraints are also important to prevent excessive operational flexibility. ### [Let’s improve our governance forum with three proposals.app feature integrations](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x38663c36b26252acff6c6ca43663167858f51f960235dc0441bd2ad4a8f66fb1) Vote: Abstain Type: Snapshot The initial post was asking for far too much for this integration, so, purely from a cost perspective, we were intending to vote Against this proposal. However, by the Snapshot phase, the cost was reduced to $60k. At this stage, because the costs aren’t too cumbersome, and the proposal seems to have a degree of merit in making the forums more robust, we are okay with the proposal passing. However, since the grant doesn’t present a surefire need for the DAO, we defer to an abstain vote. ### [DeFi Renaissance Incentive Program (DRIP)](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/13050485773425645466153415888358064378805606653363056526521393182333458879398?govId=eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4) Vote: For Type: Onchain Like in the Snapshot phase, we voted in favor of this proposal. There are too many incentive proposals that have failed to deliver long-term value to the DAO. Notably, STEP and LTIPP had some successes, but they could have been run more effectively. Namely, it’s very hard to determine whether or not a program has done well if the measures of success are difficult to surmise. Isolation of the different seasons to specific key areas of concern, like loop strategies or depth on xyz lending markets, makes assessing the efficacy of a program far easier. A large-scale incentive program introduced far too many confounding variables, which can be significantly controlled for if incentives are tranched over time and over disparate sectors. ### [Arbitrum Treasury Management Council - Consolidating Efforts](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xfab795313df4ef1023c5f7f9027857637cc3841d62dc0b54796fbfa5f8096919) Vote: For Type: Snapshot It seemed inevitable that a consolidation effort would eventually take place. Aggregation of the STEP, TMV, and GMC makes logistical sense. The OAT oversight aspect for the executing bodies is also an important inclusion. We are in support of reduced fragmentation and overhead—and are therefore in favor of this shift. ### [[Constitutional] AIP: Remove Cost Cap on Arbitrum Nova](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xeb044e3bdeba71e74dea02abeab4c33fe4bf5ab9def50082863702d5e2112b93) Vote: For Type: Snapshot Nova has solely become a cost sink for the AF. There was a spike in activity for Nova a couple of years ago when the Reddit team launched their rewards program on Nova since it was fast and cheap. But now, with the presence of new innovations like Orbit chains, the value proposition of a technology like Nova has since diminished. We are therefore in favor of removing the subsidies for Nova. ### [[CONSTITUTIONAL] Register the Sky Custom Gateway contracts in the Router](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/71020107401388505040510993373598301285550678565865201408741893567942851985019?govId=eip155:42161:0xf07DeD9dC292157749B6Fd268E37DF6EA38395B9) Vote: For Type: Onchain Since the Offchain Labs team is willing to collaborate with the Sky folks on implementation of this proposal, we are in favor of it. Ideally, proposals like this, and the previous Rari proposal, should not have to pass through an entire onchain vote—but we are sympathetic about the restrictive requirements around custom gateway contract inclusions. In a different forum post, we outlined potentially new approach that would make this process more seamless: - 1. Projects submit their custom gateway and L2 token contracts to OCL for a technical review to confirm compatibility with the Generic Custom Gateway Router, bridge security standards, etc. Community feedback on Sky’s proposal emphasized that delegates preferred that OCL was consulted as opposed to consulting the whole DAO, with most delegates having minimal to no key feedback on the proposal. - 1. Projects must attain an audit (like RARI was reviewed by OpenZeppelin and Sky by ChainSecurity) for their custom gateway and L2 token contracts, verifying security and compliance with Arbitrum’s bridge standards. - 1. After pre-validation by OCL and auditors, the project team can post a proposal with the stated stamps of approval so that delegates have an easier time conducting a review. ### [[Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/94423886836435773843507976898262621297544156552971145658873213763398017341229?govId=eip155:42161:0xf07DeD9dC292157749B6Fd268E37DF6EA38395B9) Vote: For Type: Onchain Ideally, quorum reductions do not occur simply because security is of paramount importance. A moving target when it comes to such an important parameter is unideal. However, after revising much of the ARDC data, it’s clear that issues around quorum margin are increasing especially with increases in supply. We are therefore—albeit reluctantly—in favor of this proposal. ## May Delegate Incentive Program ​The UADP received May delegate incentives from the Arbitrum DAO’s DIP. A total of 8k ARB was sent to our multisig (0x8326D18edfC50B4335113C33b25116ec268FF3fE). This amount is based on a couple of criteria: snapshot participation, onchain participation, communicating rationale behind the votes, and productive forum conversation, based on the quality of the feedback provided on the forums. ---
**Author:** ![Juanbug](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/juanbug/32/9251_2.png) [@Juanbug](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/Juanbug)\ **Post date:** [July 31, 2025, 10:17am UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-arbitrum-delegate-program-uadp-communication-thread/22185/29 "2025-07-31T10:17:21Z")
# July 2025 Voting Updates ### [Audit Committee Technical Expert Elections](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x131574819442cb6da293795ee9faeec4754a5af664b535b654b3d9d3d53f47e1) Vote: Gustavo Type: Snapshot After considering the options, we felt Gustavo was the most qualified candidate. This was a close decision. ### [Extend AGV Council Term and Align Future Elections with Operational Cadence](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xd7529f75df21183d0eb9bce0cc828d56e9a100f449857c16177d98db6497cc16) Vote: For Type: Snapshot We are supportive of this proposal as it aligns a responsible allocation of resources within the Arbitrum ecosystem. The outlined goals present a clear path to fostering innovation, increasing on-chain activity, and strengthening Arbitrum’s position as a leading L2. We appreciate the transparency and thoughtful design behind this proposal and believe it will drive meaningful long-term impact. ### [Arbitrum Research and Development Collective V2 - Extension](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x765b297702f21736e7b52c23d781dc76968519fef9c7b1ca1f924d167b2a6899) Vote: Don’t Extend Type: Snapshot We are voting NO on the proposed extension of the ARDC as the ARDC has outlined its objectives and