My recollection is that the UNI tokens issued to Uniswap Labs as part of startup compensation was that 21.5% were intended to be non-voting (obvious conflict of interest when % community was relatively low).
My general Socratic response is what is the behaviour you wish to incentivise?
- the list is already filtered for activity so the 2.5M is not payment for voting …
- should there be a minimum as delegate? It takes 1M to make a vote able proposal so if we want every delegate to be able to issue say a vote of no confidence censuring another for misfeasance, then you need sufficient group of minority to get to that threshold;
- if you want to measure outputs, you could look at metrics such as length of post relative to holdings so if you got millions of UNI and not being visible compared with delegate with just a few thousand … so rewarding
posting activity / holdingswould encourage more feedback - however you also want the performance metric to be resilient to gaming … If some idiot starts throwing ChatGPT into the gov channels just to get more UNI, then quality of discourse suffers
- how do you encourage thoughtful feedback (or even measure it)
- normal voters should signal their “trust” in delegates so perhaps consider the number of supporting votes relative to holdings? (But then VCs can concentrate on a corporate lobbyist)
- if you want diversity of views (eg LPs and Devs are relatively underrep) then you need to give UNI to delegate platforms which are not clustered near to existing ones
- long-term sustainability … Without clawing back UNI from passive delegates, some future date the issuance may need to reduce;
Another way to look at it is like functional electoral college, and you are reallocating growth into seats which are more representative but this needs careful thought given perception that investors can swing the votes if they really wanted.