activities, the measurable outcomes from its initial phase remain limited. There is insufficient evidence that the work produced has led to much actionable insights, protocol improvements, or tangible value for the Arbitrum ecosystem. We recognize the contributions of the ARDC members to date but believe this proposal requires more demonstrated value, clearer accountability, and stronger alignment with community priorities before additional funding is warranted. ### [Entropy Advisors: Exclusively Working with the Arbitrum DAO, Year 2 and Year 3](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x320cd2a99a0544184c06e1bd305aab1fc226ab0b498e077bc857a07045194f43) Vote: For Type: Snapshot Since Entropy has demonstrated their caliber during their initial engagement with Arb DAO, we see their renewal as an overall positive. Yes, it is a bit costly, but we struggle to see other teams who have as much subject matter understanding of the DAO. A multi-team committee may not be the best idea either since that increases the degree of coordination needed to facilitate the Entropy mandates. As the OpCo is being finalized, Entropy will be a strong facilitator. We also appreciate the funding terms, with vesting clauses and KPI-based milestones. ### [[Constitutional] AIP: Update the Upgrade Executors](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xc08147e229fa642ee7da2e5180f225122b8c517024902f21cdcd02b376179b8d) Vote: For Type: Snapshot This is a straightforward Yes on our end. The executeCall function helps upgrade the execution process. ### [[CONSTITUTIONAL] Register $BORING in the Arbitrum generic-custom gateway](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x586de5bf366820c4369c041b0bbad2254d78fafe1dcc1528c1ed661bb4dfb671) Vote: For Type: Snapshot After supporting similar proposals with Sky and RARI, we are also voting in favor of this proposal. We’ve previously mentioned interest in seeing the DAO follow a more seamless process for these token registrations. L2Beat recently posted a proposal along this vein that we are supportive of. Coordination with OCL and AF for these initiatives will be important. ### [Updating the Code of Conduct & DAO’s Procedures](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xd3d164905fee7dfd8516db6150a97f7f91cf6f9377f614fa6a82333c4fb20546) Vote: For Type: Snapshot After the trial run of the code of conduct procedures, the mentioned alterations based on anecdotal evidence are good to see. We had mixed feelings around the removal of the Responsible Voting Policy, however. The presence of lobbying services adds complexity to this matter, for sure. However, as a simple ethical standard, a type of responsible voting directive should still be in place. Enforcement is difficult, but it could be done on the DIP front, where folks who detach themselves from a baseline level of principles are omitted from the DIP. Apart from that, disclosures are just part of basic decorum. ### [[Constitutional] AIP: Disable Legacy Tether Bridge](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xd5a66f784523841511f7ffec4171b9c14404fdbf7c205086312084d19c95c193) Vote: For Type: Snapshot Tether has effectively pushed for the adoption of USDT0, and so, the presence of the legacy USDT bridge doesn’t make much sense. We’ve seen concerns around the fact that the new omni-chain token is based on the LayerZero OFT standard. It doesn’t really seem to matter if Arb DAO thinks the OFT token is reliable or safe—that’s besides the point. It’s more-so a matter of removing the now irrelevant USDT bridge, which makes sense as there’s practically no upside to keep it. ### [Consolidate Idle USDC to the ATMC’s Stablecoin Balance](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x95a85f5d3d82215793ba9771ff06610d2ba9e2eaf58cdba904d7a9cb5b8bdc94) Vote: For Type: Snapshot Latent funds utilized more productively is a favorable direction to take. Simply letting the funds rest elsewhere is imprudent, and the opportunity cost should be analyzed. That being said, it should be more clear how the DAO utilizes leftover budgets or deprecated committee capital. It’s disorganized to make these decisions purely on an ad hoc basis. ### [Entropy Advisors: Exclusively Working with the Arbitrum DAO, Y2-Y3](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/37638751032596392177176596241110468090299645534448966767963399982622616318705?govId=eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4) Vote: For Type: Onchain As per our support of the Entropy team in the Snapshot phase, we are voting in favor of this proposal onchain as well. ## June Delegate Incentive Program ​The UADP did not receive any rewards for the month of June. ---
**Author:** ![AbdullahUmar](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/abdullahumar/32/7920_2.png) [@AbdullahUmar](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/AbdullahUmar)\ **Post date:** [September 3, 2025, 3:37am UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-arbitrum-delegate-program-uadp-communication-thread/22185/30 "2025-09-03T03:37:19Z")
# August 2025 Voting Updates ### [[Non-Constitutional] - Updates to the DIP, The Complete 1.7 Version](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x008f190725018c3db0e6464bf31d44f09a4d7773fd1486dff0c52c27b8aba289) Vote: For Type: Snapshot In favor of these amendments to the DIP. Over the last few months, we’ve seen more and more delegates drop out and be less active as the requirements were increasingly difficult to qualify for. This should hopefully reverse this recent trend, and the different tiers and scores are more reasonable. ### [[CONSTITUTIONAL] Register $BORING in the Arbitrum generic-custom gateway](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/97685288731263391833044854304895851471157040105038894699042975271050068874277?govId=eip155:42161:0xf07DeD9dC292157749B6Fd268E37DF6EA38395B9) Vote: For Type: Onchain As per our support of this vote in the Snapshot phase, we are voting in favor of this proposal onchain as well. ### [[CONSTITUTIONAL] Remove Cost Cap, Update Executors, Disable Legacy USDT Bridge](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/51852039695020109312343918128899814224888993575448130385109956762385891284115?govId=eip155:42161:0xf07DeD9dC292157749B6Fd268E37DF6EA38395B9) Vote: For Type: Onchain Firstly, combining the three proposals that each went through their individual Snapshots is a strong operational step due to the existing issues around reaching quorum. This is especially the case with Constitutional votes. We voted in favor of all of these proposals at the offchain level and are therefore compelled to vote in favor of this aggregated vote. - Cost cap reduction for Nova makes sense largely due to the lackluster activity on the platform and the corresponding expense cuts for the AF. - Upgrading executors makes operational sense; no qualms there. - Continuity of the customary tether bridge does not make sense if the Tether team itself is moving to USDT0 and if liquidity is now concentrated in the latter token. ### [[CONSTITUTIONAL] AIP: ArbOS Version 50 Dia](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x33754da4006d0ef38666ec5d5e85fd0966a891a594ab9dc21f23beedea2d330b) Vote: For Type: Snapshot We support ArbOS 50 Dia because it keeps Arbitrum One and Nova aligned with Ethereum’s upcoming Fusaka upgrade while introducing important improvements to security, stability, and developer usability. The inclusion of cryptographic upgrades (such as secp256r1 precompile and MODEXP input bounds) ensures compatibility with Ethereum standards and reduces the risk of consensus issues. At the same time, the transaction gas cap promotes fairer blockspace usage, making the network more resilient during periods of high demand. ## July Delegate Incentive Program ​The UADP did not receive any rewards for the month of July. ---
**Author:** ![Juanbug](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/juanbug/32/9251_2.png) [@Juanbug](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/Juanbug)\ **Post date:** [October 1, 2025, 4:02am UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-arbitrum-delegate-program-uadp-communication-thread/22185/31 "2025-10-01T04:02:46Z")
# September 2025 Voting Updates ### [Revert the Delegate Incentive Program (DIP) to Version 1.5](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xb1a39a0b7543e03cbb7aca0213448f4fbed4cbf1157fcb1b2458540fb452bc73) Vote: Order from top to bottom—Abstain, Keep current, Revert, Sunset Type: Snapshot We are erring on the side of Abstain for this vote, while putting sunsetting the program towards last preference, because the presence of some type of DIP is better than none. Our team voted in favor of the v1.7 vote because as it currently stands, incentivizing voting weight does make sense. But we do recognize that this, terminally, is imperfect. There should be efforts to balance the weight of the DIP given to large voters and also to smaller members of the community who show their contribution through active ideation and discussion. If the program were to revert or stay the same, we would not have a significant preference towards either, but are just a bit more inclined towards 1.7—for the time being. Again, it’s important to look at where the DAO stands from a standpoint of what activities are most vital to incentivize. ### [[CONSTITUTIONAL] AIP: Security Council Election Process Improvements](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xb41324ddcc115d08149b192e0b8ae4cfad0ef39cecb5663ea63d8a460d2cb3cc) Vote: Voted For all options, except for “Allow members to bypass nominee” Type: Snapshot Reduce Qualification Threshold: In our opinion, a smaller amount of votable ARB should not be a disqualifying criterion. Reducing this parameter from 0.2% to 0.1% makes sense. Candidate and Member Key Rotations: Very reasonable justifications pop up that necessitate key rotation. This should not be a blocker, especially for already existing members. Having this flexibility in our opinion increases security, given effective procedural oversight. Increased Cohort Duration: This makes sense since the members of council don’t have to politic back and forth during shorter spans of time. It is much easier to ensure the job-to-done is primarily focused on as opposed to trying and getting elected with high frequency. Bypassing Nominee: Especially if longer terms are in place, we believe that competition among applicants should start from a level playing field. ### [Sept 2025 Security Council Nominee Selection](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/council/security-council/election/4/round-1) Vote: ⅓ to each Gauntlet, Cyfrin, Immunefi Type: Security Council on Tally We divided our voting power into thirds among the above three candidates. Our team has in some capacity or another, across a handful of different protocols, worked with each of the providers. All three of the teams have a strong reputation in the space, and we are confident that they’ll make for great additions to the next cycle of voting in this security council election. Each of the representatives has the technical capabilities required for admission, and all of them have a track record and brand to uphold, thereby incentivizing them to participate with care. ### [Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x15d7bef4adb076e13fbbc0941543eb93cff9512e2c83ada0498ef1df290c67a5) Vote: For Type: Snapshot Although there are aspects around the implementation component of this proposal, we are fine with supporting the utilization of these funds for earning additional return and supporting the growth of DRIP. We hope that a more robust communication plan and strategy materializes around this, though. ## August Delegate Incentive Program ​The UADP will receive August delegate incentives from the Arbitrum DAO’s DIP. The payment has not yet been executed by the DIP team as of time of commenting. ---
**Author:** ![AbdullahUmar](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/abdullahumar/32/7920_2.png) [@AbdullahUmar](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/AbdullahUmar)\ **Post date:** [October 31, 2025, 4:29am UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-arbitrum-delegate-program-uadp-communication-thread/22185/32 "2025-10-31T04:29:06Z")
# October 2025 Voting Updates ### [AGV Council Compensation Calibration: Benchmark for Next Term & Startup-Phase Bonus](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x2cffe228c7c8f1b57fb3140ed4d2a8f194f655e551c54177091bdcec43357fe3) Vote: None Type: Snapshot We supported none as we thought both other options were premature without a full operational cycle’s performance data. The Council was still in its startup phase, and the DAO had limited visibility into the true workload, effectiveness, and impact of the new compensation framework. Choosing None signals a preference for data-driven calibration after proven execution, ensuring accountability and avoiding setting a precedent of mid-term pay adjustments without sufficient benchmarking or community feedback. ### [[Constitutional] AIP: DVP Quorum](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xc5f06144fa92aaff99e0e44482ab6f7a3f6486dfb6c854d16271399ffcf895e6) Vote: For DVP Quorum Type: Snapshot We are in favor of this option because it makes quorum requirements more realistic and representative of active governance participation. The current model ties quorum to the total token supply, much of which is undelegated or inactive, creating unnecessary friction for legitimate proposals. Moving to a DVP based quorum ensures decisions reflect the voices of those actually engaged in the DAO’s governance process. This change promotes smoother proposal execution without compromising legitimacy. ### [Oct 2025 Security Council Elections](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/council/security-council/election/4/round-2) Vote: ⅓ to each Gauntlet, Cyfrin, Immunefi Type: Security Council on Tally Similar to our nominations, we divided our voting power into thirds among the above three candidates. Our team has in some capacity or another, across a handful of different protocols, worked with each of the providers. All three of the teams have a strong reputation in the space, and we are confident that they’ll make for great additions to the next cycle of voting in this security council election. Note that there are other candidates like ZackXBT that we strongly believe should be on the council, however, given they are almost certainly going to be voted in without our votes, we reserved our limited voting power for others. ### [AGV Council Compensation Calibration: Benchmark for Future Council Terms](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xdfdf56e53e2a77968c2c124be9210a5f33cb2261cca00e1d6b04f8bb6dfa626d) Vote: Abstain Type: Snapshot From the information that we were able to aggregate from a couple of sources, this proposal’s ask to increase the council compensation seems fair for the corresponding workload. We do want to see strong deliverables here, as so far, there has been lackluster output since program inauguration. The “GV Startup Phase: Scoped vs Actual Council Workload” table in the proposal also demonstrated more clearly the increased workload that is required. However, we don’t feel entirely comfortable allocating further compensation yet until more clear and transparent deliverables are published. We would like to first see a year in review with tangible projects/allocations from the AGV–we are okay with retroactive funding in the event of sufficient outputs. ### [[Temperature Check] Should we try a Delegate Incentive Program like the Arbitrum Triple Dip?](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xb9e775ba4f1fa8cdc8e45c342428c3dabff7f19ce7b8cc4bde7cc6c8e542d963) Vote: Against Type: Snapshot A stab at a new form of DIP is appreciated since this is well-thought. But the new framework risks amplifying bureaucracy and subjectivity, especially within the PRS component, where delegates are expected to assess each other’s work with little standardization. Peer review without a codified rubric will inevitably devolve into popularity-based voting or self-reinforcing cliques, producing results no more objective than the current system. Note, we do agree that the current subjective analysis by a single entity is not perfect. However, replacing SEED with an open-sourced review mechanism is not a significant improvement. Plus, adding layers of evaluation every month will further dilute attention and quality. We honestly cannot afford more of that. ### [The DAO Incentive Program (DIP 2.0)](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x44dedacbdae958904427db9ee93065917f57f50b71b4e87a94a318de18df399b) Vote: Against Type: Snapshot There are elements of this proposal that are similar to the Triple DIP. Namely, our concern starts with the complexity and increased gatekeeping with the peer-to-peer assessment model. The requirement that delegates and contributors must join a newly created peer assembly via a vouching system before becoming eligible for rewards introduces a gatekeeping layer that risks excluding capable actors and discouraging broader participation. It also adds undue complexity. Also, the consolidation of delegates and contributors into the same umbrella may blur roles and create misaligned incentives. By making the same assembly responsible for both roles and linking rewards across multiple tracks like voting, recognition, nudges, it becomes unclear whether the program will incentivize quality deliberation and oversight or simply volume and self-promotion. ### [Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/57495998481040869152703890521939307107269690440073097268210566577740258992963?govId=eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4) Vote: For Type: Onchain In line with our snapshot vote, we are voting in favor of this proposal. We hope to continue supporting initiatives that turn idle capital into active investments, abiding by the newly delivered IPS from the Entropy team. ## September Delegate Incentive Program ​The UADP was eligible for 1,061.93 USD worth of rewards in September. ---
**Author:** ![Juanbug](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/juanbug/32/9251_2.png) [@Juanbug](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/Juanbug)\ **Post date:** [December 2, 2025, 5:25pm UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-arbitrum-delegate-program-uadp-communication-thread/22185/33 "2025-12-02T17:25:50Z")
# November 2025 Voting Updates ### [AGV Council Compensation Calibration: Startup-Phase Bonus for Current Council Members](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x23702e34d0ffdabe6e17315f81daaf4119a36d108326473a6e063a35da5ba281) Vote: For Type: Snapshot Give enough support on the last benchmarking vote for the AGV to pass, we see the argument for a start-up phase bonus due to the non-trivial and meaningful upfront work needed to get this started. ### [AIP: Raise the gas target, min L2 base fee, & implement improvements to the pricing algorithm](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x4a96a91d162975de0d402b83ca8b8a24e808ca357150120fc0d44ae0bf1cc4a5) Vote: For Type: Snapshot No concerns here, pretty straight forward operational vote. We are in support. ### [Tim Chang reconfirmation for AGV council](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x2253b8cdf0d483adf4dd1e9c4a9f473184a51a0ee3e8e826371c203f376edbc6) ### [John Kennedy reconfirmation for AGV council](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x0a3a7b84c7c01cc0feb8a7fad662cbf1f5aeb1b089b205ce412e2bc01d99c504) Vote: Abstain & Abstain Type: Snapshot No strong opinions here. We would have liked to see a re-election process for this vote ideally but are not very concerned with this. ## October Delegate Incentive Program ​The UADP was eligible for 1,084.57 USD worth of rewards in October. ---
**Author:** ![AbdullahUmar](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/abdullahumar/32/7920_2.png) [@AbdullahUmar](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/AbdullahUmar)\ **Post date:** [January 6, 2026, 10:41pm UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-arbitrum-delegate-program-uadp-communication-thread/22185/34 "2026-01-06T22:41:46Z")
# December 2025 Voting Updates ### [[Constitutional] AIP: Activate ArbOS 51 (Dia) and Gas Pricing Updates](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/53154361738756237993090798888616593723057470462495169047773178676976253908001?govId=eip155:42161:0xf07DeD9dC292157749B6Fd268E37DF6EA38395B9) **Vote:** **For** **Type: Onchain** Just as we voted in favor of this proposal in the Snapshot phase, we also voted For it onchain. ### [AGV - 2026 Council Elections](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x12bad84219d04c54cd72231ad8fe883499e85c14762919a06aaa7a251d64b8da) **Vote:** **50% JoJo, 50% Chris** **Type: Snapshot** Our reason for splitting voting power 50/50 among JoJo and Paper was because we sought a balance of opinion in the AGV council. JoJo has been actively involved with the existing team and is therefore acclimated with the operations and personnel. Paper, on the other hand, brings a strong sense of accountability and honesty which the DAO needs for oversight purposes. ### [Rewarding Active Delegates (RAD) Program](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xa06500740b56c647f25bd3edba80bf05b00140afe99d6b0d27c0f1dc93287901) **Vote:** **For** **Type: Snapshot** Relative to the previous proposal around delegate incentives, this one ultimately goes back to the basics, primarily around operations and inclusion criteria. Omission of more complex components like the social reference system previously proposed compelled us to vote in favor here. As disclosure, the UADP is likely a beneficiary of this initiative. ## November Delegate Incentive Program ​The UADP did not receive any rewards for the month of November. ---
**Author:** ![Juanbug](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/juanbug/32/9251_2.png) [@Juanbug](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/Juanbug)\ **Post date:** [February 3, 2026, 4:31am UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-arbitrum-delegate-program-uadp-communication-thread/22185/35 "2026-02-03T04:31:12Z")
# January 2026 Voting Updates ### No Votes for this Month ## December Delegate Incentive Program ​The UADP did not receive any rewards for the month of December. ---
**Author:** ![AbdullahUmar](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/abdullahumar/32/7920_2.png) [@AbdullahUmar](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/AbdullahUmar)\ **Post date:** [March 4, 2026, 12:48am UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-arbitrum-delegate-program-uadp-communication-thread/22185/36 "2026-03-04T00:48:20Z")
# February 2026 Voting Updates ### [[Constitutional] DVP Quorum for ArbitrumDAO: Implementation & Parameters](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x3ac48360cb2cf6f921e391a97416a53c8ca442e3a621a9f7bb406719a8f8034d) Vote: For Type: Snapshot With the current level of DAO activity, we think this change makes sense to calculating quorum. ### [[Constitutional] DVP Quorum & Proposal Cancellation ](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/112177996398925212273579485756315626637025938627124330171390356044681347897430?govId=eip155:42161:0xf07DeD9dC292157749B6Fd268E37DF6EA38395B9) Vote: For Type: Onchain Both of the alterations in this proposal are worthwhile. The state of governance has generally been on the downtrend, so the DVP model makes more sense than total votable supply, which was easier to justify closer to TGE + during a more optimistic market when entities are more engaged in voting/delegating. Proposal cancellation also makes sense for operational ease. ## January Delegate Incentive Program ​The UADP received ~$930 in January. ---
**Author:** ![Juanbug](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/juanbug/32/9251_2.png) [@Juanbug](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/Juanbug)\ **Post date:** [March 31, 2026, 2:56pm UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-arbitrum-delegate-program-uadp-communication-thread/22185/37 "2026-03-31T14:56:53Z")
# March 2026 Voting Updates ### [Automate the Consolidation of Idle Funds into the Treasury Management Portfolio](https://snapshot.org/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x703ef86b79590b07f770dd2369666085e112e2a8998a7e2f8011ed755611968c) **Vote:** **For** **Type: Snapshot** We voted in favor of this proposal because idle funds sitting in various program wallets generate zero yield and carry a clear opportunity cost. Routing surplus funds into the ATMC portfolio puts them to work without sacrificing governance control, as each deployment still requires OAT approval and the DAO retains clawback ability. As long as transparency standards are met, we are good with this request. ### [March 2026 Security Council Nominee Selection](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/council/security-council/election/5/round-1/candidate/0xeEe3Fb3B792C7DDbB6aEF0C440FBC621f4d6fe2D) **Vote: 1.32M ARB to Certora** **Type: Election** Our entire voting lot went to Certora for the nominee selection round. We believe that their team is highly competent from a protocol security perspective. The UADP members have personal experience interfacing with Certora in other DAOs as well and can vouch for their professionalism. ### [Updating the Code of Conduct & DAO Procedures to Become Living Documents](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xf78c223115031090b918ea09fa585d340718a426a21eb1556d81d19892e10b39) **Vote:** **For** **Type: Snapshot** The major alterations to the CoC make logical sense to us. A living document and optimistic amendments reduce unnecessary governance overhead. We are relatively indifferent on the shielded voting mechanism. Not making the CoC a constitutional amendment also makes sense for enabling any potential flexibility where needed. Over time, de facto rules could become crystalized, however. ### [[Constitutional] AIP: ArbOS 60 Elara](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x04d6219c392f3f6187779f609d6cad21e3b3d6091809355ad12ba6bb39b55834) **Vote:** **For** **Type: Snapshot** We see no issues with this upgrade and are in support of the proposal. It ensures fairer fees and increased network capacity and provides developers with the ability to create high-performance applications. Specifically, fine-tuning the L2 base fee is an exciting update for helping Arb optimize revenue. We are curious to see how that design space evolves. ## February Delegate Incentive Program ​The UADP received ~$118 in Ferbuary. ---
**Author:** ![AbdullahUmar](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/abdullahumar/32/7920_2.png) [@AbdullahUmar](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/AbdullahUmar)\ **Post date:** [April 30, 2026, 5:12pm UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-arbitrum-delegate-program-uadp-communication-thread/22185/38 "2026-04-30T17:12:35Z")
# April 2026 Voting Updates ### [Improvements to the Arbitrum Audit Program](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xa8d3dbf1b6cbe81847b5165da5d194d2fc554ae223f6ccf77f53c3fdecc6987e) Vote: For Type: Snapshot We see no issues with these improvements and are in support. The flexible alignment and pilot program are all logical additions. ### [Transfer 6,000 ETH and Idle Stablecoins from the Treasury to the Treasury Management Portfolio](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x25877ad1de4b9232af7a744dbd9ffb1b023c385aaf15c96c5b016859926416a2) Vote: For Type: Snapshot It makes total logical sense to move these assets over to the actively managed portfolio. No concerns. ### [April 2026 Security Council Member Election](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/council/security-council/election/5/round-2) Vote: 670k ARB to Certora & Michael Lewellen Type: Election Our votes were divided 50/50 between Certora and Michael. We gave our full weight to Certora during the Nominee election but have split our votes during this round since Michael had previously reached the voting threshold. The UADP members have personal experience working with both Certora and Michael in other DAOs and are confident in their ability to be Arbitrum security stewards. ### [Transfer 6,000 ETH and Idle Stablecoins from the Treasury to the Treasury Management Portfolio](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/86654545843645364200491220873325841239317939837732580673532485559601859962180?govId=eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4) Vote: For Type: Onchain Following in line with our Snapshot vote, we are in support of ensuring capital is made as productive as possible. The additional eth and accrued usdc, allocated to the treasury portfolio, is therefore advantageous. ## March Delegate Incentive Program ​The UADP received $1,900 in March. ---
**Author:** ![Juanbug](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/juanbug/32/9251_2.png) [@Juanbug](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/Juanbug)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2026, 2:32am UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-arbitrum-delegate-program-uadp-communication-thread/22185/39 "2026-06-01T02:32:28Z")
# May 2026 Voting Updates **[Approve Release of Frozen ETH](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xb32581468bece42245fa267ea86156a621ae77f61bb866118189b5d50155b051)** Vote: For Type: Snapshot We support approving the release of the frozen ETH into the DeFi United recovery process. The ETH in question represents proceeds tied to the exploit, and the Arbitrum Security Council’s rapid immobilization of those funds created a real opportunity for governance to reduce user harm rather than leave affected markets in limbo. Directing the recovered ETH toward the coordinated remediation effort is the most practical route to restoring rsETH backing and helping users across Arbitrum and the broader DeFi ecosystem who remain exposed to losses, trapped positions, or ongoing interest accrual. **[[Constitutional] AIP: Amended Release of Frozen ETH Pursuant to Court Order](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/71236395575275509514809232906539225896862899916501711888027988560774655719183?govId=eip155:42161:0xf07DeD9dC292157749B6Fd268E37DF6EA38395B9)** Vote: For Type: On Chain Our opinions have stayed constant since the snapshot and still now. We are voting yes in compliance with the mandated court order, and hope the situation can be resolved quickly and efficiently. ## April Delegate Incentive Program ​The UADP received $924.11 in April. ---
**Author:** ![AbdullahUmar](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/abdullahumar/32/7920_2.png) [@AbdullahUmar](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/AbdullahUmar)\ **Post date:** [July 3, 2026, 5:42pm UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-arbitrum-delegate-program-uadp-communication-thread/22185/40 "2026-07-03T17:42:23Z")
# **June 2026 Voting Updates** ### **[Continued Funding for the Arbitrum Foundation](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x56c7306391fa75a295fc2b63d9e80090bc7a42677bbd07f105a89f76c31778a3)** **Vote:** **For** **Type: Snapshot** Despite funds being pulled from the DAO’s investment portfolio, we voted in favor of this proposal due to the required sustenance of the AF. The goal of diversifying out of the native ARB token and into alternative assets must be coupled with a long-term perspective that prioritizes compounding treasury funds. Significant withdrawals such as this hamper the capital to benefit from time in the market. ### **[[Constitutional] AIP: Minimize Arbitrum Nova](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x002b8264f83d19f88d17dc48a92d1e92638285a6592c491255fa7b14c955da81)** **Vote:** **For** **Type: Snapshot** Nova’s lack of usage and existing overhead justifiably warrants reducing its prioritization. ### **[Continued Funding for the Arbitrum Foundation](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/21861170607500194610699142421898826942478361357343425061227227766726035674989?govId=eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4)** **Vote:** **For** **Type: Onchain** Despite some concerns around prudent treasury utilization, which diminish the effects of compounding, and in line with other delegates’ points on more granularity around the request, we have voted For this proposal onchain as the AF stands as a critical stakeholder in making sure Arbitrum functions effectively. ### **[Extending DRIP’s Mandate](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xa69fce8c756ac96160ddb6ac09653d3254415d046fdd43e5876663e9f343f183)** **Vote: For** **Type: Snapshot** This is a deadline extension rather than a fresh ask, pushing the mandate end date from July 2026 to July 2027 with no additional funding and the unspent ~63.7M ARB still sitting with the Foundation under Season Selection Committee approval. We are comfortable granting that runway given Season 1’s track record, which delivered the strongest cost-effectiveness ratio of any major Arbitrum incentive program to date alongside a substantial increase in yield-bearing stablecoin supply on the network. We would rather the committee take the time to align Season 2 with the strategic developments it referenced than force 15-20M ARB into a weaker campaign on the original timeline. Our main ask is simply that the committee follow through with a concrete Season 2 design and timeline now that the program has another year to operate. ### **[[Constitutional] AIP: Transition Arbitrum One ordering policy to Priority Gas Auctions (PGA)](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xb380013efad355a9888561e1a108f0e6344f2e39c11087bb9043378d14ecec4d)** **Vote: For** **Type: Snapshot** We are in support of sunsetting Timeboost in favor of a priority gas auction. Timeboost’s ahead-of-time express lane saw participation thin out over time and posed a barrier for newer primitives that depend on cheap, frequent, priority inclusion, while a per-transaction priority fee model is already familiar to the searchers and arbitrageurs operating across other EVM chains. Importantly, the sequencer retains its private mempool, so the change does not introduce sandwiching or frontrunning, and the anti-starvation mechanism gives low and zero priority fee transactions a path to timely inclusion so the new revenue is not extracted at the expense of ordinary users. With 97% of priority fees routed to the DAO treasury and the operator’s parameter discretion bounded and revocable by governance, we view this as a net positive for both Arbitrum’s revenue and its competitiveness for latency-sensitive activity. As this is the temperature check, we anticipate confirming in line on the subsequent on-chain vote. ## **May Delegate Incentive Program** ​The UADP received $1,136.61 in May. ---
**Author:** ![Juanbug](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/juanbug/32/9251_2.png) [@Juanbug](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/Juanbug)\ **Post date:** [August 2, 2026, 4:00pm UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-arbitrum-delegate-program-uadp-communication-thread/22185/41 "2026-08-02T16:00:32Z")
### **[AGV Wind-Down: Structured Transition & Return of Capital to the DAO Treasury](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x05dcd430c800d5cd0763cd2424033739abab0f3117ee7423d90f59ef56f9b41d)** **Vote: For** **Type: Snapshot** We support the structured wind-down and the return of roughly 143.7M ARB of AGV’s original 225M allocation to the DAO treasury. From a capital allocation standpoint, venture capacity parked against a consumer and gaming thesis the ecosystem has moved past is better recycled into the treasury where it can serve current priorities, and the structured approach preserves the value of the capital already deployed rather than forcing an untidy exit. Narrowing the remaining mandate to managing the existing portfolio plus selective follow-ons, executed by OpCo under OAT oversight, keeps the residual book inside existing accountability structures instead of standing up new machinery for a shrinking program. We would like to see transparent reporting on the reserves retained for portfolio management and outstanding obligations through the end of 2026, with any further surplus returned to the treasury as it frees up. ### **[[Constitutional] AIP: Automate Timeboost Proceeds Split](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x5b67a2c7c8f9b0e4ee46d2e7e9d580c90b069e0bbf8ed1a1e025a372886aabc4)** **Vote: For** **Type: Snapshot** This hard-codes the 97/3 Timeboost proceeds split the DAO already ratified, routing bid proceeds on Arbitrum One and Nova through an on-chain fee splitter instead of requiring a fresh 30-plus day governance vote each time the Developer Guild’s share needs to be transferred. Automating an already-approved distribution is straightforward operational hygiene, removing recurring governance overhead and the risk of a manual transfer being delayed or missed, while keeping the ADG portion at a Foundation-controlled address so the existing oversight is unchanged. We see no new risk surface being introduced here, and enforcing the split on-chain keeps Arbitrum’s ordering-related revenue handling consistent as those products evolve. As this is the temperature check, we anticipate confirming in line on the subsequent on-chain vote. ### **[Fast Feed: Constitutional AIP](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xe98ec21fc4212d98ef86d513b69e24c7d082359d735632bb4e4d9df3e857fde9)** **Vote: For** **Type: Snapshot** The Fast Feed turns early visibility into the sequencer’s ordered transaction stream into a subscription product, with proceeds split 97/3 between the DAO treasury and the Developer Guild through the same on-chain RewardDistributor framework the DAO just ratified for Timeboost proceeds. We like that the value of low-latency data gets captured by the DAO instead of accruing quietly to whoever runs the fastest infrastructure, and that access stays open since anyone willing to pay the subscription receives the same feed. Because the stream only publishes transactions after their order is fixed, it adds no new frontrunning or sandwiching surface and leaves ordering, inclusion guarantees, and user fees untouched. Pricing parameters sit with Offchain for two years while the DAO alone retains control over the revenue split, which we consider an acceptable balance for a new product finding its market, and the paid-only model is a sensible DoS mitigation. In line with our vote on the PGA transition, this rounds out a coherent set of ordering-related revenue products for the DAO. ### **[OAT Elections](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xf2ca6637ad74a993354006def22c1e2a64468c269883616353e0c9fe8b4f4fd4)** **Vote: 33.33% each to Jojo, Rika Goldberg, A.J. Warner** **Type: Election** We split our weight evenly across three candidates for the Oversight and Transparency Committee, backing the applicants whose governance track record and independence we were most confident in for the oversight mandate. An effective OAT depends on members willing to interrogate execution, spending, and reporting rather than defer to it, and we would rather concentrate our support on a shorter slate we have real conviction in than spread it thin across the field. Weighting the three equally gives each of them the best chance of clearing the threshold for a seat. ### **[[Constitutional] AIP: Ratification of Security Council Election Process Improvements](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xe9373b2226ab14005ae14075953e5755448d7ac7dc61a21a9c1d51dcae427e42)** **Vote: For** **Type: Snapshot** This package ratifies four of the five Security Council election process changes floated last September, and each is a sensible efficiency fix. A two-year cohort with annual rather than semiannual elections cuts the recurring fatigue the every-six-months cadence imposes on candidates and voters alike, the lower 0.1% Nominee Selection threshold protects the candidate pipeline as votable ARB moves around, and the key-rotation allowances during the compliance phase and mid-term close an operational gap that had forced emergency workarounds. Dropping the fifth item, an incumbent bypass of Nominee Selection, is the right read of where delegate sentiment landed, and the completed Trail of Bits audit gives us confidence in the underlying code changes. We support the temperature check and would expect to confirm on the subsequent on-chain vote. ### **[[Constitutional] AIP: ArbOS 61 Elara](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/7191014407719621170610709569285477750369874509305441081488686529382763374426?govId=eip155:42161:0xf07DeD9dC292157749B6Fd268E37DF6EA38395B9)** **Vote: For** **Type: Onchain** The Elara upgrade is a routine Nitro protocol bump for Arbitrum One and Nova, and the case to support it is clean. The jump from ArbOS 60 to 61 exists only because Sepolia testing caught two interacting gas-refund bugs whose fix modifies the State Transition Function, and neither One nor Nova was ever exposed since ArbOS 60 was not activated on them, which is the catch-it-on-testnet discipline we want to see before a mainnet upgrade. We also agree with leaving Dynamic Pricing off for now, since Offchain Labs and Entropy Advisors made a defensible call that Arbitrum’s multidimensional gas implementation should converge with Ethereum’s eventual spec rather than diverge ahead of it, avoiding a heavier long-term maintenance burden, and the performance tradeoffs at 100ms blocktimes argue for taking more time. With the scope otherwise unchanged from the reviewed Elara release, we support activation. ### **[[Constitutional] AIP: Ratification of Security Council Election Process Improvements](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/99505320587245662570748490045867467578602042886347829693486500764737017017943?govId=eip155:42161:0xf07DeD9dC292157749B6Fd268E37DF6EA38395B9)** **Vote: For** **Type: Onchain** This is the on-chain ratification of the Security Council election process improvements, confirming the position we took on the temperature check. It carries forward the same four changes from the September 2025 review: a two-year cohort with annual rather than semiannual elections, the lower 0.1% Nominee Selection threshold that protects the candidate pipeline as votable ARB moves around, and key-rotation allowances during the compliance phase and mid-term that close an operational gap which had forced emergency workarounds. All four are backed by the completed Trail of Bits audit, and the fifth item, an incumbent bypass of Nominee Selection, was already dropped in response to delegate feedback, so we are comfortable confirming these changes on-chain. ## **June Delegate Incentive Program** ​The UADP received $1,194.94 in June. ---
**Author:** ![AbdullahUmar](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/abdullahumar/32/7920_2.png) [@AbdullahUmar](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/AbdullahUmar)\ **Post date:** [August 28, 2026, 1:08am UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-arbitrum-delegate-program-uadp-communication-thread/22185/42 "2026-08-28T01:08:15Z")
# **August 2026 Voting Updates** ### **[Arbitrum Security Program](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x666a31ac239818a8b90f9d5784adad5974009fe6254da9c3be7f39aed57391bc)** **Vote: For** **Type: Snapshot** We backed the continuation of the Arbitrum Audit Program into the broader Arbitrum Security Program. The AAP earned this extension: it surfaced and remediated real vulnerabilities before they reached mainnet and pulled a meaningful share of net-new teams onto Arbitrum, which is the kind of subsidised security that converts directly into ecosystem value. The reframed program widens the mandate across the full security lifecycle, from AI-assisted pre-screening through the audit itself, the bug bounty, and Security Council support, and it does so without a new treasury request, running instead on the roughly $1.76M USDC and 25M ARB the Foundation already holds. The operational tightening around it, a right-sized $2.5k monthly technical retainer, a lightweight optimistic approval path for program changes, and quarterly reporting, keeps overhead in proportion to the work. Extending a proven program that lowers a real cost barrier for early teams, on funds already allocated, is an easy one for us to support. ### **[[Constitutional] AIP: Authorize Priority Gas Auctions and Establish the Fast Feed](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/104933844856336554027758452704713321330340501652892001249184191934279866979282?govId=eip155:42161:0xf07DeD9dC292157749B6Fd268E37DF6EA38395B9)** **Vote: For** **Type: Onchain** We voted in favor of this constitutional AIP, which combines two already-temperature-checked actions into a single atomic on-chain execution. The first swaps Timeboost for Priority Gas Auctions as Arbitrum One’s ordering policy and sunsets Timeboost on Nova, moving ordering onto transparent, per-transaction priority fees. The second stands up the Fast Feed, a paid, permissionless data stream that delivers ordered transactions and metadata to authenticated subscribers ahead of the standard per-block sequencer feed, turning low-latency ordered data into revenue for the chain. Each component cleared its own Snapshot temperature check, and the on-chain proposal simply carries those mandates into one combined payload with the post-vote implementation updates folded in, so we are comfortable supporting it. Given the atomic single-payload execution, our one ask is that those incorporated implementation changes stay clearly documented against the versions the temperature checks approved. ## **July Delegate Incentive Program** ​The UADP received $708.76 in July. ---
**Author:** ![Juanbug](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/gov.uniswap.org/juanbug/32/9251_2.png) [@Juanbug](https://gov.uniswap.org/u/Juanbug)\ **Post date:** [September 29, 2026, 8:32pm UTC](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-arbitrum-delegate-program-uadp-communication-thread/22185/43 "2026-09-29T20:32:27Z")
# **September 2026 Voting Updates** ### **[Banning projects identified in the high-severity Watchdog Program cases - Good Entry](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x472fb3b40d3df9b1a65de03b85e4867a76f7b1ec014e2d69f347256b0d08184c)** **Vote: For - Ban Good Entry** **Type: Snapshot** We supported this ban. The Watchdog Committee documented 142,839 ARB reaching 1,032 ineligible wallets across and beyond the STIP window, together with self-farming traced to addresses connected to the team, and the response to being asked about it was a refusal to engage. Due process was observed in the way that matters to us: a public window to contest the findings was open on the forum, it closed unused, and no ARB came back. A grants regime only holds if the DAO is willing to act once a case is documented to this standard, and declining to act on a file this clear would signal to every future applicant that non-cooperation is a workable strategy. With the entity already wound down, what the exclusion actually constrains is the people behind it rather than an operating business, and that is what carries forward. ### **[Banning projects identified in the high-severity Watchdog Program cases - Limitless](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x57e83d4df2139ff67626852cf2693146318492cc973ba5084a2a2625e78578a9)** **Vote: For - Ban Limitless** **Type: Snapshot** Grant money leaving the chain altogether is a different category of failure from grant money being spent badly, and this is the former. The team converted 75,000 ARB of its LTIPP award into USDC and moved it to Base, so the incentives it was funded to distribute never reached Arbitrum users at all. Once a project has bridged its award away and then become uncontactable, there is very little left for the DAO to weigh: no team member could be found to put another reading on that sequence, the reply window closed without a word, and none of it was repaid. We were comfortable voting to make the exclusion permanent. ### **[Banning projects identified in the high-severity Watchdog Program cases - APX Finance](https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xddcea6a783aaabce1d616508999078e45ca95932b2b536c0620a9f5e57fa1899)** **Vote: For - Ban APX Finance** **Type: Snapshot** This case matters most of the three in practical terms, because APX Finance is the only one of the projects not described as having ceased operating, so the ban carries forward effect rather than standing as a mark against a closed company. The file totals 239,714 ARB across three separate behaviours: an on-chain sybil cluster traced back to addresses the team controls, a substantial share of the award never leaving team treasuries for the contracts meant to hand it out, and what did move going out behind schedule. Individually each might be argued as sloppiness; set side by side, the pattern is program money being handled as though it were the team’s own working capital. The committee reached nobody, the reply window expired unanswered, and none of the award came back. Removing them from eligibility for future ArbitrumDAO programs is the proportionate response. ## **August Delegate Incentive Program** ​The UADP received $471.96 in August. [Previous page](https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-arbitrum-delegate-program-uadp-communication-thread/22185.md?page=1)